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INTRODUCTION: 
Corporate Governance has become a global phenomenon in recent times. The stages 
of development of Corporate Governance and its systems synchronize with the 
evolution of the economy, corporate structure, political and legal developments of a 
country. In India, studies about Corporate Governance have been focusing on its 
divergent issues and varying methodologies. Prior to the economic reforms of 1992, 
the development of Corporate Governance in India was slow, but post liberalization 
rapid strides have been made in its development to^copverge with global practices. 
This paper extends the existing literature on Corporate Governance, firstly by 
constmcting a Corporate Governance index and then finding its relationship with 
financial performance using cross sectional and panel regressions.The study also 
covers other mechanisms of Corporate Governance and Board structures. 
This study is organized as follows. 
Chapter 1 describes the evolution of Corporate Governance, its theoretical cum 
regulatory framework and development of indices. Chapter 2 provides a detailed 
discussion on the relationship between Corporate Governance and financial 
performance with a focus on index based studies. It also details studies on Board 
structures and other mechanisms of Governance. Chapter 3 details the methodology 
used in the construction of governance index and sub indices. It provides details of 
data and usage of statisfical and econometric techniques with Tobin's Q, MVBV and 
ROA as proxies for financial performance. Methodologies related to other 
mechanisms of CG have also been included here. Chapter 4 discusses the results of 
the study and compares it with the findings of other researchers. The data analyses 
contain individual year wise and combined analyses of five years. The regressions 
include multiple, pooled, fixed effects, random effects and dynamic panel data models 
with different control variables. Chapter 5 provides the conclusions and points out the 
implications of the study with directions for further research. 
CHAPTER 1: Introduction to Corporate Governance: 
This chapter covers the Origin and development of Corporate Governance; 
Definition, Theories and Models of Corporate Governance; Development of 
regulatory framework; Issues in Corporate Governance; Coiporate Governance 
indices and firm perfomiance; Development of Corporate Governance in India and 
Indian mode! of Corporate Governance. 
1.1 Definition of Corporate Governance: 
There is no universal definition of Corporate Governance. In this regard the objective 
of studying various definifions is to come to an understanding of what constitutes 
good governance, quantificafion of the attributes and its implications on firni 
performance. The following defintion captures the current essence of Corporate 
Governance. 
The Financial Times Lexicon (2010) defines Corporate Governance as "How a 
company is managed, in terms of the institutional systems and protocols meant to 
ensure accountability and sound ethics. The concept encompasses a variety of issues, 
including disclosure of information to shareholders and board members, remuneration 
of senior executives, potential conflicts of interest among managers and directors, 
supervisory structures, etc". 
1.2 Theories of Corporate Governance: 
Various theories have been developed describing the various phenomenon of 
Corporate Governance and some of the important theories which fonn the basis of 
this study are Agency theory. Stewardship theory. Resource dependence theory. 
Stakeholder Theory, Managerial Hegemony Theory etc.. 
Agency theory: This theory is about the conflicts that arise between the Principal and 
the Agent because of differences in the goals resulfing in additional costs to the firni 
thereby eroding the wealth of the finn and its shareholders 
Stewardship theory: Stewardship theory has a more social-oriented perspective and 
non-economic assumptions on Coiporate Governance. The dominant non-monetary 
motive, which directs managers to accomplish their job, is their desire to perform 
excellently because their reputations are at stake (Davis et al, 1997; Burkart, Gromb, 
&Panunzi, 1997). 
Resource dependence theory: This theory focuses on the resources, the directors can 
provide to the firm for its effective operations and profitability 
Stakeholder Theory: Stakeholder is a terni originally introduced by the Stanford 
Research Institute (SRI) referring to "those groups without whose support the 
organization would cease to exist". 
5) Managerial Hegemony Theory: Managerial hegemony theory states that CEOs 
and Management dominate the boards of directors resulting in passive roles for NED 
and independent directors (Mallete & Fowler, 1992). 
1.3 Models of Corporate Governance: 
Depending upon the business practices, customs and culture, the process of Corporate 
Governance differs from country to country. Besides, the variety of capitalism in 
which countries are embedded with, explains the considerable variations in Corporate 
Governance models around the world. The important models are 
1) The Anglo American model 
2) The Gennan Model and 
3) The Japanese Model 
The Indian Model is a hybrid model based on the Anglo American and German 
models. 
1.4 Issues in Corporate Governance: The issues in Corporate Governance are 
ethical. Accountability and efficiency. 
1.5 Corporate Governance in India The Corporate Governance history in India can 
be disfinctly bifurcated, based on the inifiation of economic reforms in the year 1992, 
into two distinct historical time periods: pre 1992 era and post 1992 era. 
Current Indian model of Corporate Governance: 
It is a hybrid model based on Anglo-American and Gernian models. Unlike the dual 
class system prevalent in US, single class is the dominant model prevailing in India. 
This model can be best described by grouping businesses in India in the following 
way. 
^ Highly dispersed shareholding and professional management (L&T, ICICI 
Bank, Infosys). 
> The founder, his family, and associates closely hold the company and exercise 
maximum control over the activities of the company (Tata group-Birla group. 
Reliance group, Wipro etc). 
> Public sector with government ownership and professional management (SBI, 
ONGC, BHEL, etc). 
> Multinational corjwrations (ABB, HUL, Siemens, etc). 
1.6 Development of Corporate Governance regulatory framework in India: 
The regulatory framework is mainly modeled on the lines of Cadbury committee 
report of 1992 and Sox Act of 2002.Indian CG laws for listed firms are enunciated by 
the Companies Act, 1956 and SEBI's listing agreements, primarily the Clause 49. 
Development of Corporate Governance Indices: 
All over the world an objective assessment of Corporate Governance practices is by 
developing metrics. Metrics in the form of an index facilitates better assessment and 
monitoring of the Corporate Governance practices of a firm. 
A Corporate Governance index, in its simplest fonn, is a tool summarizing in a 
measurable forni, the various Corporate Governance factors which influence the 
performance of a finn. It is an indicator to benchmark the Corporate Governance 
quotients of companies, and through it the capital markets of countries. 
CHAPTER 2: Literature Review 
The literature review covers studies about developed and emerging markets. Section 
2.1 details fmn level cross country studies about the relationship between Coiporate 
Governance and firm's financial perfonnance (LLSV, 2002; Amman et al.. 201 land 
others). Section 2.2 covers country/finn specific studies about the relationship 
between Corporate Governance index and financial performance (Gompers et al., 
2003; Brown & Caylor, 2006; Aggarwal & Williamson, 2006; Garay & Gonzales, 
2008 and others). These studies elaborate the development process of CG indices, 
using both binary and weightage methods. The positive relationship between 
Corporate Governance and financial perfonnance is well documentd in these Studies. 
This section also covers other mechanisms of Corporate Governance such as 
promoters' holding, issue of ADR/GDRs etc. Section 2.3 deals with studies by 
Yemiack (1996); Singh and Harianto (1989); Elsayed (2007); Bliss (2011); Jensen 
and Meckling (1976); Dalton et al., (1998) and others about Board structures 
comprising of Board size, CEO Duality and Board independence. Section 2.4 covers 
studies about internal and external mechanisms of Corporate Governance. Section 2.5 
deals with studies about Corporate Governance in India. From the point of Index 
based studies, there have been two studies so far (Mohanty, 2003 & Balasubramanian 
et al., 2010). Board structure studies in India include Jackling and Johl (2009); Kaur 
and Gill (2008); Mayur and Saravanan (2008); Lange and Sahu (2008); Dwivedi and 
Jain (2005). Studies about promoters" holding by Sarkar and Sarkar (1999 and2005); 
Kumar (2005); Pattanayak (2008) have been included in this section. 
CHAPTERS: Research methodology: 
Section 3.1 discusses the need for the present study. Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 discuss 
respectively, the objectives, hypotheses and data description. Section 3.5 discusses the 
methodologies adopted and parameters considered in the computation of governance 
index. 
3.1 Need for the present study 
a) Corporate Governance and financial performance: A number of studies to 
explore the relationship between Corporate Governance, as measured by index and 
firm performance have been conducted both in developed countries and in emerging 
markets. However, in India on this aspect, only two studies-1) Balasubramanian et al., 
(2010) covering the year 2005-06 and 2) Mohanty (2003) covering the year 2002, 
have been carried out. Therefore, there is a dearth of index-based studies on 
Corporate Governance in India. Mohanty" s (2003) study is on general Corporate 
Governance attributes with a focus on stakeholders (Customers, society, employees 
and others). It does not cover any of the regulations of clause 49 which came into 
force in the year 2000. The study of Balasubramanian et al., (2010) is a survey based 
one. This kind of studv has its limitations. Moreover, this was conducted prior to the 
amendment to clause 49 of the listing agreements which came into force from T' 
January, 2006. The amendment reflects many of the provisions of the post Enron's 
SOX Act, 2002. As these studies cover only one year period, dynamics of the 
relations between Corporate Governance and firni value using panel data could not be 
examined. 
Apart from the Corporate Governance Index based study, this study covers other 
individual attributes of Corporate Governance mechanisms and financial 
performance. 
b) Board size, Board independence and CEO duality and firm values: Some 
research studies in Indian context about board size, board independence and CEO 
duality are; Jackling and Johl's (2009) study covering a period of one year (2005-06) 
about large companies; Lange and Sahu's (2008) study covering a period of 3 years 
from 2005 to 2007 of NIFTY 50 companies; Kaur and Gill's (2008) study covering a 
period from 2001to 2006; Dwivedi and Jain's (2005) study covering a period of 
5years from 1997 to 2001.The findings of these researchers are mixed. Hence there is 
a need to revisit the issue. 
c) Promoters' holding and firm performance: The ownership structure influences 
the Corporate Governance and firm values. Khanna and Palepu (1999) and Pattanayak 
(2008) report that the insider ownership has positive and significant impact on firm 
value. Sarkar and Sarkar (1999, 2005); Saravanan (2009) invesUgate the relation 
between promoters' shareholding and its impact on firm values. The first study of 
Sarkar and Sarkar reports a non-linear relationship between promoters' holding and 
firm values. On the other hand, in their second study, they find that promoters' 
holding has no impact on firm values in case of low growth firms while it has positive 
impact on firm values for high growth firms. Saravanan (2009) studied the Corporate 
Governance characterisfics of Family Owned (not less than 51% shareholding) and 
Non-Family Owned businesses of India. He documents that value of the firni as 
measured by Tobin's Q is not affected by type of the firm. The results of these studies 
are ambiguous. Therefore, it warrants closer scrufiny. 
d) Other governance mechanisms: Corporate Governance is affected by the size and 
sector of the firm and listing on foreign bourses. There have been few studies in India 
on these aspects. Kumar (2005) and Pattanayak (2008) have used sales as a proxy for 
finn size in their study about ownership structures and fimi values. Mohanty (2003), 
Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) have used log of assets as a control variable. To the best of 
my knowledge, the impact of GDR/ADR on finn valuation has only been examined 
by Balasubramanian et al., (2010). Again no study has been conducted on the non-
linear relationship between CGI and Financial performance in India. The present 
study aims to examine these issues. 
There is a boom in the Indian Economy. Business fmns are pursuing growth strategies 
acquiring foreign firms. In the recent past there has been financial crisis in US and 
Europe affecting the economies of many countries of the world, including India. All 
these have a profound impact on the Governance processes, warranting a fresh study. 
3.2 Objectives of the study 
a) To examine the relationship between Corporate Governance index and firm 
values/ performance of companies as measured by Tobin's Q, MVBV and ROA. 
b) To ascertain whether the relationship between Corporate Governance index and 
firm values is linear or not. 
c) To assess the impact of Board structures comprising of Board size, Board 
independence, CEO Duality on firm values as measured by Tobin's Q. 
d) To explore the relation between sales, assets and margin on firm performance/ 
valuation. 
e) To investigate the relationship between promoters' holding and financial 
performance as measured by Tobin's Q. 
f) To examine the differences in valuation/ perfonnance across manufacturing and 
services sectors as measured by Tobin's Q, MVBV and ROA. 
g) To ascertain the differences in performance/ valuation between large tangible 
and small tangible asset intensive companies. 
h) To examine the impact of sales differentials on firm performance/ valuation. 
i) To examine the differences in fimi values/ perfonnance between the firms 
which have issued ADRs/GDRs and those which have not. 
3.3 Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses have been evaluated: 
Hoi: There is no relationship between Corporate Governance index and financial 
perfonnance as measured by Tobin's Q, MVBV and ROA. 
H02: There is no relationship between sales and financial performance as measured by 
Tobin's Q, MVBV and ROA. 
H03: There is no relationship between assets and financial performance as measured 
by Tobin's Q, MVBV and ROA. 
H04: There is no relationship between margin and financial performance as measured 
by Tobin's Q, MVBV and ROA. 
Hos: There is no relationship between promoters' holding and financial performance 
as measured by Tobin's Q, MVBV and ROA. 
H06: The relationship between Corporate Governance index and financial 
perfonnance measured by Tobin's Q is not linear. 
H07: There is a no relationship between the Board size and firm values as measured 
by Tobin's Q 
Hos: The number of independent directors in the board composition does not impact 
finn performance measured by Tobin's Q. 
Ho9: CEO duality has no impact on firni value. 
Hio: There is no difference in financial performance/ valuation across sectors. 
Hii: There is no difference in firm valuations/ perfonnance between large tangible 
asset companies and small tangible asset companies 
H12: The impact of sales differential on financial performance/ valuation is non-
existent. 
H13: Margin differentials cast no influence on valuation/ perfonnance of the finns. 
H14: There is no difference in finn valuations/ perfonnance between finns which have 
issued Depository receipts and which have not. 
3.4 Data description and sample 
The study comprises of BSE 100 index companies. The sample period is five years 
from 2004-2008. The data required to construct Corporate Governance index and 
board structure and composition were obtained 1) Company web sites 2) SEBl 
EDIFAR site 3) NSE/BSE web site and 4)Commercial agencies like Report junction, 
Cygnus etc. The financial data used in the study has been obtained from the data base 
of Centre for Monitoring of Indian Economy (CMIE).The data consisted of sales, 
assets, and promoters' holding, EBIT, book value of debt and Market price of equity 
shares. For the purposes of uniformity all financial data is for the month ending 
December of the particular year. Some of the companies were eliminated from the 
sample due to non- availability of data. The number of companies that formed the 
sample, ranged from 78 to lOO.The number of companies in the years 2004, 2005, 
2006, 2007 and 2008 were 78, 83, 91, 96 and 100 firms respecfively. In all, 448 firm-
years observations were available. 
3.5 Methodology adopted in analyzing the relationship between Corporate 
Governance index and financial performance 
3.5.1Construction of Corporate Governance Index 
This has been done in three stages. First stage consisted of the selecfion of parameters 
which form the basis of Governance index. Second stage consists of assigning binary 
values-'r for positive factor of governance and '0' otherwise. Finally computation of 
the index scores for each year for each firm over the 5 year period was done. 
3.5.1.1Selection of parameters for this research study 
21 parameters have been considered in this research study for the computation of 
overall Corporate Governance index. The reasons for selecting 21 parameters are: 
a) The reporting of these parameters in the Annual reports has been consistently 
available which facilitated panel data analysis. 
b) They are uniform across all the sectors and all firms. 
The 21 parameters have certain commonality with the parameters considered by 
researchers like Balasubramanian et al., (2010) who have considered 49 parameters in 
their survey and some of them are privy in nature or not mandatory. In the 
Governance index constructed by Mohanty (2003) almost all the parameters are not 
the reporting requirements of clause 49 of the listing agreement, old and revised. 
Perhaps this is the reason for the same not being considered in the survey of 
Balasubramanian et al., (2010).These 21 parameters have been categorized into the 
following four sub-indices. 
1 Board structure index 
Bl-Attendance-75% and above; B2-Board meetings 5 and above; B3-
Remuneration/compensation committee composed of fully independent directors; B4-
Nomination committee exists; B5-Attendance of each Director is indicated in the last 
Annual General Meeting. 
2 Auditing systems index 
Al-Totally independent audit committee; A2-Audit committee attendance-75% and 
above; A3-Audit committee meetings 5 and above; A4-No Qualified audit report .ie 
no adverse remarks from the statutory Auditors regarding financial statements. 
3 Investor management & Disclosures index 
II- The composition of investors' Grievance committee consists of independent 
directors; I2-Firm puts annual/quarterly financial statements on web; I3-Share holding 
pattern indicated; 14- Not accused of insider trading; I5-Provision of postal ballot 
facility; 16-No significant changes are made in accounting policies impacting sales 
and profits 
4 External Control Mechanisms index 
El- Listing on foreign bourses including its parent company; E2- Existence of 
Whistle Blower policy; E3- Issuance of ESOPS to its employees and Directors; E4-
Whether Management Discussion and analysis report is a part of annual report;E5-
Whether disclosures of materially significant related party transactions have been 
indicated;E6- Whether disclosure of condngent liabilities, which are likely to impact 
on the f jture, is made 
Each finn was studied for Corporate Governance practices based on the above 
mentioned parameters. Score of 1 was assigned in case the company was adopting a 
particular parameter or the reply is affirmative, if not 0 score was assigned. Thus each 
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firm could score a maximum of 21 and a minimum of 0 depending on the firm's 
Corporate Governance practices. This fonned the basis f3r overall Corporate 
Governance index of a firm. Thus the overall Corporate Governance index is the sum 
of values of each sub index. 
BRD-IND + ADT-IND + INV-IND + ECM-IND=5+4+6+6=21 
Based on this method Corporate Governance indices have been computed for each of 
the firms belonging to the BSE 100 index of the Bombay stock exchange for each 
year over a five year period from 2004-2008. 
3.5.2 Estimation methods: The correlation between dependent variables Tobin's Q, 
MVBV and ROA have been low/medium. Hence separate multiple regressions using 
these dependent variables have been conducted. The independent variables considered 
in the multiple regressions are CGI index, Log sales, Log assets. Margin and 
promoter's holding. The regressions also include sales, asset, margin, GDR and sector 
dummy variables. Sector dummy is set to one if the firm belongs to manufacturing 
sector and '0' otherwise. Assets have been divided into two groups based on the 
median value of assets. Asset dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above 
median asset group and '0' otherwise. Similarly based on the median values of sales 
firms are divided into two groups. Sales dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the 
above median sales group and '0' otherwise. Based on the median values of margin 
(EBIT/Sales) firms are divided into two groups and Margin dummy is set to one if the 
firm falls in the above median margin group and '0' otherwise. Companies which 
have issued ADRs/GDRs /FCCBs have been identified. GDR dummy is set to one if 
the firm has issued depository receipts and '0' otherwise. 
To analyze the non linear relafionship of CGI, multiple regressions of Tobin's Q on 
CGI index, CGI square. Log sales, Log assets, margin and promoter's holding have 
been conducted. To analyze fiarther the association between CGI and Tobin's Q, 
companies were sorted on the basis of the CGI score. The mean CGI score was used 
to divide the companies into two groups; one above mean and other below the mean. 
To analyze the relationship between the components of Board structures and firm 
performance, regressions of Tobin's Q on Board size, Board independence, CEO 
duality, Log sales. Log assets, margin and promoter's holding have been run. 
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Diagnostic test of regression consisted of multi-coUinearity, hetroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation. Mutli collinearity was diagnosed using correlation and variance 
inflation factor. VIF values less than 10 have been considered (Myers, 1999). The 
standard errors were calculated using white's heteroskedasticity-consitent standard 
errors. The hypotheses were tested using usual t- test. 
3.5.2.1 Panel regression: Panel data refers to the combination of time series and cross 
sectional observations. Panel regressions include Pooled, Fixed effects. Random 
effects and Dynamic panel data estimations. 
3.5.2.2 Pooled regression: Pooled regression analysis combines time series for 
several cross-sections and facilitates to test the impact of a large number of dependent 
variables within the framework of a multivariate analysis (Schmidt, 1997). It is 
extensively used in Coiporate Governance and other studies (Kumar, 2005; Black et 
al., 2010). 
The equation for pooled regression 
YrC+pi (log sales) + p, (log assets) + PB (Margm)+ P4 (Pro hol)+ P5 (CGI)+ pe (Sales 
dum) + P7(Asset dum) + Ps (Mrgn dum) + Pg (GDR dum) + Pio (Sect dum) + 8t 
(Eq forCG index...!) 
Tobin's Q =C+pi (log sales) + P2 (log assets) + p3 (Margin)+ p4 (Pro hol)+ P5 ( Log 
brd siz)+ P6(Log brd ind)+ P7(CE0 duality )+8t ( Eq for board structures 2) 
Where: C= intercept; pi, P2, P3 pio are the slopes of the corresponding 
independent variables; s, = error term; Yt = dependent variable (Tobin's 
Q/MVBV/ROA) 
3.5.2.3 Fixed and Random Effects 
In the classic view, a fixed effects model treats unobserved differences between 
individuals as a set of fixed parameters that can either be directly estimated, or 
partialed out of the estimating equations. In a random effects model, unobserved 
differences are treated as random variables with a specified probability distribution. 
Statistically, fixed effects are always a reasonable thing to do with panel data (they 
always give consistent results) but they may not be the most efficient model to run. 
Random effects will give better p-values as they are a more efficient estimator, so one 
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should run random effects if it is statistically justifiable to do so. Random effects 
methods also typically have less sampling variability than fixed effects methods, hi 
general, random effects is efficient, and should be used (over fixed effects) if the 
assumptions underlying it are believed to be satisfied. 
The equations for fixed effects model /random effects model are similar to the pooled 
regression model except for the error term 8t which is substituted with |ii + Ujt..Where 
IJj is the individual error component and Uit is the combined time series and cross-
section error component.However for the selection, between Random and Fixed 
effects models, Hausman specification test needs to be conducted after running both 
these tests. In addition to this Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for 
Random effects are also run. 
Estimation with the panel data has been undertaken by testing the null that all 
intercepts are equal. If this null is accepted then the data is poolable. If the null is 
rejected, Hausman test is applied. If the null is not rejected, random effects are used. 
The equality of the intercept can be tested by using Lagrangian multiplier test for 
random effects developed by Breusch and Pagan. The null here is that there is no 
random effect (Kennedy, 2008). 
3.5.2.4 Dynamic panel data: 
Arellano, Bond, and Bover developed one and two step general methods of moments 
(GMM) estimators for panel data analysis. GMM is usually robust to deviations of the 
underlying data generation process to violations of heteroskedasticity. 
CHAPTER 4: Results and discussions 
4.1 Analysis of results of Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
CGI and financial performance: The analyses of the results and inferences about the 
relationship between Corporate Governance Index and Financial performance are 
based on the cross sectional and panel regressions.The cross sectional regressions are 
that of Tobin's Q/MVBV/ROA on CGI index. Log sales, Log assets, margin and 
promoter's holding. The regressions also include sales, asset, margin, GDR and 
Sector dummy variables. Unreported /-values are based on White's 
heteroskedasticity- consistent standard errors. ***, (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, (5%) and (10%) level. 
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Table 4.1: Summary Table of coefficients of variables for the year 2004 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
_cons 
RSq 
Adj R Sq 
Tobin's Q 
0.892** 
-1.689*** 
-0.625 
0.018 
0.413*** 
0.814* 
0.306 
0.353 
-0.457 
-2.468*** 
4.601 
0.5215 
0.450 
MVBV 
2.122 
-3 491*** 
4.378 
-0.051 
0.806** 
0.814 
0.844 
-0.745 
-1.205 
-3.246 
10.734 
0.1539 
0.1246 
ROA 
0 119*** 
-0.139*** 
0.340*** 
0.001 
0.006 
0.061* 
-0.008 
0.091*** 
-0.033 
0.042 
0.131 
0.7193 
0.5532 
On similar lines, cross sectional regressions for the other four years of the study were 
conducted. 
Panel regressions consisting of Pooled, Random effects and Fixed effects regressions 
were conducted separately for the three dependent variables. These regressions 
suppliment the results of cross sectional regressions. Dynamic panel data estimations 
are also included in the same. The following table reports the summary of these 
regressions 
Table 4.2: Summary of panel data regressions for the years 2004-08 with Tobin's 
Q as the dependent variable 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Pooled 
regression 
0.330** 
-1.525*** 
0.605 
0.021*** 
0.255*** 
Fixed effects regression 
0.465 
-1 957*** 
0.521 
0.019 
0.124 
Random effects 
regression 
0.343** 
-1 537*** 
0.382 
0.020*** 
0.189*** 
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Sales duin 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
cons 
1.080*** 
0.434 
0.318 
-0.112 
-1.098*** 
8.886 
RSq = 0.329 
0.402 
0.533 
0.530 
0.482 
-0.560 
13.342 
RSq 
Within 0.1100 
Between 0.3839 
Overall 0.2725 
0.852** 
0.496 
0.444 
-0.064 
-1 049*** 
9.959 
RSq 
Within 0.0951 
Between 0.4671 
Overall 0.3251 
Hausman and Breusch-Pagan Tests 
Hausman test chi2(10) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-l)](b-B)= 9.76 Prob>chi2= 0.4619 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
chi2(l) = 60.83 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
The tests suggest the appropriateness of the Random effects model. 
On similar basis separate pooled, fixed effects and Random effects regressions have 
been run for MVBV and ROA. The results of Hausman and Breusch-Pagan tests 
indicate that the pooled regression model was found to be appropriate in the case of 
MVBV. Fixed effects model was found to be appropriate in the case of ROA. Final 
conclusions have been drawn considering the results of both cross sectional and panel 
regressions. 
4.2: Results of regressions for different ranges of promoters' holding 
Further analysis of promoters' holding showed that the coefficients of promoters' 
holding is negafive when the holding is between 0-40%, it is positive and significant 
when the holding is between 40-60%, and positive but not significant when the 
holding is between 60-100%. Sarkar and Sarkar (1999, 2005); Pattanayak (2008) 
found such type of changes for different levels of promoters' holding. 
4.3: Results of non-linear relationship of CGI 
To analyze the non linear relafionship of CGI, multiple regressions of Tobin's Q on 
CGI index, CGI square. Log sales, Log assets, margin and promoter's holding have 
been conducted. To analyze further the association between CGI and Tobin's Q, 
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companies were sorted on the basis of the CGI score. The mean CGI score was used 
to divide the companies into two groups; one above mean and other below the mean. 
The results of the regression showed that coefficient values of CGI >mean were 
consistently significant and higher than the coefficient of CGKmean and also they 
were not significant. 
4.4: Relationship between Board Structure and Corporate Governance 
This section deals with the analysis of board structures comprising of Board size, 
CEO duality and Board independence. In the first stage of analysis the results 
supported larger board size. Subsequent panel regressions showed an optimum range 
to be between 9and 20, both inclusive. The results of the same are shown below. 
Table 4.3: Summary of panel data regressions for the years 2004-08 with Tobin's 
Q as the dependent variable 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log Assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
Log brd siz 
Log brd ind 
CEO duality 
_cons 
No of obs 
Prob > F 
Pooled regression 
0.576*** 
-1.108*** 
2.406*** 
0.004 
0.796* 
0.374** 
0.049 
4.200*** 
336 
0.000 
Fixed effects 
regression 
0.338* 
-0.952*** 
2.750*** 
-0.003 
0.656 
-0.110 
0.482* 
6.015*** 
336 
0.000 
Random effects 
regression 
0.482*** 
-1.047*** 
2.304*** 
0.001 
0.794* 
-0.014 
0.218 
c 1jn*^^ 
336 
0.000 
Hausman and Breusch-Pagan tests indicated the appropriateness of Random effects 
model. In the random effects regression, the coefficient of board size is positive and 
significant. The coefficients of board independence and CEO duality are not 
significant. 
Summary of cross sectional and panel data regressions 
Hoi: There is no relafionship between Corporate Governance index and financial 
perfon-nance as measured by Tobin's Q, MVBV and ROA 
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Relationship between CGI and Tobin's Q: The relationship is found to be positive and 
significant in four out of five years of cross sectional regressions. In the random 
effects regression, it is found to be positive and significant. Based on this, it can be 
inferred that the relationship is positive. 
Relationship between CGI and ROA: The relationship is found to be positive and 
significant in four out of five years of cross sectional regressions. It is found to be 
positive and significant in the fixed effects regressions. It implies that the relationship 
is positive. 
As there is a significant positive relationship between Tobin's Q/ROA and Corporate 
Governance, the null hypothesis (Hoi) that there is no relationship between Corporate 
Governance and Financial performance/fimi values measured by Tobin's Q/ROA is 
rejected. However in the case of MVBV the relationship is significantly not 
conclusive. 
The findings of this study are in line with the following researchers who have 
conducted cross sectional studies.Gompers et al., (2003); Brown and Caylor (2006); 
Drobetz, Schillhofer and Zimmemian (2004); Bebchuk et al, (2009); Ammami et al., 
(2011). Black et al., (2006 Garay and Gonzalez (2008); Bai, Liu, Lu and Song 
(2004); Javid and Iqbal (2007). In the Indian context Balasubramanian et al., (2010) 
and Mohanty's (2003) 
In the case of Panel data studies, the findings are in line with Black et al., (2010-
Korea); Ammann et al, (2011); Black et al., (2010-Brazil); Al-Haddad et al., (2011) 
etc. 
However Bhagat and Bolton (2008) find a negative reladonship between Governance 
score and ROA. 
H02: There is no relationship between sales and financial perfomiance as measured by 
Tobin's Q, MVBV and ROA 
Relationship between Sales and Tobin's Q: In the panel data regressions the 
coefficients are positive and significant in the random effects model. In the cross 
sectional regressions it is positive and significant in two years out of five years. Thus 
it can be inferred that the relationship is positive and significant with respect to 
Tobin's Q. Hence the Hypothesis is rejected. 
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MVBV: In the case of MVBV, in cross sectional regressions the coefficients are 
positive in four years but not significant. In panel data regressions the coefficients are 
negative but not significant. Based on this it can be said that there is a weak 
relationship between the two. Hence the hypothesis is not rejected. 
ROA: In the case of ROA the coefficients are positive and significant in all the years 
of the study. In the case of Panel data regressions it is significant in all the three 
models. Based in this, it can be said that the relationship is positive and significant. 
Hence the hypothesis is rejected. 
The findings of this study are in line with the findings of Saravanan (2009); Pant and 
Pattanayak (2008); Friedman (1953) and others. The results are not in confirmance 
with Morey et al., (2010) who find a negative relationship between MVBV and sales 
across all the years of their study. 
H12: The impact of sales differential on financial performance/ valuation is non-
existent* 
Relationship between Sales dummy and Tobin's Q: The coefficients are positive and 
significant in the years 2004, 2007 and 2008. It is positive and not significant in the 
other two years. Similar positive and significant relationship is observed in the 
random effects models. Hausman test and Breusch-Pagan test results indicate the 
appropriateness of random effects model. Based on this it can be said that the 
relationship between sales dummy and Tobin's Q is positive and significant. 
Accordingly the hypothesis is rejected. 
MVBV: In the case of MVBV the coefficients of sales dummy are positive but not 
significant in all the three models of panel data regressions. In the cross sectional 
regressions it is positive in all the years and significant in one year. Hence the 
hypothesis is not rejected. 
ROA: In the case of the relationship between ROA and sales dummy it is positive and 
significant at 10% and 5% levels in the years 2004 and 2005 respectively. In the fixed 
effects model it is negative but not significant. Based on Hausman test, fixed effects 
model is appropriate. It can be infeired from this that there is no association between 
the two and hence the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
Ho3: There is no relationship between assets and financial performance as measured 
by Tobin's Q, MVBV and ROA 
Relationship between assets and Tobin's Q: The relationship is negative and 
significant in all the years of cross sectional regressions and in all the models of panel 
data regressions. Hence the hypothesis is rejected. The findings are consonance with 
Ammann et al., (2011); Aggarwal and Williamson (2006). Black, Kim and Jang 
(2006) attribute such negative relationship to the presence of intangible assets which 
are not recorded in the books. Bhagat and Bolton (2008) find an insignificant 
relationship between these two. The findings of this study are not in line with the 
findings of Balasubramanian et al., (2010) 
MVBV: It is negative and significant in four years and positive and not significant in 
one year. In all the panel data regressions also the coefficients are negative but not 
significant. It can be inferred from this that there is no relafionship between MVBV 
and assets. Hence the hypothesis is not rejected. 
ROA: The coefficients are negafive and significant in all the years of cross sectional 
regressions. It is negative and significant in all the models of panel data 
regressions.This implies that the relafionship between assets and firm perfonnance 
measured by ROA is negative. The hypothesis is rejected 
Hii: There is no difference in firm valuations/ performance between large tangible 
asset companies and small tangible asset companies* 
Relationship between asset dummy and Tobin's Q: The findings of the study show 
that the relationship between asset dummy and Tobin's Q is positive but not 
significant in the entire cross sectional regressions except in the year 2008. Similarly 
in the case of panel data regressions it is positive but not significant in all the three 
models. Based on this it can be inferred that there is no relationship between the two. 
Hence the hypothesis is not rejected. 
MVBV: It is positive and not significant in two years and negative and not significant 
in other years.It is positive and not significant in the pooled model. Hausman and 
Breusch-Pagan tests do not indicate the appropriateness of either fixed effects or 
random effects models implying the appropriateness of pooled model. The results in 
the pooled model being mixed, conclusive inference cannot be drawn. Hence the 
hypothesis is not rejected. 
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ROA: It is positive and not significant in four cross sectional regressions and in the 
other year it is negative but not significant, h is negative and not significant in the 
fixed effects models. The results of Hausman test indicate the appropriateness of the 
fixed effects model. Based on this it can be considered that there is no relationship 
between asset dummy and financial performance measured by ROA. The hypothesis 
is not rejected. 
Ho4: There is no relationship between margin and financial perfonnance as measured 
by Tobin's Q, MVBV and ROA 
Relationship between Margin and Tobin's Q: The coefficients are insignificant 
indicafing that there is no relationship between the two. Hence the Hypothesis is not 
rejected. 
MVBV: The coefficients are insignificant implying that there is no relationship 
between MVBV and Margin. Hence the hypothesis is not rejected. 
ROA: It is positive and significant in three out of five years of cross sectional 
regressions. It is positive and significant in the random and fixed effects model. 
Hausman test indicates the appropriateness of the fixed effects model. Hence it can be 
concluded that there is a positive relationship between ROA and Margin. Hence the 
hypothesis is rejected. 
The results are in conformance with the findings of Kumar (2005); Phillipon (2010); 
Mukodim (2010) and Ammann et al., (2011). 
Hi3: Margin differenfials cast no influence on valuafion/ performance of the finns.* 
Relation between Margin dummy and Tobin's Q: The coefficients are positive but not 
significant in the enfire cross secfional regressions except one year in which it is 
positive and significant at 5% level. Similarly it is found to be positive but not 
significant in the panel data models. Hence it can be inferred that there is no 
relafionship between the two. The hypothesis is not rejected. 
MVBV: The coefficients are negative and insignificant in all the panel data 
regressions. In cross sectional regressions the coefficients are insignificant. Hence the 
hypothesis is not rejected. 
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ROA: It is positive and significant in ail the 5 years and also in all the panel data 
regressions. This shows that there is a positive relationship between ROA and Margin 
dummy. Hence the hypothesis is rejected. 
Hos: There is no relationship between promoters' holding and financial performance 
as measured by Tobin's Q, MVBV and ROA 
Relationship between promoter's holding and Tobin's Q: The results of cross 
sectional regressions of Tobin's Q on promoters' holding show that except for the 
year 2004 the coefficients of promoters' holding are positive and significant. In the 
year 2005, it is positive but not significant. In the panel data regressions the 
coefficient in the random effects model is positive and significant. Hausman test and 
Breusch-Pagan tests confirms the appropriateness of the random effects model. Based 
on this it can be inferred that the relationship between the two is positive. Hence the 
Hypothesis is rejected. 
MVBV: Based on the cross sectional regressions and panel data regressions it can be 
said that there is no relationship between promoters' holding and MVBV. Hence the 
hypothesis is not rejected. 
ROA: Based on the cross sectional regressions and panel data regressions it can be 
said that there is no relationship between promoters' holding and ROA. Hence the 
hypothesis is not rejected. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) in their respecfive 
studies find ownership concentration and firm perfonnance to be unrelated. Klianna 
and Palepu (1999) have found that promoters' holding has a positive and significant 
impact on firm values. Sarkar and Sarkar (2005) found a positive and significant 
impact on firnis in case of high growth firms and no impact on low growth firms. 
Pattanayak's (2008) study provides evidence of the fact that with increase in 
promoter's holding, the firni value inititially increases, and then it declines. 
Ho6: The relationship between Corporate Governance index and financial 
perfonnance measured by Tobin's Q is not linear. 
In the cross sectional studies the assumption is that the relationship between CGI and 
Tobin's Q is linear. However, additional analyses indicate that the relationship 
between the two is not non linear. Hence the hypothesis is not rejected. 
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HOT: There is a no relationship between the Board size and fimi values as measured 
by Tobin's Q 
Based on the analysis of data it is found that the relationship between larger board 
sizes (between 9 and 20) and Tobin's Q is positive and significant. Hence the 
hypothesis is rejected. 
In the Indian context these findings are in line with Jackling and Johl (2009); Lange 
and Sahu (2008); Dwivedi and Jain (2005).The findings are not in line with the 
findings of Kaur and (3111 (2008); Yermack (1996); Eisenberg, Sudgren and Wells 
(1998) and others.Bhagat and Black (2002); Mayur and Saravanan (2008) did not find 
any solid evidence on the relationship between Board size and firm performance. 
Hos: The number of independent directors in the board composition does not impact 
finn performance measured by Tobin's Q. 
Based on the analyses of cross sectional regressions and panel data analysis no 
significant relationship is found except for the year 2006.This implies that the 
proportion of independent directors does not influence firm valuations. Hence the 
hypothesis is not rejected. 
These findings are in line with Kaur and Gill (2008); Lange and Sahu (2008): 
Balasubaramanian et al., (2010) .Findings of Jackling and Johl (2009) are in 
contradiction 
Dalton et al. (1999); Fosberg (1989); Bai et al. (2004), Bhagat and Black (2002); 
Klein (1998) find that the insider/outsider board proportion has no direct relafionship 
to firm perfonuance., 
Ho9: CEO Duality has no impact on firm value 
Based on the analyses of data of cross sectional regressions and panel data 
regressions, it can be inferred that there is no relationship between CEO duality and 
finn valuations. Hence the hypothesis is not rejected. 
This finding is in line with Ponnu (2008); Dalton et al. (1999); Berg and Smith 
(1978); Jackling and Johl (2009) and others. This is in contradiction to the findings of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) who contend that CEO duality is detrimental to finn 
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performance as envisaged in the Agency theory. BHss (2011) finds that CEO duality 
constrains board independence. 
Hio: There is no difference in financial performance/ valuation across sectors. 
Relationship between Sectoral Dummy and Tobin's Q: The coefficients are negative 
in all the five years and negative and significant in one year. It is negative and 
significant in random effects regressions. The Hausman test is indicating the 
appropriateness of the random effects model. One can infer from this that the 
relationship between sectoral dummy and Tobin's Q is negafive, meaning that 
valuations of service sector firms measured by Tobin's Q is relatively higher. The 
hypothesis is rejected. 
MVBV: All the coefficient values are insignificant based on which it can be inferred 
that there are no differences in firm valuations across sectors. Hence the hypothesis is 
not rejected. 
ROA: Coefficient values are positive and significant in the years 2005 and 2008. It is 
positive and not significant in the other years. It is negative but not significant in the 
fixed effects model. Hausman test confirms appropriateness of fixed effects model. 
This shows that Manufacturing firms have a better operafing performance when 
compared to firms in the service sector with respect to this financial measure. Hence 
the hypothesis is not rejected. 
Hi4: There is no difference in firm valuafions/ performance between firms which have 
issued Depository receipts and which have not. 
Relafion between GDR dummy and Tobin's Q: The coefficients are insignificant, 
indicating that there is no relationship between the two in all the regressions. Hence 
the hypothesis is not rejected. 
These findings are in line with the findings of Balasubramanian et al., (2010) in the 
Indian context; Black et al., (2010) in the Korean context. However these findings are 
contrary to the findings of Karoiyi et al., (2006); Reese and Weisbach (2002) who 
show that firms which issued GDRs have positive firm valuations. 
MVBV: It is negative and insignificant in four years. Based on Hausman and 
Breusch-Pagan tests both random effects model and fixed effects models are 
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inappropriate implying appropriateness of the pooled model. In the case of pooled 
model it is negative and significant. Hence the null hypothesis is rejected. 
ROA: The coefficients are positive in 3 years and positive and significant at 1% level 
in one year. It is negative and not significant in 2 years and in the fixed effects model. 
Hausman test is indicating appropriateness of fixed effects model. Overall it can be 
said that there is no relationship between the two. Hence the hypothesis is not 
rejected. 
*In order to draw overall conclusion hypotheses 2 and 12; 3 and 11; 4 and 13 have 
been taken together. 
Summary of Hypothesis testing: Tobin's Q as Dependent Variable 
Hypotheses 
HOI 
H02 
H03 
H04 
H05 
H06 
There is no relationship 
between Corporate 
Governance index and 
financial pertbnnance as 
measured by Tobin's Q, 
MVBVandROA 
There is no relationship 
between sales and 
financial performance as 
measured by Tobin's Q, 
MVBV and ROA 
There is no relationship 
between assets and 
financial perfbnnance as 
measured by Tobin's Q, 
MVBV and ROA 
There is no relationship 
between Margin and 
financial perfbnnance as 
measured by Tobin's Q, 
MVBV and ROA 
There is no relationship 
between Promoters' 
holding and financial 
performance as measured 
by Tobin's Q, MVBV and 
ROA 
The relationship 
between 
Corporate 
Governance 
index and 
financial 
peiformance 
ineasured by 
CGI 
> 
Mean 
CGI 
< 
Mean 
CGI 
Cross-section 
2004 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
2005 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
2006 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
2007 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
2008 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Random 
Effects 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
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H07 
H08 
H09 
HIO 
Hll 
HJ2 
H13 
H14 
Tobin's Q is not 
linear 
SQ 
There is a no relationship 
between the Board size 
and firm values as 
measured by Tobin's Q 
The number of 
independent directors in 
the board composition 
does not impact finn 
perfonnance measured by 
Tobin's Q 
CEO Duality has no 
impact on firm value 
There is no difference in 
financial performance/ 
valuation across sectors 
There is no difference in 
firm valuations/ 
performance between 
large tangible asset 
companies and small 
tangible asset companies 
The impact of sales 
differential on financial 
performance/ valuation is 
non-existent 
Margin differentials cast 
no influence on valuation/ 
performance of the firms 
There is no difference in 
finn valuations/ 
performance between 
firms which have issued 
Depository receipts and 
which have not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
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Summary of Hypothesis testing: MVBV as Dependent Variable 
Hypotheses 
1101 
H02 
H03 
H04 
H05 
HIO 
Hll 
H12 
HJ3 
H14 
Description 
There is no relationship 
between Coiporate 
Governance index and 
tnianeiai performance as 
measured by Tobin's Q, 
MVBV and ROA 
There is no relationship 
between sales and 
financial performance as 
measured by Tobin's Q, 
MVBV and ROA 
There is no relationship 
between assets and 
financial perfonnance as 
measured by Tobin's Q, 
MVBV and ROA 
There is no relationship 
between Margin and 
financial performance as 
measured by Tobin's Q, 
MVBV and ROA 
There is no relationship 
between Promoters' 
holding and financial 
performance as 
measured by Tobin's Q. 
MVBV and ROA 
There is no difference in 
financial perfonnance/ 
valuation across sectors 
There is no difference in 
firm valuations/ 
peiformance between 
large tangible asset 
companies and small 
tangible asset companies 
The impact of sales 
differential on financial 
performance/ valuation 
is non-existent 
Margin differentials cast 
no influence on 
valuation' perfonnance 
of the firms 
There is no difference in 
flnn valuations/ 
performance between 
firms which have issued 
Depository receipts and 
which have not 
Cross-section 
2004 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
2005 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
2006 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
2007 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
2008 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Pooled 
Regression 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
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Summary of Hypothesis testing: ROA as Dependent Variable 
Hypotheses 
HOI 
H02 
H03 
H04 
H05 
HIO 
Hll 
H12 
H13 
H14 
Description 
There is no relationship 
between Coiporate 
Governance index and 
financial perfonnance as 
measured by Tobin's Q, 
MVBV and ROA 
There is no relationship 
between sales and financial 
performance as measured 
by Tobin's Q, MVBV and 
ROA 
There is no relationship 
between assets and financial 
performance as measured 
by Tobin's Q, MVBV and 
ROA 
There is no relationship 
between Margin and 
financial performance as 
measured by Tobin's Q, 
MVBV and ROA 
There is no relationship 
between Promoters' holding 
and financial performance 
as measured by Tobin's Q, 
MVBV and ROA 
There is no difference in 
financial perfonnance/ 
valuation across sectors 
There is no difference in 
firm valuations/ 
performance between large 
tangible asset companies 
and small tangible asset 
companies 
The impact of sales 
differential on financial 
perfonnance/ valuation is 
non-existent 
Margin differentials cast no 
influence on valuation/ 
perfonnance of the finns 
There is no difference in 
firm valuations/ 
perfonnance between firms 
which have issued 
Depository receipts and 
which have not 
Cross-section 
2004 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
2005 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
2006 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
2007 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
2008 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Fixed 
Effects 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
Rejected 
Not 
Rejected 
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CHAPTER 5: Findings and conclusions 
Summary of Findings 
This chapter provides the main findings and draws conclusions from the study: 
1) The Corporate Governance Index is found to be positively related to Tobin's Q 
which is line with the findings of the studies in developed and emerging 
markets, including India. The study reveals that there is a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between Corporate Governance Index and 
financial performance of Indian firms over a period of five years in both cross 
secfional regressions and panel data regressions. The results are also robust to 
different estimation methods. With respect to the financial measure of MVBV 
the relationship was found to be positive but not significant. However 
Balasubramanian et al., (2010) report the relationship with this financial 
measure to be positive and significant. In consonance with the findings of 
Brown and Caylor (2006), the Corporate Governance index is found to be 
positively and significantly related with ROA. The bifurcation of the finns on 
the basis of the mean values of CGI scores suggests that firms belonging to 
below CGI mean scores have no impact on firm valuations. This implies that 
there is a threshold level of governance score beyond which CGI contributes 
positively to firm valuafion. In the Dynamic Panel Data estimations the lagged 
one value of Tobin's Q is positive and significant and the coefficients of 
MVBV/ROA are negative and not significant. 
2) The results show that the relationship between sales and Tobin's Q is positive 
and significant. The relationship between sales dummy and Tobin's Q is found 
to be positive and significant. This implies that firm valuations are relatively 
higher for those finns which have a higher amount of sales. In the case of 
relationship with MVBV, for both the variables of sales and sales dummy, it was 
found to be not significant. The relafionship between sales dummy and ROA is 
positive but not significant. It can be interpreted that higher sales may not 
impact finn performance measured by ROA. 
3) The relationship between assets and firm values show negative relationship with 
Tobin's Q, indicating that finn valuations with lesser amount of assets are 
relatively higher. This could be due to unreported intangible assets in the 
balance sheets or 'e-capitaF (tenn coined by Stanford Economist, Hall, 1993). 
Further, while analyzing the differences in firm values of large and small 
tangible asset intensive companies with Tobin's Q, the relationship was found to 
be not significant which underlines the impact of intangible assets. The 
relationship between asset/asset dummy and MVBV is not significant indicating 
that there is no relationship between the two. However in the case of assets the 
firm performance measured by ROA is negative and significant implying that 
firms having lower assets have higher firm performance measured by ROA. 
4) The results show that the relationship between Margin/Margin dummy and 
Tobin's Q is positive but not significant. In the case of MVBV also the 
relationship is not significant. The relationship with financial measure of ROA 
is positive and significant implying that higher margins of firms results in 
increase in returns on assets. 
5) The study finds that there are no differences in firm valuations measured by 
Tobin's Q between firms which have issued Depository receipts and those 
which have not. This is in line with the findings of Balasubramanian et al., 
(2010) in the Indian context. In the case of MVBV significant relafionship is 
observed. In the case of ROA, the relationship is found to be positive but not 
significant implying that there are no differences in firm performance measured 
by ROA between firms which have issued the Depository receipts and which 
have not issued. 
6) The overall results show that valuation of service sector firnis in comparison to 
manufacturing is higher in terms of Tobin's Q. However the firm valuations 
measured by MVBV and ROA show no significant relationship implying that 
there are no differences between the manufacturing and service sectors with 
respect to these financial measures. 
7) The relafionship between promoters' holding and financial performance proxied 
by Tobin's Q was found to be positive and significant at the overall level. 
However the segmented analyses shows that the relationship is negative when 
the holdings are between 0-40 percent and then turns positive and significant 
between 40-60 percent level and then positive but not significant at higher level. 
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This could be interpreted as being caused by two opposing influences, incentive 
alignment effect and entrenchment effect (Pattanayak, 2008). 
8) Board of directors plays an important role in Corporate Governance. The study 
shows larger board size has a positive impact on firm valuations which is in 
consonance with the findings of Indian researchers like Jackling and Johl 
(2009). Further analysis showed an optimum board size ranging between 9 and 
20, both inclusive, in the Indian context. Brown and Caylor's (2006) study 
indicates a range of 6 to 15 as optimum. Overall, the results of this study reflect 
the nature of the environment in which firms operate in India whereby greater 
board size supports the resource dependence theory. 
9) The proportion of independent directors in the board composition does not seem 
to influence firm valuations. According to Balasubramanian et al., (2010); Kaur 
and Gill (2008); Lange and Sahu; Sarkar and Sarkar (2005), greater board 
independence has no significant influence on firm valuations. While the 
resource dependency theory is valid in case of larger board size, it is not so with 
respect to independent directors being on the board. In contrast, the findings of 
Jackling and Johl (2009) indicate that greater board independence improves firm 
valuafions. 
10) The separation of dudes of the CEO and board chairman has generated many 
discussions across the globe and India is no exception. The analysis of data 
shows that there is no relationship between CEO duality and firm valuations. 
According to Jackling and Johl (2009), "Given the uncertainty of India's 
institutional transitions, the answer to the complex question about the impact of 
CEO duality/Non duality is not obvious". This captures the essence of the 
findings. Chaine and Tohme (2009) find that CEO duality is beneficial when 
there is effective monitoring, thereby alleviafing agency costs associated with 
CEO duality. Thus the notion of separating the roles in a manner consistent with 
agency theory is not supported. 
Implications of tlie study 
This study demonstrates the economic importance of the valuation effect of Corporate 
Governance. Investors can use these indices along with other information about the 
financial performance of firms for making investment decisions. The benefits of a 
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larger board sizes has some synergies and relevance to emerging economies, such as 
India. This will avoid overlapping of functions of directors in the operations of the 
various committees. 
Limitations of the study 
The results of this research study are subject to some limitations that should be taken 
into consideration when generalizing and interpreting the results. 
1) CGI is a single measure of Corporate Governance and there is no unanimity in 
the construction of the Corporate Governance index. Hence the CG index 
suffers from some limitations. 
2) Broader index incorporating CSR attributes would have provided better measure 
of Governance. 
3) The sample size and period of the study are small. 
4) Corporate Governance is influenced by external environmental factors such as 
industry structure, product market competition etc, which this study has not 
considered. 
5) Studies in Corporate Governance are associated with endogeneity concerns. In 
order to overcome the problem, simultaneous equation method suggested by 
Bhagat and Bolton (2008) would have produced better results which have not 
been considered in this study. 
6) Survey methods can capture some good governance practices which are not 
available in the public domain and these have been not considered in this study. 
The research findings must, therefore, be interpreted in the light of the above 
limitations. 
5.4 Directions for furtlier research 
1) Application of simultaneous equation method to study the relationship between 
CGI and firm values: By developing a system of simultaneous equations, where 
all control mechanisms are allowed to affect each other as well as Tobin's Q, 
while at the same time Tobin's Q is allowed to affect the choice of each 
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mechanism is a comprehensive system, which can improve the quahty of 
regression results and control for possible endogeneity. 
2) In India there have been no studies on Corporate Governance characteristics, 
idiosyncratic risk an d corporate investment decision making. Research in this 
aspect assumes importance in view of the spurt in Mergers and Acquisitions 
activities in India. 
3) In their study Gompers et al., (2003) have ranked the finns based on 
governance index values and found that investments in firms in the top decile 
group, which adopt better governance practices, have earned significant long-
term abnormal returns per year in comparison to the investment in the firms in 
the lower decile group. A similar study on these lines will be fruitful. 
4) The existence of a large number of family businesses in India warrants a further 
investigation regarding the role of independent directors. 
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PREFACE 
Corporate Governance is an area that has gi-own tremendously in the last decade all 
over the world. Concisely it can be considered as a system by which firms are 
managed and controlled. The main objective of Corporate Governance is to establish 
responsibility and accountability for board and expect that the board of directors 
exercise due diligence in their roles of setting strategies and ensuring that the 
management implements it. Due to globalization and growth in the economies of the 
world, the scope of Corporate Governance of finns has widened. 
From an economic perspective, there is ample research evidence to show that good 
governance practices, reduces the cost of capital, improves financial performance, 
enhances firm values and thereby benefits all the stakeholders of the firm. 
Opinions vary as to whether Corporate Governance systems are converging or are 
likely to converge. However there seems to be convergence all over the world on the 
core aspects of Corporate Governance which are; regulatory compliance, transparency 
in accounting and disclosures; contribution of Independent non-executive Directors; 
shift from narrow shareholder's orientations towards broader stakeholder orientations; 
sustainability; corporate social responsibility etc. All these factors form the basis for 
framing of Corporate Governance laws of a country. 
Corporate Governance is a global phenomenon. Hence regulatory enactments and 
amendments in one country, not only affects that particular country, but other 
countries as well. Post Cadbury committee's report and Enron's collapse, the 
regulatory enactments had far reaching consequences on the Corporate Governance 
framework across the world. While many practices of Corporate governance are 
becoming mandatory and standardized over a period across all countries of the world, 
some country specific variations are observed because countries also enact business 
laws reflecting the socio-economic factors prevailing in that particular country. This is 
reflected in the Indian context too. 
In India regulatory aspects of governance was a part of Companies Act of 1956. Later 
regulatory bodies in hidia MCA (Ministry of Corporate Affairs) and SEBl (Securities 
vui 
Exchange Board of India) have setup committees to frame laws which converge with 
the Corporate Governance systems of the world. By adopting global governance 
practices, Indian firms can attract foreign investments to sustain economic growth. 
There is also a growing trend among Indian firais to list in foreign bourses and to 
resort to cross border M&As which makes it imperative for them to adopt good 
Corporate Governance practices. 
Corporate Governance is multifaceted, covering areas of law, economy, politics, and 
sociology etc, prompting research in these areas. However from the economic aspect, 
research studies on the financial performance of firms are gaining importance and this 
study is primarily aimed at studying the effects of Corporate Governance on financial 
performance. Among different approaches to study such relationships, index method 
is becoming increasingly popular with researchers and commercial agencies all over 
the world because it facilitates easy assessment and measurement (Gompers et al, 
2003). 
This research study has constructed a Corporate Governance Index (CGI) for the 
companies listed in BSE 100 index for a period of 5 years from 2004-2008 and 
examines the relationship between the CGI and financial performance proxied by 
Tobin's Q, MVBV and ROA. It also provides details about econometric tools adopted 
to test the relationship between CGI and financial performance. This research also 
includes study on other governance mechanisms like Board size; CEO duality; board 
independence; promoters' holding etc. 
This study is organized as follows. 
Chapter 1 describes the evolufion of Corporate Governance, its theoretical cum 
regulatory framework and development of indices. 
Chapter 2 provides a detailed discussion on the relationship between Corporate 
Governance and financial performance with a focus on index based studies. It also 
details studies on Board stioictures and other mechanisms of Governance. Research 
Studies on Indian Corporate Governance are also included in this section. Apart from 
covering the studies in developed markets, the literature review specially focuses on 
emerging markets, including India. 
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Chapter 3 details the methodology used in the construction of governance index and 
sub indices. It provides details of data and usage of statistical and econometric 
techniques with Tobin's Q, MVBV and ROA as proxies for financial perfomiance. It 
also gives details about different econometric tools adopted to test the relationship 
between CGI and financial perfonnance. 
Chapter 4 discusses the results of the study and compares it with the findings of other 
researchers. The data analyses contain each individual year wise and combined 
analyses of five years. The regressions include mulfiple, pooled, fixed effects, random 
effects and dynamic panel models with different control variables. 
Chapter 5 provides the conclusions and points out the implications of the study with 
directions for further research. 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Corporate Governance is a system by which firnis are managed. The stages of 
development of Corporate Governance and its systems synchronize with the evolution 
of the economy, corporate structure, ownership groups, political and legal 
developments of a country. Academicians, practitioners and researchers have evolved 
different theories and models describing different facets of governance and its 
practices across different countries of the world. In this process, metrics are also being 
developed to measure Corporate Governance and its processes. In India prior to the 
economic refomis of 1992, the development of Corporate Governance was slow but 
post liberalization rapid strides have been made in its development to converge with 
global practices. 
This chapter covers these aspects and is organized as follows. 
> Origin and development of Corporate Governance 
> Definition of Corporate Governance 
> Theories of Corporate Governance 
> Models of Corporate Governance 
> D evelopment o f regul atory framework 
> Issues in Corporate Governance 
> Corporate Governance indices and firm performance 
> Development of Corporate Governance in India 
> Indian model of Corporate Governance 
1.1 Origin and development of Corporate Governance 
The concept of governance is as old as human civilization and the word 'governance' 
has come in to use from the time of Chaucer in the fourteenth century. It has only 
recently come to prominence in the business world because of conflicts of interest 
between the shareholders and the business managers of the firm. Economic aspects 
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necessitate the existence of fmns because they either avoid or intemaUze some of the 
transaction costs using price mechanisms (Coase, 1937). Many activities become 
redundant in firnis because of team working which improves the efficiency of the finn 
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). Benefits arising out of economies of scale and scope, 
monopoly gains and technology support the formation and growth of finns (Barzel, 
1982; WilHamson, 1981). Modem legal systems also foster the growth of the firms 
because they permit incorporation of firnis as a separate legal entity, separate from the 
owners of the company. 
In this process there is transfer of power from the owners to the managers of the finn 
resulting in the formation of two groups; the first being shareholders (principal) who 
are the legal owners; the second being managers (agents) who are appointed by the 
shareholders because managers have greater expertise to run the affairs of the firm. 
This eventually results in managers deriving discretionary powers to operate the firm. 
Over a period, managers develop the tendency to become de facto owners rather than 
the de jure owners pursing their own interests rather than that of shareholders. The 
shareholders also caimot directly observe all the actions of the managers, resulting in 
information asymmetries and moral hazard (Spence & Zeckhauser, 1971). Managers 
also have incentives to expropriate the firm's assets benefiting themselves thereby 
impacting shareholder's wealth (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Shliefer&Vishny, 1986). 
The following quote of Adam Smith in 'The Wealth of Nations' (1776) encapsulates 
the managerial behaviors mentioned above: 
"The directors of companies, being managers of other people's money than their own, 
it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious 
vigilance with which the partners in private co-partnerships frequently watch over 
their own". 
While the economic and legal aspects are essential for fostering the growth of the 
firnis, it leads to agency conflicts and its associated costs (Berle & Means, 
1932).Various academicians and practitioners of Corporate Governance have put 
forward different definitions emphasizing on the primary role of mangers which is to 
enhance the wealth of the finn, thereby benefitting all the stakeholders of the finn. 
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1.2 Definitions of Corporate Governance 
There is no universal definition of Corporate Governance. In this regard the objective 
of studying various definitions is to come to an understanding of what constitutes 
good governance, quantification of the attributes and its impHcations on firm 
performance. The divergence in these definitions can be attributed to two important 
factors; economic diversity and cultural diversity (Marisetty & Ved Puriswar, 2005). 
In Anglo-Saxon countries, such as the U.S and the U.K, good Corporate Governance 
process means pursuing the interest of shareholders. In countries like Japan, Germany 
and France, Corporate Governance is concerned with the interests of a wider set of 
stake holders, employees, customers and shareholders (Allen & Gale, 1999). 
Following are some of the definitions which reflect these perspecfives. 
"Corporate Governance is holding the balance between economic and social goals. 
The governance framework is to encourage the efficient use of resources, its 
accountability and finally its stewardship. The aim is to align as nearly as possible the 
interests of individuals, corporations and society. The incentive to corporafions is to 
achieve their corporate aims and to attract investment and the incentive for states is to 
strengthen their economics and discourage fraud and mismanagement (Sir Adrian 
Cadbury, 1992). 
"Corporate Governance is the process by which corporations are made responsive to 
the rights and wishes of stakeholders" (Demb & Neubauer, 1992a). 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define Corporate Governance as, "The ways in which 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getfing a return on their 
investment." 
The Financial Times Lexicon (2010) defines Corporate Governance as "How a 
company is managed, in terms of the institutional systems and protocols meant to 
ensure accountability and sound ethics. The concept encompasses a variety of issues, 
including disclosure of information to shareholders and board members, remuneration 
of senior executives, potential conflicts of interest among managers and directors, 
supervisory structures, etc". 
Narayana Murthy committee's report, 2003, states that Corporate Governance is 
beyond the realm of law. It stems from the culture and mindset of management, and 
cannot be regulated by legislation alone. It is about openness, integrity and 
accountability. Legislations can lay down a common framework, the 'forni' to ensure 
standards. The 'substance' will ultimately determine the credibility and integrity of 
the process. The "substance" is inexorably linked to the mindset and ethical standards 
ofmanagement. 
It can be seen from the above definitions that the core aspect of Corporate 
Governance is ethical conduct of managers in the pursuit of wealth maximization of 
the firm and its stake holders. Over a period of time, these operational and 
relationship issues have drawn the attention of academicians who have put forth 
certain theories to explain them. The Corporate Governance framework stems from 
these theories. The broad set of theories developed by academicians have linkages to 
different disciplines such as finance, economics, accounting, law, management and 
organizational behavior etc (Stiles & Taylor, 1993). Some of the important theories 
are discussed in this part. 
1.3 Theories of Corporate Governance 
1) Agency theory: This theory is about the conflicts that arise between the Principal 
and the Agent because of differences in the goals resulting in addifional costs to the 
firm thereby eroding the wealth of the firm and its shareholders. Study by Berle and 
Means (1932) has brought into focus the divergence in the profit maximizing and cost 
minimizing ideals of the finn's behavior. This causes agency costs, since managers 
and owners, having conflicfing objectves, try to control each other (Shankman, 
1999). Owners' expect managers/agents to operate the businesses with planned 
outcomes to enhance shareholders' wealth, which the managers may not do (Ghatak, 
Healey & Jackson, 1998). This necessitates the implementation of governance 
structures in large business firms to safeguard the interests of shareholders (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Fama and Jensen (1983) assume a two-fier forni of finn control 
based on the premise that fimis are actually groups of connected fiefs and each fief 
has its own specific interest and culture and views the purpose of the finn differently. 
As the number of shareholders (owners) and the complexity of operations increase, 
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managers are prone to pursue their own interests due to lack of monitoring (Mizruchi, 
1983). Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that managers may act too cautiously in 
making investments thereby eroding shareholders' wealth. This is also due to 
differences in the risk perceptions between the agent and owners (Arnold & Lange, 
2004). The implicit effect of all these result in increase of agency costs. 
In the banking firms a different set of agency conflicts arises owing to the interaction 
of three sets of interest groups; Managers, shareholders and creditors. Shareholders 
often have conflicts with managers because managers seek quick profits that increase 
their own wealth, power, reputafion and rewards, while shareholders are more 
interested in a slow and steady growth over time (Mayur & Saravanan, 2008). Since 
banks operate under different statutes, the transaction and borrowing costs increase 
due to infonnation asymmetry; increased monitoring and limiting managers' powers 
(Hughes & Mester, 2008). 
According to agency theorists, the purpose of studying the agency theory is to identify 
points of conflict among the key players and suggest the following mechanisms of 
Corporate Governance to reduce it: 
a) Separate roles for CEO and Chairman: this avoids managerial opportunism 
and agency loss (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Donaldson & Davies, 1991). 
b) Provide financial incentives to managers: these include fixing execufive 
compensafion and levels of benefits linked to shareholders' returns; Issue of 
stock options etc. 
c) Inclusion of more independent directors on the board (Baysinger & 
Hoskinson, 1990). 
d) Direct intervention by shareholders and the threat of firing the 
underperfonning managers (shareholder activism) 
e) An active market for corporate control: The threat of a hosfile takeover 
disciplines managerial behavior and induces managers to attempt to maximize 
shareholder value. 
2) Stewardship theory: Stewardship theory has a more social-oriented perspective 
on Corporate Governance. Although agency theory appears to be the dominant 
paradigm underlying most governance research and prescriptions, researchers in 
psychology and sociology have suggested theoretical limits of agency theory because 
of its focus on only economic assumptions (Hirsch, Machael & Friedman, 1987). 
There are non-economic assumptions supporting stewardship theory (Doucouliagos, 
1994). The dominant non-monetary motive, which directs managers to accomplish 
their job, is their desire to perform excellently because their reputations are at stake 
(Davis et al, 1997; Burkart, Gromb, & Panunzi, 1997). Drawing from Maslow's 
hierarchy theory, self actualization motivates manager to successfully perform 
challenging tasks and gain recognition (McClelland, 1961). Based on this premise, 
stewardship theory favors boards having a majority of 'specialist' executive directors 
rather than a majority of 'non-specialist' independent directors who will supplement 
the organizational knowledge resources. 
3) Resource dependence theory: This theory focuses on the resources the directors 
can provide to the firm for its effective operations and profitability. As per Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) boards have a crifical role to play in achieving economic efficiency 
and since some directors may have access to some strategic resources required by the 
firm, they may be appointed to the board. Gales and Kesner (1994) suggest that 
directors may also bring in specialized skills and expertise which will help them to 
cope with uncertainty by connecfing with external resources (Alchian, 1950). 
Williamson (1964) held that environmental linkages could reduce transaction costs 
associated with environmental interdependency. Scott and Davis (2007) extend this 
concept to alliances between organizations to share knowledge and resources to 
pursue joint activities for mutual benefit. 
4) Stakeholder Theory: Stakeholder is a term originally introduced by the Stanford 
Research Insfitute (SRI) referring to "those groups without whose support the 
organization would cease to exist". Stakeholders of a firm include suppliers, buyers, 
public policy decision makers, social groups and Government (Freeman, 1984). The 
conventional view that the success of the finn is dependent only on maximizing 
shareholders' wealth has limitafions due to negative externalities imposing external 
costs on the society. This theory states that the success of the finn is dependent on the 
relationship that a firm has with its stakeholders. The potential stakeholders may be 
divided into two groups: (1) the primary stakeholders - shareholders/investors, 
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creditors, customers, suppliers and employees; (2) secondary stakeholders - the 
government, trade associations, political groups and the community. Stakeholder 
theory states that, managers and entrepreneurs must take into account the legitimate 
interests of those gi'oups and individuals who can affect or be affected by their 
activities (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Watts and Zimmerman (1983) suggest that 
firnis should carry out socially responsible activities to reduce the risk of 
governmental intrusions that may affect firm value. The underlying emphasis of this 
theory is that managers should have broad stake holder orientations rather than narrow 
shareholder orientations. 
5) Managerial Hegemony Theory: Managerial hegemony theory states that CEOs 
and Management dominate the boards of directors resulting in passive roles for NED 
and independent directors (Mallete & Fowler, 1992). This is because CEOs dominate 
the director selection process and therefore control the board (Mace, 1986). Vancil 
(1987) is also skeptical about the ability of outside directors to make independent 
judgments on firm performance due to the dominant role played by CEOs in selecting 
outside directors. Stiles and Taylor (1993) cited Sir Adrian Cadbury's quote that up to 
80 % of outside appointments to the boards of large British companies were made on 
the old boys' network. All these may negatively influence the board cohesiveness 
since Non executive and independent directors are involved in the decision-making 
process of the firm and, at the same time, act as monitors of management. This 
conflict of interest will impair the efficiency of the finn despite being dominated by 
outside directors. 
THEORIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Main theories influencing the development of Corporate Governance 
1.4 Models of Corporate Governance 
Depending upon the business practices, customs and culture, the process of Corporate 
Governance differs from country to country. Besides, the variety of capitaUsm in 
which countries are embedded with, explains the considerable variations in Corporate 
Governance models around the world. While there are different models, many of them 
can be clustered into the following broad groups and each model has its own distinct 
features. 
The Japanese model (J-Form): Many firnis of Japan are a part of intricate 
shareholding structures called keiretsus. A Japanese Keiretsu is a network of different 
businesses that hold interest in each other to forni a type of security blanket. In a 
horizontal keiretsu firms are financed by a main bank with a system of cross-share 
holding and horizontal network of interlinked corporations (Ojo, 2009). While the 
central figure in a horizontal Keiretsu is a central bank, in a vertical Keiretsu it would 
be a big manufacturing company such as Toyota. Managers do not have a fiduciary 
responsibility only to shareholders but also to the stakeholders. In practice the 
managers are expected to pursue the interests of a wider set of stakeholders, including 
employees, customers and Shareholders who are considered part of it (Allen & Gale, 
1999). 
German Model; In the German model of Corporate Governance even though the 
shareholders own the coiporation, they do not directly control the governance 
mechanism. In fact in Germany the legal system is quite explicit that firms do not 
have a sole duty to pursue the interests of shareholders because of the system of 
codetermination. In large corporations employees have an equal number of seats on 
the supervisory board of the company which is ulfimately responsible for the strategic 
decisions of the company (Hopt &Leyens, 2004). Half of the supervisory board is 
elected by the labor unions which ensure that the workers participation in the 
governance mechanism is ensured. Another feature is that there is a heavy presence of 
banks in the equity structure of German firms. 
Chaebols of South Korea: Chaebol refers to a South Korean fomi of business 
conglomerate. They are powerful global multinationals owning numerous 
international enterprises. The tradifional structure of Korean chaebol can be explained 
by two of their features; their absolutely closed concentration of ownership within the 
family of the founder, and their highly diversified business stmcture. The founding 
family possesses bulk of the stocks and holds the decision making right as top 
management. Chaebols suffer from a number of problems such as entrenchment, 
agency conflicts, tunneling, etc (Kim & Nam 2004). 
Anglo-American Model: The traditional Berle-Means (1932) mode! of Corporate 
Governance is characterized by a separation of ownership and management. It is 
considered as a liberal model which is common in Anglo-American countries, which 
tends to give priority to the interests of shareholders. The CEO has broad powers to 
manage the corporation on a daily basis, but needs to get board approval for certain 
major actions, such as hiring his/her immediate subordinates, raising money, 
acquiring another company, major capital expansions, or other expensive projects. 
Other duties of the board may include policy setting, decision making, monitoring 
management's perfonnance, or corporate control (Clarke & Dela Rama, 2009). 
1.5 Development of Corporate Governance Regulatory mechanisms 
The regulations related to Corporate Governance have been significantly influenced 
by the regulations of UK, USA and Europe. Following are some of the important 
enactments which form the core element of governance systems, not only in India, but 
across the world. 
The Cadbury Report, 1992 
There were a series of governance failures in UK around the years 1990-92; 
Bankruptcy of Maxwell's; Insolvency of BCCI; Polly Peck and others. These events 
led to the formation of a committee chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury whose aims were 
to suggest improvements and restore investor confidence in the British Corporate 
Governance system. The committee made recommendations on the arrangement of 
company boards and accounting systems to mitigate Corporate Governance risks and 
failures. The report's recommendations have been adopted in varying degrees by the 
European Union, the United States, the World Bank, and other common wealth 
countries. 
The Asian financial crisis (AFC) 
In late 90's, East Asian economies came to limelight due to the quick boom and burst 
phenomenon disrupting the economies of not only Asian countries but many countries 
of the worid. The East Asian financial crisis (AFC) was primarily attributed to poor 
governance and it undoubtedly established the importance of having effective 
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Corporate Governance structures for corporations particularly PLCs (Kim, 2005). 
Subsequently, World Bank brought in a series of Coiporate Governance refonns, 
primarily in countries to which it lends, to avoid such crisis. 
Sarbanes Oxiey Act, 2002 (Referred to as SOX ACT, 2002) 
Enron's scandal has been one of the serious lapses in the Corporate Governance 
history. Since many world markets were inter-connected it had wider and serious 
ramifications resulting in loss of billions of dollars, affecting many countries. Enron's 
Governance fiasco led to the enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act, 2002.This has 
been one of the most sweeping reforms in the past 70 years of the Corporate 
Governance history (Byrnes et al., 2003). Because of global importance of US 
financial markets, many countries of the world reviewed their Governance regulations 
on the basis of this Act. Foreign Firms which are listed in US and Subsidiaries of US 
firms have to comply with its stringent internal control and financial reporting 
requirements of this Act (Baker, et al., 2007; O'Brien, 2006). 
Parmalat Scandal of Italy, 2004 
It is dubbed as Europe's Enron. Parmalat was Italy's largest food company. Primarily 
there was disappearance of more than $10 billion in declared assets which came into 
limelight during the auditor rotation. Subsequent to this scandal there were regulatory 
amendments, particularly in the area of Auditing and Audit committees. 
1.6 Issues in Corporate Governances 
Ethical issues: Corporate Governance encompasses commitment to values and ethical 
conduct of businesses to maximize shareholder's wealth, while ensuring fairness to all 
stakeholders and retain investors' trust. Ethical dilemmas arise from conflicting 
interests of the parties involved and managers should make decisions based on a set of 
principles influenced by the values, context and culture of the organization. What 
constitutes good Corporate Governance will evolve with the changing circumstances 
of a company and must be tailored to meet these circumstances. 
Accountability issues: Transparency in decision-making leads to accountability 
because responsibilifies could be fixed easily for actions taken or not taken. The 
accountability for safeguarding the interests of the stakeholders and the investors in 
the organization is paramount and rests with the management. 
Efficiency issues: Efficiency issues are concerned with the efficient perfonnance of 
the management to ensure fair returns to the shareholders. This means achievement of 
economic efficiency comprising of allocative and productive efficiencies. 
ISSUES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
ETHICAL ACCOUNTABILITY EFFICIENCY 
1.7 Development of Corporate Governance Indices 
It is well known that Good Corporate Governance practices reduce the agency costs. 
However many of the Corporate Governance processes are subjective. Hence an 
objective assessment of Corporate Governance practices helps in better understanding 
and monitoring of the same. Metrics in the form of an index facilitates better 
assessment of the CG practices of a finn. 
A Corporate Governance index, in its simplest fonn, is a tool summarizing in a 
measurable form, the various Corporate Governance factors which influence the 
performance of a firm. The idea and concept of Corporate Governance index (CGI) 
has been adopted by researchers, commercial agencies and others to measure the level 
of governance in listed companies. It is an indicator to benchmark the Corporate 
Governance quotients of companies, and through it the capital markets of countries. 
S&P has devised a Corporate Governance evaluation and scoring methodology; 
similarly the FTSE Group in UK; ICRA /CARE m India and so on. 
Both S&P's Corporate Governance score and FTSE/ISS's CGI are primarily tools for 
institution investors to measure the Coiporate Governance practices of listed 
companies and to manage risks associated with poor Corporate Governance when 
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investing in global equities. They are each derived from a set of objective criteria 
under which a company's Corporate Governance practices are evaluated. These 
criteria are based on universally accepted Corporate Governance principles of 
fairness, transparency, accountability, and responsibility. 
Among other things, such criteria examine the structure and transparency of a 
company's ownership, the structure, independence, and effectiveness of its board, the 
company's shareholder rights and stakeholder relations, shareholders meetings and 
voting procedures, the transparency, content and timeliness of disclosure, the audit 
process and internal control, and the compensation policy of its senior executives and 
directors. In recent times corporate social responsibility of a company is also 
considered as an important criterion. Some researchers use the data provided by the 
institutions or build their own index based on the above principles. 
CGI measures the non-financial quality of companies. Together with the usual 
financial data and informadon, CGI would enable investors to have a comprehensive 
analysis of the risk profiles of companies in their portfolio. After all, corporate 
scandals in the last few years have shown that poor governance is a high risk factor 
for investors. As a qualitafive score, the CGI will be a competitive differentiator for 
companies within the same market, as well as among different markets. With a CGI, 
there will be a ready distinction among companies of different quality in the market 
and at the same time, CGI will also distinguish the quality of one market from those 
of others in the region. 
Thus the importance of CG Index, as a metric, is gaining more acceptances because of 
its comprehensiveness, wider applicability and a strong belief that these indices 
positively correlate with the financial perfomiance. 
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Researchers have different perspectives of the terms firm performance, financial 
performance and finn values and these terms are being interchangeably used. 
Researcher Huselid (1995) has used Tobin's Q as market based financial perfonnance 
measure and also considers the same as a measure of value added by the management. 
In their studies on Board independence and managerial entrenchment, Surroca and 
Tribo (2007) have considered Tobin's Q as a financial perfonnance measure. Tobin's 
Q has been considered as a proxy for firm values by many researchers in developed 
and emerging markets (Gompers et al., 2003; Balasubramanian et al., 2010 to name a 
few). Similarly MVBV is also considered as a proxy for Firm Value by Mohanty 
(2003). Brown and Caylor (2006) and other researchers besides using Tobin's Q, have 
also used ROA (Return on assets) and ROE (Return on equity) as operating 
performance measures. Gupta et al., (2010) have considered reducfion in the cost of 
equity as a proxy for improvement in finn values. 
Hence while the tenns used by the researchers could vary, the common aim of all of 
them is improvement in financial perfonnance resulting in increase of the wealth of 
the firm. 
1.8 Corporate Governance in India 
The macro perspective of Corporate Governance in developed countries is finance 
and economics while in the developing countries, particularly in India, it is financial 
and economic development (Chakrabarti, 2005). The Corporate Governance history in 
India can be distinctly bifurcated, based on the initiation of economic refomis in the 
year 1992, into two distinct historical fime periods: prel992 era and post 1992 era. 
1.8.1 Pre 1992 era 
During the colonial period the managing agency model was prevalent in India where 
the investor protecfion was virtually absent. Subsequent laws, such as the Companies 
Act, 1956 were intended to strengthen the rights of investors, but all these were only 
on paper and its implementation was abysmally poor. 
From the beginning of independence fill latel960s, the private corporate sector was 
dominated by 20 family groups (business houses) who had their beginnings as traders 
in the pre-independence era and who took a pioneering interest in the industrialization 
of the country in the post-independence era too. These family groups developed 
strong political connections and took full advantage of the licensing system 
(commonly referred as Licence Raj). Notwithstanding the diverse shareholdings 
pattern, companies were managed by the same family group with all senior 
management posifions being occupied by the family (Vaghul, 1997). 
Concentrated ownership of shares, pyramiding and tunneling of funds among group 
companies were the features of Indian corporates. Earnings management am6ng 
family business groups was common. Due to the prevalence of weak form of market 
efficiency, and infomiafion asymmetry, even pooriy governed finns could manage to 
raise enough equity. Entrenched companies had little fear of being taken over. Thus, 
Corporate Governance in India was in a dismal condition in the Pre 1992 era. 
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1.8.2 Post 1992 era 
This was an era of economic and financial reforms-a strategic move towards market 
economy. The real opening up of the economy started with the issuance of new 
Industrial Policy on June 24, 1991. The main thrust of the new policy was on 
relaxations in industrial licensing and foreign investments. Industrial de-licensing 
resulted in a spurt of private sector investment and corporate restructuring. Increased 
transparency and speed in capital markets facilitated reasonably efficient price 
discovery mechanism-a move towards efficient markets. This has enabled spread of 
Indian investor base. Current account convertibility and relaxation in repatriation has 
attracted FII's. Indian economy is on the move towards capital account convertibility. 
Spurt in cross-border capital flows and the economic growth of India 
Building on liberalization policies dating back to the early 1990s, India has 
differentiated itself as a dynamic recipient and source of global capital. India's 
prospects are brighter now than ever to be a leading magnet for cross-border capital 
investments in the years ahead. The positive impact of transparency in Corporate 
Governance on FDI is well documented and hence over a period of time there have 
been a series of Corporate Governance reforms aiming towards global convergence. 
1.9 Current Indian model of Corporate Governance 
It is a hybrid model based on Anglo-American and Gennan models. Unlike the dual 
class system prevalent in US, single class is the dominant model prevailing in India. 
This model can be best described by grouping businesses in India in the following 
way. 
> Highly dispersed shareholding and professional management (L&T, ICICI 
Bank, Infosys). 
'> The founder, his family, and associates closely hold the company and exercise 
maximum control over the activities of the company (Tata group-Birla group. 
Reliance group, Wipro etc). 
> Public sector with government ownership and professional management (SBI, 
ONGC, BHEL, etc). 
> Multinational corporations (ABB, HUL, Siemens, etc). 
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INDIAN MODEL OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
It is a hybrid model based on Anglo-American and German models 
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Development of Corporate Governance regulatory framework in India 
The chronology listed below briefly indicates the evolution of the Corporate 
Governance norms in India. 
1. CO Code on Corporate Governance (1998): The Confederation of Indian 
Industry (CII) "India's premier business association," unveiled India's first 
comprehensive code on Corporate Governance in 1998. This Code was well 
received by Corporate India and many of its recommendations became part of 
subsequent regulations. However, since the Code's adoption was voluntary, 
few firms adopted it. 
2. Kumar Mangalam Biria Committee on Corporate Governance (SEBI, May, 
1999): SEBI appointed the Birla Committee to develop a code of Corporate 
Governance. In 2000, SEBI accepted the recommendafions of the Birla 
Committee and introduced Clause 49 into the Listing Agreement of Stock 
Exchanges. Clause 49 outlined Corporate Governance requirements of 
exchange-traded companies. 
3. Report of the Task Force on Corporate Excellence through Governance 
(Department of Company Affairs-Nov, 2000). 
4. Report of the Advisory group on Corporate Governance Standing Committee 
on Inter-official Financial Standards and Codes (RBI-March, 2001) 
5. Recommendations of the Naresh Chandra Committee Report on Corporate 
Audit and Governance (2002), The Department of Corporate Affairs (DCA) 
6. Report of the consultative group of Directors of Banks/Financials Insfitutions 
(RBI-April 2002) 
7. Report of the committee on regulation of Private companies and Partnerships 
(Naresh - Chandra committee-II, July, 2003) 
8. Narayana Murthy Committee's Report (2003): This report forms the basis of 
the latest regulations of SEBI which came into force from 1st January, 2006. 
DEVELOPMENT OF REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF INDIAN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
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The regulatory framework of Corporate Governance systems in India are primarily 
influenced by the legal systems of UK and US. The development of Governance 
index is generally based on the compliance of the regulations both mandatory and 
voluntary. The economic consequences of Corporate Governance practices are 
reflected in firms' financial performances. The related literature survey deals with 
these mechanisms, index and financial perfonnance. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The relationship between Corporate Governance and financial perfomiance has been 
one of the important issues in the Corporate Governance literature and Index is one of 
the means of measuring the same. The empirical literature shows different approaches 
to the construction of Governance index and the role of other mechanisms in 
monitoring and controlling agency costs. This has an impact on the financial 
perfonnance. The related literature review is organized as follows. 
Chapter 2 details the studies on Corporate Governance and financial performance. 
Section 2.1 details firm level cross country studies about the relationship between 
Corporate Governance and firm's financial perfonnance. Section 2.2 covers country 
specific firm level studies about the relafionship between Corporate Governance index 
and financial performance. This section also covers other governance related aspects 
such as promoters' holding, issue of ADR/GDRs etc. Section 2.3 deals with studies on 
Board size, CEO Duality and Board independence and their impact on firni 
performance. Secfion 2.4 covers studies about internal and external mechanisms of 
Corporate Governance. Section 2.5 deals with studies about Corporate Governance in 
India. 
2.1 Corporate Governance and firm performance 
This secfion deals with studies wherein the researchers have considered the finn level 
attributes of governance and its relafionship with finn perfonnance. The literature 
review covers studies about developed and emerging markets. 
Klapper and Love (2004) used firm-level data (based on CLSA governance index) of 
14 emerging stock markets to examine the Corporate Governance practices and finn 
valuations of those countries. Their findings suggest a positive relationship between 
Corporate Governance and finn performance proxied by Tobin"s Q and ROA.Their 
other findings are that there is wide variation in finn-level governance scores across 
countries and stock prices of better governed finns in countries with weaker legal 
systems, are relatively higher than the stock prices of finns in countries with stronger 
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legal systems. Durnev and Kim (2005) did similar studies using fmn-level governance 
and transparency data of 859 finns in 27 countries. They find that firms which have 
higher governance rankings have higher firm valuations measured by Tobin's Q. 
Further research findings of theirs indicate that certain firms, which have a greater 
need for external source of funds, also practice higher-quality Corporate Governance. 
Firm level cross country studies by Aggarwal et al., (2006); Bruno and Claessens 
(2007); show a positive relafionship between Corporate Governance indices and firm 
market values measured by Tobin's Q. Based on the study of 7380 finn years 
spanning across 22 Common Law countries, Gupta et al., (2010) find that positive 
firm level governance attributes are associated with reduced cost of equity and 
correspondingly better finn values. Based on Deminor Corporate Governance Ratings 
of companies included in the FTSE Eurotop 300, a study by Bauer, Gunster and Otten 
(2004) found positive relationship between governance indices and finn performance 
among European companies. Similar firm level cross country studies by Doidge et al., 
(2007); Durnev and Fauver (2010) find positive relationship between governance and 
firm values. Besides, they find that there are country specific influences on Corporate 
Governance practices of firms and accordingly the Corporate Governance measures 
differ. 
The study by Martynova and Renneboog (2010) covers 30 countries in Europe and 
US spanning 15 years (1990-2005). They have developed firm level Corporate 
Governance indices for each country and their findings are that while there is posifive 
relationship between CG and Firm values, there is no convergence in the CG practices 
among these countries because of changes in the business environment. They attribute 
this to the country specific differences in the Corporate Governance laws governing 
Shareholders, Managers and Bond holders. 
Post Asian financial crisis of 1998, Mitton (2001) studied 399 Asian firms comprising 
of Thailand, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and Philipines. His study focused on 
differences in the Corporate Governance variables at the finn-level, particularly 
disclosures. His observations are that higher finn valuations, measured by Tobin's Q, 
are associated with better disclosure quality of the financial statements, certified by 
big accounting firms. Research study by Claessens et al., (2000), covering 1,000 finns 
of East Asia and Chile, show evidence of a posifive relationship between Corporate 
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Governance and firm perfonnance.Their other important observation is that business 
groups adopt their own methods of managing business rislcs and do not depend much 
on the capital markets of the country. 
Klianna and Rivkin's (2001) study covers firm level studies of five Lafin American 
countries of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru and their findings affinn the 
positive relationship between Corporate Governance and finn perfonnance. Their 
other findings are that there are differences in governance practices between group 
affiliated firms and non-affiliated firms. Researchers Hasan, Kadapakkam and Kumar 
(2002), in their study on emerging markets of Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand, create a cross country Index of Corporate 
Governance (ICG) from the published data. In their research study they find that in 
countries with high standards of Corporate Governance there is a positive association 
between the ICG and firm investments. They also observe that foreign institutional 
investors (FII) accord priority to governance when making investment decisions in 
countries. 
In addition to the studies made by individual researchers, commercial agencies 
(Mckinsey, Deuche Bank and CLSA) made cross country assessment on the positive 
impact of good governance practices on firm performances. Their findings affirm the 
findings of the researchers. 
2.2 Firm level index based studies in Corporate Governance 
This section deals with the literature on the relationship between Corporate 
Governance and firm perfomiance at country specific firm levels with a focus on the 
usage of CG index as a measure of Corporate Governance practices. Developing firni 
level governance indices of a specific country has its own significance and advantages 
since they reflect the rules and unique practices of those specific individual countries. 
According to Balasubramanian et al., (2010), another distinct advantage of such 
studies is that smaller finns are included in the studies which are overlooked in many 
of the cross country studies. According to Sarkar and Sarkar (2005) studies in one 
market may not be in consonance with the studies of other markets. 
In the country specific firm level studies on relationship between Corporate 
Governance, and fmn performance, there has been extensive use of indices. The 
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significant advantage of indices are that they are measurable and faciltates better 
communication among users. In the development of indices each researcher has used 
a different set of parameters, many of which are context-based. Further in the scoring 
method Binary method, Binary method with weightage, Weightage method and 
estimation mehtods are used by researchers. There are variations in the methodology 
of collection of data as well. (Survey method adopted by individuals and institutions; 
Data provided by Governance advisory fimis-such as ISS; Data provided by stock 
exchanges; manual collection of data from the Annual reports). 
2.2.1 Research studies using Binary methodology 
The following literature study relates to the binary method adopted by researchers 
studying the relationship between Coiporate Governance and firm performance. 
Beginning with Gompers et al., (2003), Black, Kim and Jang (2006); Barotini and 
Siciliano (2003) and others have developed their own specific indices as measures of 
Corporate Governance practices. 
Gompers et al., (2003), (hereafter referred to as GIM) computed a Corporate 
Governance index for 1,500 US companies consisting of 24 anti-takeover provisions 
and shareholder's rights as panneters of the governance index. The data for their 
research study was compiled by Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) and 
they adopted Binary method ('0' or T ) for scoring. First these 24 anti-takeover 
provisions and shareholder's rights are classified into five groups (1-Tactics for 
delaying hostile takeover; 2-Voting rights; 3-Director/officer protection; 4-other 
takeover defenses; 5- state laws). Each firm was evaluated based on these 24 
parameters and a value of 0 is assigned when a particular practice of the firm opposes 
anti takeover, otherwise 1 is assigned when the practices are positive.The index is the 
simple sum of the scores of those variables ranging from 0-24.They temied this index 
as G-index and considered it as a proxy for governance. The important finding of 
these researchers is that better shareholder rights are associated with greater finn 
values measured by Tobin's Q, a proxy for finn values. 
G-Index of GIM is considered as a pioneering one and a valuable contribufion to the 
Governance literature on firm level index based Corporate Governance studies. The 
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concept has been widely used in many accounting and finance studies to represent 
governance even though it is an anti-takeover protection index and not a broad index 
of Corporate Governance (Cremers & Nair, 2005). 
Bebchuk et ah, (2009) have shortUsted six provisions out of the twenty four 
provisions considered by GIM (Four provisions that limit shareholder rights and two 
that make potential hostile takeovers more difficult). As per them these six provisions 
are considered to be more important than the remaining 18. The index so constituted 
comprising of these six provisions is termed by them as "Entrenchment index (E-
index). Based on their research study, they conclude that entrenchment index is 
negatively associated with firm value, while the remaining 18 provisions are not 
correlated with firm values measured by Tobin's Q. 
Brown and Caylor (2006) use Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) data to create 
their governance index. Their index comprises of 51 Corporate Governance 
parameters such as board structure and processes, corporate charter issues such as 
poison pills, management and director compensafion and stock ownership. Their 
research findings are that firm valuations, measured by Tobin's Q, are higher for 
those firms which adopt better governance practices measured by the index. They 
contend that such firms also perform better, are less risky, stock prices are less 
volatile, and pay out more dividends. The researchers also find that governance 
parameters are also positively related to return on assets (ROA), a proxy for firm's 
operating performance. 
Chong et al., (2009) compute finn-level Corporate Governance index of Mexican 
firms and show that better firm-level Corporate Governance pracfices are linked to 
higher firni valuations measured by Tobin's Q, better operating performance and 
more disbursement of dividends to investors. 
The study, by Drobetz, Schillhofer and Zimmermann (2004), explores the relationship 
between firm-level Corporate Governance and firm perfonnance for a sample of 253 
Gernian fimis.The data collecfion was based on a survey and 91 out of 253 fimis 
responded to the survey. Based on the responses to the questionnaire of the survey 
and using binary method they developed CG score for each finn. Their findings 
support the findings of other researchers that firnis with higher Corporate Governance 
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scores are associated with substantially higher firm values measured by Tobin's Q. 
They report an improvement of 24% increase in Tobin's Q for one standard deviation 
change in the governance score. Aggarwal and Williamson (2006) develop an index 
for US based companies which are based on Corporate Governance attributes and data 
provided by histitutional Shareholder Services (ISS).Their method is similar to that 
adopted by Brown and Caylor (2006). Their study covers a much wider set of 
governance provisions (64 as against 51 by Brown & Caylor, 2006) with specific 
focus on those governance attributes targeted by new regulations of SOX Act, 2002 
and listing code of NYSE. They find a positive and significant relation between 
governance index and firm values. 
For Chinese firms, Bai et al., (2004) construct a Governance index using binary 
method to reflect overall level of governance pracfices among listed companies in 
China. Broad classifications of their index comprises of board structure, ownership 
structure, financial transparency, market for corporate control, and legal framework. 
Their results indicate that better Corporate Governance leads to higher firm values, 
and that stock prices of firms which adopt better Corporate Governance practices, are 
relatively higher. 
Lei and Song (2004) develop a CGI model consisfing of 17 parameters covering five 
governance mechanisms: board structure, executive compensation, ownership 
structure, execufives' conflict of interest and transparency standards. Binary 
methodology is adopted for scoring these seventeen parameters and an index is 
developed. Their study includes different groupings such as H Shares, Red chips and 
family controlled companies which are listed on HongKong stock exchange. Their 
findings are that stocks of finns, which adopt better governance standards, are traded 
at higher prices. 
Kanellos and George Karathanassis (2007) have computed the governance index of 
finns quoted on the Athens Stock Exchange. Based on the index score, finns were 
classified into three groups; 1-Democracies 2-Semi-Democracies and 3-Dictatorships. 
They found higher Tobin's Q ratios for finns grouped in democracies followed by 
semi-democracies and dictatorships indicating better finn valuations for good 
governance practices adopted by democracies. 
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Leal and Silva (2005), in their study of 65 non-financial listed companies in 
Argentina, find a positive relationship among Corporate Governance measure. Return 
on assets (ROA) and Tobin's Q. 
In their studies about Colombian firms, Gutierrez and Pombo (2005) developed a 
Corporate Governance index by conducting a survey comprising of 43 firms for the 
year 2004. Based on this survey, CGI of Columbian firms was constructed. They find 
that implementafion of good governance in Colombian firms has been slow and poor 
as measured by the index and they do not find an evidence of a posifive associafion 
between CGI and performance. 
Bebchuk et al, (2009) in their study of 65 non-financial listed companies in Argentina 
for the period 2003-2004 developed two indices; One Corporate Governance Index 
(CGI) and the other Transparency and Disclosure Index (TDI). Corporate Governance 
Index (CGI) is developed based on responses of the firm to the survey questionnaire. 
The Corporate Governance Index includes three binary(O-l) variables, namely, 
whether the firm: (a) has a positive weight in the stock portfolio of any pension fund 
of Argentina (weight indicates the priorities assigned by investors of pension fund); 
(b) whether firms consented to respond to their governance survey; and (c) has a 
percentage of independent directors above the mean levels. This CGI has one of the 
smallest numbers of variables. The second index developed by them is the 
Transparency Disclosure index (TDI) which is based on the infomiation available on 
the public domain. This comprises of 32 parameters and scoring is based on binary 
methodology. The parameters derived relate to Board structures. Disclosure, and 
Shareholder concerns. Their findings are that Corporate Governance practices are 
poor in Argentinean firms vis-a-vis international practices. However the findings are 
that there is a posifive effect of governance index on Tobin's Q. 
In India there has been only one study based on the binary method by 
Balasubramanian et al., (2010). They adopted the survey method for the collection of 
the data and construction of Coiporate Governance index. Their study findings are in 
consonance with other researchers, affinning positive relationship between Corporate 
Governance Index and firm values. 
26 
2.2.2 Weightage methods 
Black et al., (2006) constnact a Corporate Governance index of Korean firms and 
temied it as Korean Corporate Governance index (A'CG/j.Their study comprises of 
515 Korean companies listed on Korean Stock exchange and the data for the same has 
been collected by the exchange. Their index comprises of four sub index groups with 
each group comprising of different parameters and fifth group comprising of only one 
parameter. The four sub index groups are.l- Shareholder Rights (5 parameters); 2-
Board Structure (4 parameters); 3- Board Procedure (26 parameters); and 3-
Disclosure (3 parameters); 5-Ownership Parity sub index (1 parameter). Each 
parameter of the sub index, other than ownership parity, is a 0-1 dummy variable 
which indicates whether a firm has a particular positive governance element or not. 
Ownership parity is a continuous 0-1 variable. All the scores are proportionately 
prorated to the maximum sub index value of 20.Thus, each sub index value for a firni 
ranges between 0 and 20 and cumulatively the sum of the sub index amounts to 
100.This fonus the basis of Korean Corporate Governance Index (KCGF). They 
specifically state that while they lack a theoretical basis to assign weights to sub 
indices or to parameters within sub indices, their findings are that better-governed 
fimis with higher KCGI score have higher firni values measured by Tobin's Q. The 
researchers also find that KCGI is positively related to return on total assets (ROA). 
Javid and Iqbal (2007) constructed multifactor Corporate Governance index for the 
finns listed on Karachi Stock Exchange, which is based on the data obtained from the 
annual reports of the firms submitted to SECP (Securities and Exchange commission 
of Pakistan). The index construction is based on 22 governance parameters 
categorized into three sub-indices: Board; ownership shareholdings; transparency, 
disclosure and audit. The maximum score is 100. A score of 100 is assigned if good 
governance factors are observed by a firm, 80 if largely observed, 50 for partially 
observed and 0 if it is not observed. The average is taken out and they arrive at the 
rating of one sub-index. By taking the average of three sub-indices they obtain CGI 
for a particular firm. They also find positive relafionship between Corporate 
Governance index and fimi valuations. 
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In India there has been one study on Corporate Governance and firm values using the 
weightage method by Mohanty (2003).This is given in detail in the literature review 
section of Indian Corporate Governance studies. 
From the above literature survey, there is enough evidence to show that broad 
measures of good firm-level Corporate Governance practices predict higher share 
prices in developed and emerging markets. This evidence comes from both single-
country studies, Russia (Black, 2001); Korea (Black et al., 2006); U.S (Gompers et 
al, 2003) and multi-country studies (Dumev & Kim, 2005; Klapper & Love, 2004). 
The study of the literature also indicates that each researcher has certain objectives to 
measure the Corporate Governance and accordingly appropriate parameters are 
identified for measuring Corporate Governance. Gompers et al., (2003) used anti-
takeover provisions as a measure of Corporate Governance. LLSV (2002) focused on 
share holder protection. Barotini and Siciliano (2003) accorded priority to existence of 
pyramids or non-voting shares and Javid and Iqbal (2007) on disclosures and 
transparency. Mohanty (2003) had constructed CG Index of companies from mutual 
fund investment perspective. All these demonstrate that the selection of CG 
parameters is contextual, time based and business environment based. 
From the index scoring point of view the usage of the binary method without weights 
is less biased and reliable and hence finds support from many researchers. While 
computing the index of Italian firms, Barotini and Siciliano (2003) have emphasized 
that an unweighted binary based index is easier to reproduce and less subjective than a 
weighted index. Similar opinion is echoed by Leal and Silva (2005) when computing 
index of firms in Brazil and Chile.Gompers et al., (2003) state that the advantage of 
unweighted index is that the index construction is straightforward.While the index 
may not accurately reflect the relative impacts of different provisions, it has the 
advantage of being transparent and easily reproducible. 
Index based studies 
Authors 
Barontini and Siciliano, 
2003 
Gompers et al., 2003 
Drobetz, Schillhofer and 
Zimmermann, 2004 
Lei and Song, 2004 
Gutierrez and Pombo, 
2005 
Leal and SiIva, 2005 
Blaci<, Jang and Kim, 
2006 
Brown and Caylor, 2006 
Aggarwal and 
Williamson, 2006 
Javid and Iqbal, 2007 
Kanellos and 
Karathanassis, 2007 
Bebchuk, 2009 
Chong et al., 2009 
Studies in India 
Mohanty, 2003 
Balasubramaniaii et al., 
2010 
Sample details 
230 Italian companies 
1500 large tlrnis Listed 
in US 
253 finns of Neur Stock 
Exchange 
106 H shares ,84 Red 
Chips and family based 
companies listed in Hong 
Kong 
108 non-financial finns 
of Colombia; Study 
period-1998 to 2002 
240 companies listed in 
Brazilian stock exchange 
526 Korean companies 
1868 US based listed 
finns 
5200 firm years-US 
50 finns listed in Karachi 
stock exchange 
314 Greek firms 
Listed finns in US 
150 Mexican finns 
103 Indian finns for the 
year 2002 
292 finns listed in BSE 
500 for the year 2005-06 
Focus of study 
Expropriation and firm 
values 
CGI and firm values 
CG rating and firm 
values 
CGI and firm values 
Evaluation of CG 
practices adopted by 
Columbian finns 
Index and finn values 
CGI and firm values 
G Index and firm 
values 
CGI scores and finn 
values 
CGI and firm values 
GI index and firm 
values 
Entrenchment index 
and finn values 
CG, valuations and 
investor returns 
Investment decisions 
of Institutional share 
holders based on CGI 
CGI and firm values 
Findings 
High expropriation has a negative 
impact on firm values 
A strategy of buying stocks of firms 
having provisions of strong 
shareholder rights and selling the 
weaker ones results in abnormal 
return of 8.5% per year 
Strategy of buying and selling stocks 
based on CGI gives 12% extra returns 
Hong Kong investors are willing to 
pay higher prices for stocks of firms 
with better governance 
Based on CGI index parameters 
implementation of Governance in 
Colombia is poor. 
Positive relationship between IBCG 
and firm values 
10 point increase in CGI increases 6% 
in Tobin's Q 
Positive relation between Governance 
Index and firm values measured by 
Tobin's Q 
Positive relationship between CGI 
and finn values. Non-mandatory 
practices by firms are accorded 
premium by investors. 
Positive relationship between CGI 
and finn values 
Good governance benefits 
shareholders and stakeholders in 
tenns of improved firm valuations 
E index is negatively related to firm 
values 
Differentiated governance practices 
lowers cost of equity and increases 
returns to investoi'S 
Institutional investors consider goocd 
CGI practices as a criterion for 
Investment decisions. 
Positive relationsip between ICGI and 
firm values 
29 
The above set of research studies have been based on the assumption of linear 
relationship between Coi-porate Governance index and finn perfomiance. There are a 
few studies on the non-linear relationhship between the two also. 
In their study on the relationship between Coiporate Governance and firni values, 
Chen, Hsiao, Kao and Shou Lu (2010) found the relationship between CG and finn 
values to be nonlinear.The authors have used Neural network method in their analysis. 
Zheka (2007) finds the relationship between Corporate Governance index and firm 
values measured by Tobin's Q to be non-linear.The researcher has split the firms 
based on the mean values of CGI and analysed the relatiohsip between CGI and firm 
performance. In addition to this, a separate regression has been run using CGI Sq as 
an additional control varaible to establish the non-linear relationship. Based on his 
study, Zeitun (2009) states that the relationship between CG and firm valuations of 
the firms listed in capital markets of Jordan is neither simple nor linear. 
While studying the governance aspects of firms, researchers Brown and Caylor (2006) 
have highlighted that the process of governance differs depending on the nature of 
industry. In his research study Guillen (2001) observes that due to globalization, finns 
have to develop disfinctive competencies so as to make a dent in international 
compefifion and this requires changes in the Corporate Governance processes. 
Manufacturing processes cause negative externalities in greater proportions than 
services. Hence the governance processes also change warranting a special focus on 
manufacturing sector. This research study has analyzed the relafionship between 
Corporate Governance and firm performance of companies belonging to the 
manufacturing sector. 
The following section of literature review is based on the resource based view of the 
firm. The resources could be both tangible and intangible. The asset values shown in 
the balance sheet are the values of physical assets and the values of the intangible 
assets which are paid for. However there are many firms such as software, banking 
etc, which operate in the tertiary sectors, whose intangible asset values are not 
recorded. Research evidence shows that the firm performance and its values are 
dependent on both tangible and intangible assets of the firm. Aggarwal and 
Williamson (2006) find statistically significant differences in governance practices 
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across firm size and industries. Hence finn's asset size may liave an ambiguous effect 
on the firm performance (Kumar, 2005). Smaller asset intensive firms can be more 
efficient than large ones because of better control by top managers over strategic and 
operafional acfivities of the finn (Himmelberg, Hubbard & Palia, 1999; Sarkar & 
Sarkar, 2000; Willamson, 1967). Lange and Stulz (1994) suggest a decrease in finn 
values as finn becomes larger and more diversified. 
As the economy is expanding in the tertiary sector there is growing importance of 
intangible assets in reshaping business values and the basic conditions of Corporate 
Governance (Capasso, 2004). The findings of Cohen (2005) are that traditional 
companies are being transformed into new organizafional structures in which 
intangible assets are influencing the finn valuations. Stanford economist Hall (1993) 
states that the current market valuations are characterized by new intangible resources 
manifesting into a new kind of capital termed as "e-capital". 
However a study by Ahuja and Majumdar (1998) shows that large finns appoint 
better managers; therefore larger firms should have better performance and they can 
also benefit from the economies of scale. 
All these mean that small tangible asset intensive firms can have better performance 
and firm valuations than the large tangible asset intensive companies. This research 
study has examined this aspect in the Indian context. 
Post liberalization the competifion scenario in India has changed. Competition can 
have a complementary impact on firm performance resulting in improvement in sales 
and operating efficiency of finn (Gupta, 2001). A finn's productivity performance 
can be considered as a more telling indicator of efficient investment by various 
stakeholders of the firm and its potential for long-term growth (Kim, 2005). Sustained 
long-run economic growth of a firm is reflected in its sales. Improvement in 
productivity perfonnance and its sales means reduction in agency costs (Baumol, 
1959; Marris, 1964). Alchian (1950); Friedman (1953), and Sfigler (1958) state that 
managerial slack cannot exist or survive in competitive industries. Hence implicitly, 
sales become one of the important of measures of Corporate Governance. This 
research study covers the link between governance and sales. 
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According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Corporate Governance defines the ways in 
which the suppUers of finance to corporations are assured of getting a return on their 
investment in a firni. Stated differently, real margins reflect proper governance. 
Jensen (2001) states that managers have to make trade-offs between various 
conflicting objecfives of the management of a fimi. Hence profit margin management 
is essential, not only for growth strategy but also to improve shareholders' 
perceptions. Good Corporate Governance means that managers should not unduly or 
fi-audulently influence, coerce, manipulate firni's financial statements. Hence a firm's 
margin is a reflection of the firm's utilization of resources and good governance. 
D'Souza, Nash and Megginson's (2000) study of 118 firnis (from 29 countries and 28 
industries) shows that stronger output gains for finns in compefitive industries means 
significant increases in real profitability, real sales, operating profits and capital 
expenditure. 
To sum up, universally, profit margin disclosed in true sense reflects good 
governance. This research study has analyzed the relationship between sales and fimi 
performance. 
Promoters have an important role to play in Corporate Governance process and the 
extent of their holding can cause or mitigate agency costs. Concentrated holding is 
prevalent around the world and it has numerous ramifications on firni performance 
(Claessens et al, 2000; La Porta et al., 2000). Even in US, contrary to belief that the 
ownership is widely dispersed, it is similar to the average ownership concentration of 
European and East Asian countries (Holdemess, 2010). The East Asian crisis amply 
demonstrates that family based governance model affected the economy of not only 
these countries, but also created chaos around the world (Lemmon & Tins, 2003). 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that one-third of S&P 500 finns are family controlled. 
In Western Europe, the majority of public held finns remain family-controlled (La 
Porta et al., 2002; Faccio, Lan-y& Young, 2002; Maury, 2006). Such controlling 
families often hold large equity stakes and frequently have executive representation 
influencing the governance processes (Holderness and Sheehan, 1999; Burkart, 2003). 
Fama and Jensen (1983) hypothesize that majority shareholders use their power to 
expropriate firm resources at the expense of minority shareholders. On the positive 
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side there is also an evidence of higher amount of equity ownership benefiting small 
investors when there is little divergence between the cash flow rights and control 
rights. 
Against this background two sets of contrasting theories emerge regarding ownership 
structures and firm performance; the first one being, monitoring hypothesis or 
convergence-of-interest hypothesis which predicts a positive relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm performance; the second one being entrenchment 
hypothesis which posits a negafive relationship between ownership and finn 
performance. Research studies show that both these effects are observed in a finn due 
to varying levels of ownership and hence the relationship between promoters holding 
and firm performance is invariably observed to be non-linear in developed and 
emerging market studies. 
In a sample of 371 'FortuneSOO' firms, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), find both 
the effects in firms i.e., the convergence-of-interest and entrenchment effect among 
these firms. Their study shows a non-monotonic relationship between board 
ownership and firm performance. Holdemess and Sheehan (1999) also find that 
ownership of a firm has a non-linear impact on firm performance. While observing 
differences in governance systems between US and UK, Keasey and Short (1999) find 
that the relation between managerial ownership and firm perfomiance consists of both 
alignment effect and entrenchment effect operating at different levels of managerial 
shareholding. The values range from maxima at 13 percent and minima at 42 percent 
in the finn values. 
In their studies over two time periods spanning a decade (1,173 firms for 1976 and 
1,093 finns for 1986), McComiell and Servaes (1990) find a strong evidence of a 
curvilinear relation between insider ownership and Tobin's Q. They further observe 
that the maximum is reached when insider ownership is 49.4 percent. Study by Han 
and Suk (1998) further affinn the non-linear relationship between management 
ownership and performance for US firms for the period 1988-1992. In emerging 
market studies Bai et al. (2004) find the impact of large shareholder on finn 
performance to be non-linear i.e., U-Shaped among Chinese firms. 
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However studies by some researchers show the relationship between promoter's 
holding and firm perfonnance to be either linear or having no effect at all. Chen, Guo 
and Mande (2003) study the relation between managerial ownership and market value 
for 123 Japanese finns covering a period from 1987 to 1995 and they find a linear 
relationship between Tobin's Q and managerial ownership. Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996) find that the effects of insider shareholding on finn perfonnance to be 
statisfically insignificant. 
Holdemess and Sheehan (1999) do not find any consistent difference in firm 
performance of manager controlled and owner controlled firnis. Himmelberg, 
Hubbard and Palia (1999) use a fixed effect panel data study and find that managerial 
ownership has no statistically significant effect on firm performance. Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) find ownership concentration and 
firm performance to be unrelated. Chen, Cheung, Stouraitis and Wong (2005) study 
the governance structure and firm performance of 412 listed Hong Kong finns during 
1995-1998. In most of the models, they do not find any relafion between family 
ownership and firm perfonnance, which is measured by return on assets (ROA), 
return on equity (ROE), market to book ratio and dividend payment. 
A number of studies suggest that ownership concentration creates a trade-off between 
incenfive alignment and entrenchment effects (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). In this 
context, the question of whether a family ownership hinders or facilitates firm 
perfonnance becomes an empirical issue that is related to institutional and politico-
regulatory factors (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Family control seems to affect finn 
performance depending on the level of transparency and regulation in the country (La 
Porta et al. 2002). In well-regulated and transparent markets, family ownership in 
public firms reduces agency problems without leading to severe losses in decision 
making efficiency (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Families are more likely to maintain 
control when the efficient scale is small, the need to monitor employees is high, 
investment horizons are long, and the finn has dual-class stock (Villalonga & Amit, 
2009). 
Overall promoters' holding is one of the important Coiporate Governance 
mechanisms that affect the agency cost both in positive and negative ways. In the 
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Indian context there have been a number of studies regarding the relationship between 
promoters" holding and fimi perfonnance which have been included in a separate 
section dealing with research studies about Corporate Governance in India. 
American depository receipts are equity capital raised by Non-US firms. Reduction 
in the firms' cost of capital is an important reason to issue ADRs (Bekaert & 
Campbell, 2000; En-unza & Miller, 2000; Stulz & Hyun-Han, 1999). Many 
developing countries particularly Korean, Latin American and Indian firms are cross-
listing in the US through the American Depository Receipts (ADRs) program. Study 
by Reese and Weisbach (2002) shows that foreign cross-lisfing is associated with 
lower agency costs due to better supervision. Similarly Pagano, Roell and Zechner 
(2002), indicate that experience in foreign markets and the firm's reputafion are other 
advantages of being listed abroad. Karolyi et al., (2006) find that issue of ADRs 
facilitates 'functional convergence' toward a stronger Corporate Governance 
environment. Chong et al., (2009) find that there are more advantages than 
disadvantages when a finn lists its shares in a more developed stock exchange. 
Research studies of Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007) show that foreign firms that list 
in the United States have greater finn values. 
2.3. Research studies on Board Structure 
2.3.1 Board Size 
Boards of directors are economic institutions that help to solve the agency problems 
inherent to organizations. Besides safisfying numerous regulatory requirements, they 
exist primarily to address the issues of conflict of interests (Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2000). Corporate boards ratify all important decisions related to investment policy, 
management compensation policy and other aspects of board governance (Bhagat & 
Bolton, 2008). Hart (1995); Lodi (2000) consider boards as one of the most important 
internal mechanisms of the Corporate Governance system for their role in monitoring, 
investment approvals, developing strategic guidelines, managing conflicts of 
interests,thus benefitting shareholders and stakeholders. 
The agency problem manifests into two types of agency conflicts: first, the conflicts 
between shareholders (owners) and managers; second, the conflicts between 
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controlling majority and minority shareholders (Shleifer &Vishny, 1997). Boards of 
directors belonging to both the groups (shareholders and managers) manage the 
complex governance mechanism, since they have both internal and external interface. 
As a team they form the core aspect of value creation in a firm. 
Board size reflects a trade-off between the firm specific benefits of monitoring and 
costs of such monitoring. Economic considerations such as the specific nature of the 
firm's competitive environment and managerial team drive corporate board size and 
compositions (Boone et al., 2007). However there are diverging views about the board 
size which are discussed in the following section 
Arguments in favor of smaller board size 
Study by Yermack (1996) about the relationship between the board size and firm 
values of large US firms, suggests smaller boards. His findings are that higher 
valuations often come from relatively smaller boards that have fewer than ten 
members. Eisenberg et al., (1998) in their study of small and midsize Finnish firms, 
recommend smaller boards. Both these findings support the theories put forward by 
Lipton and Lorch (1992) and Jensen (1993). The researhers support the findings on 
the premise that the aspects of both cost cutting and downsizing stemming from 
technological and organizational changes, requires smaller board size. Smaller board 
sizes not only reduce the agency problems and costs, but also free rider problems 
associated with larger boards (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). For effective control by 
CEO, Jensen (2001) optimizes around seven or eight members. 
In the studies about emerging markets, Mak and Yuanto (2003) reported that firm 
valuations of listed firms in Singapore and Malaysia are highest when the board 
consists of five members. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) in their study on Malaysian 
finns, support the concept of smaller board size on the contention that each member 
of smaller boards can be easily monitored and decisions can be made more quickly. 
While Bhagat and Black (2008) found no solid evidence on the relationship between 
board size and performance, they observed weak links of an inverse correlation 
between the two. In the Indian context Kaur and Gill (2008) favor smaller boards. 
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Arguments in favor of a larger board size 
According to Zahra and Pearce (1989), larger boards can be effective in their 
oversight duties relative to smaller boards and effectively monitor the action of top 
management and be less dominated by CEOs. Besides bigger boards can bring higher 
management skills and make it easier to make strategic decisions which enhances the 
fimi values. Similarly, Singh and Harianto (1989) suggest larger boards because 
management proposals not benefiting shareholders are easily disapproved by the 
board. Findings of Dalton and Dalton (2005) show that larger boards have increased 
board diversity in terms of experience and skills and monitoring will be effective in 
such companies. Sulong and Mat Nor (2010) studied the relationship between board 
size and firm values measured by Q (Market value /Book value of share) ratio and 
find that board size is positively related to firm values for Malaysian firnis. Abidin, 
Kamal, and Jusoff (2009) in their study of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia, found 
that large board sizes have positive and significant impact on firm performance as 
measured by the value added efficiency instead of the conventional Tobin's Q 
adopted by many researchers. 
In the Indian context research studies by Jackling and Johl (2009); Lange and Sahu 
(2008); Dwivedi and Jain (2005) support large board size. 
Findings of Beiner et al., (2006), suggest that the size of the board of directors is an 
independent control mechanism. As per them the variations in board size is due to the 
specific requirements of the finn and its operating environment. 
Studies on Board size 
Authors 
Yerniack,1996 
Dalton and Dalton, 2005 
Brown and Cayior, 2006 
Sulong and Mat Nor, 
2010.^ 
Focus of study 
Board size and firm values; Study 
covering 452 Large firms in US 
No of directors and financial 
performance 
Corporate Governance and Firm 
Performance 
2,327 firms listed in US 
Dividends, Ownership Structure and 
Board Governance on Firm Value 
Evidence from Malaysian Listed Firms. 
Findings 
Firms with smaller board sizes 
have better firm valuations. 
Findings support larger board 
size 
Board sizes between 6 and 15 
have higher returns on equity 
and higher net profit margins. 
Positive relationship between 
board size and firm values. 
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Indian studies on board size 
Authors 
Dwivedi and Jain.2005 
Kaur and Gill. 2008 
Lange and Sahu, 2008 
Jackling and Johl, 
2009 
Focus of study 
Board size of firms and firm 
valuations 
The Effects of Ownership 
Structure on Corporate 
Governance and performance: An 
Empirical Assessment in India 117 
companies listed in BSE 200 
index.2003-06 
The impact of 
changes to Clause 49 in India 
regarding Board structure and 
size:43 Firms listed in NIFTY50 
Board structure and firm 
performance: Study about Top 
Indian companies having 65% of 
market capitalization Year of 
study.2005-06 
Fiudiugs 
Positive and Significant 
relationship between board size and 
firm values. 
Firms having smaller board sizes 
have better firm valuations 
Firm values are posifively related to 
board size. 
Larger board size is suggested. 
Independent directors are positively 
correlated-with firm performance: 
supporting resource dependency 
theory. CEO duality is not 
detrimental: does not support 
agency theory. 
From the literature review on board size it can be seen that there are variations in the 
research outcomes to date. However across all research studies there is agreement 
regarding the key roles of the board-monitoring and advising (Lange & Sahu, 2008). 
Recent regulations across the world have placed emphasis on the formation of 
separate committees such as Audit committee, Remuneration Committee etc 
comprising of Board members. If due diligence is to effectively exercised then 
overlapping of roles are to be minimized which justifies larger board size and the 
same is the case with India. 
2.3.2 Role of CEO Duality 
CEO duality is an important Corporate Governance mechanism affecting the value of 
a firm. CEO duality means an Executive director perfonning dual roles of Chainnan 
and CEO. Stewardship theory is in favor of CEO duality, Agency theory supports 
CEO non-duality. 
Arguments in favor of CEO Duality 
Stewardship theory supports CEO Duahty. Research evidence supporting stewardship 
theory shows that when one person is perfonning both roles, the director is able to act 
more efficiently and effectively, thereby improving the value of a firm. This is 
because the agency cost between the two is eliminated (Alexander, Fennell & 
Halpem, 1993). Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) say that costs of separation are 
larger than the benefits for most large finns. Their reasoning for such a stand is that 
aditional costs of maintaining a separate CEO and Chaimian is not only due to 
separate compensation but also because of costs associated with informational 
asymmetries. 
In his study of 304 firms of Arab countries, Elsayed (2007) contends that CEO duality 
attracts positive and significant fimi valuations when the corporate performance is 
low. The researcher further states that holding dual roles as CEO/chairman creates 
unity across the company's managers and board of directors facilitating CEO to serve 
the shareholders even better. 
Study by Peng, Zhang and Li (2007) covering 403 publicly listed firms in China 
strongly support stewardship theory (favoring CEO duality) and relatively little 
support for agency theory. 
Some of the other supporters of the above theory are Stoeberl and Sherony (1985); 
Alexander, Fennell and Halpem (1993) and Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997). They 
suggest that CEO duality leads to a higher perfoiTnance as it provides strength to the 
organization. The CEO cannot plan and make the decisions beneficial for the 
shareholders in the case of differences between the CEO and Chairman. 
Bhagat and Jefferis (2002) justify CEO duality by stating that the interests of 
shareholders and the CEO can be aligned without much difficulty. This type of benefit 
to shareholders is wasted in the case of the finns having a non-dual structure of 
leadership. Jackling and Johfs (2009) study does not support the notion of separating 
leadership roles of CEO in line with Agency theory. 
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Arguments in favor of CEO-Non duality 
Proponents of agency theory suggest that the roles of the CEO and chaimian should 
be delegated to different people in order to deal effectively with the agency problem 
of increasing costs and erosion of shareholder's wealth. This method of splitting 
avoids domination by the CEO and lessens his potential opportunistic behavior 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). hi this context, the chainnan, along with his board of 
directors, is more likely to be responsible for certain activities, such as strategic 
advices, mobilizing external resources, HRM, remuneration and monitoring the CEO 
etc, (Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand, 1996).The Cadbury report of 1992, the SOX Act of 
2002 and regulations of various bourses, Shareholder groups and the SEC, 
recommend separation of chair because duality may lead to suboptimal managerial 
perfonnance (Brickley, Coles & Jarrell, 1997). According to Braun and Shanna 
(2007), when family ownership is low the separation of CEO and board chair roles is 
beneficial in terms of shareholders' returns. Mallette and Fowler (1992) state that 
CEO duality has negative implication on firm performance. 
Pathan and Skully (2010) studied 212 US bank holding companies, covering a period 
from 1997 to 2004. The researchers find that in the presence of opportunities for 
insiders to extract private benefits, the CEO and board chair roles should be separated 
to achieve a balance between board independence and such opportunities. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that combining the positions of CEO and board chair 
violates the basic principle of separation of decision management from decision 
control. White and Ingrassia (1992) contend that CEO duality leads to worsening of 
performance as the board cannot remove an underperforming CEO and can create an 
agency cost if the CEO has conflicfing interest benefiting the CEO at the expense of 
other shareholders. 
It is generally opined by the researchers that since the board of directors are 
responsible for the monitoring of management, CEO duality may impair monitoring 
effectiveness. Vance et al, (1983), Lorsch and Mciver (1989), Lipton and Lorsch 
(1992) and Goyal and Park (2002) provide evidence consistent with this notion. 
Institutional Shareholders Services (2006) of governance reforms and Calpers 
[California Public Employees" Retirement System] argue for separating the positions 
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of CEO and board chair, as they beheve, combining these two positions give too 
much power to the CEO and increases agency problems. 
hi their study of 500 large hidian firnis, Sarkar, Sarkar and Sen (2006), find that CEO 
duality increases earnings management (distorting adverse financial positions into 
favorable one). In his research study, Bliss (2011) finds that CEO duality constrains 
board independence. 
The following section deals with research studies where CEO duality or non-duality 
does not affect firm perfoiTnance. 
Moyer, Rao and Baliga (1996) say that there is only a weak evidence to show that 
duality status affects the long term performance.Brian (1995) says that CEO duality 
can have either positive or negative effect on firm performance, depending on the 
industry environment. Ponnu (2008) has studied about Corporate Governance 
structures of Malaysia and finds that there is no significant relationship between CEO 
duality and company performance. Studies by Chen et al., (2008) of Chinese 
companies do not show a significant relaUonship between CEO duality and firm 
perfomiance nor improvement in firm perfonnance after change in leadership 
structure. The empirical research studies by Lam and Lee (2008) provide evidence 
that CEO duality is not necessarily bad for public companies in Hong Kong. 
According to him CEO duality is good for non-family firms, while non-duality is 
good for family-controlled firms. Dey, Engel and Liu's (2009) research evidence 
shows that fiiTns which have capable CEOs are more likely to combine CEO and board 
chair roles (i.e., duahty). 
Studies on CEO Duality 
Authors 
Peng, Ziiang and 
Li (2007) 
Jackling and Johl 
(2009)" 
Dey, Engel and 
Liu (2009) 
Research topic 
CEO duality and firm 
performance 
Board structure and 
firm performance: 
evidence from top 
Indian companies 
CEO and board chair 
roles: To split or not 
to split. 
Focus of study 
403 publicly listed 
firms in China 
Top Indian 
companies with 
65%maket cap 
Impact of CEO 
duality on financial 
perfomiance 
Findings 
Findings Supports stewardship 
theory (favoring CEO duality) 
Does not support agency theory-
CEO duality has no detrimental 
effect on firm performance 
Firms which have capable CEOs 
are more likely to combine CEO 
and board chair roles without 
affecting the firm performance 
Pathan and Skully, 
(2010) 
Chen etal., (2010) 
Does Board Structure 
in Banks Really 
affect their 
perfonnance 
CG index and firm 
perfonnance: The 
index parameters are 
CEO duality-board 
size 
Study of Australian 
banks 
Taiwanese firms 
CEO duality has detrimental 
effect on firm performance 
CEO duality has neither 
detrimental nor positive effect. 
2.3.3 Board independence 
One of the most widely accepted features of good governance in recent years has been 
"boardroom independence". Conventional wisdom demands that a significant 
proportion of company boards should consist of "independent" non-executive 
directors. 
It is often cited that independent directors are the cornerstones of good Corporate 
Governance. Over the last decade, particularly post Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), the 
global movement toward outside director representation has accelerated. Primarily it 
started with the Cadbury Report (1992) recommending that publicly traded companies 
in U.K should have at least three outside directors. CaLPERS and NACD insist on 
adopting similar guidelines. Apparently this trend of global movement is made on an 
assumption that outside directors may be able to make better decisions and enhance 
the monitoring role (Dahya, Dimitrov & McConnell, 2008). 
Related research literature suggests two theories; agency theory and stewardship 
theory. Proponents of the agency theory, Fama and Jensen (1983) and Brickley et al., 
(1994) argue that independent directors may reduce agency cost and improve finn 
perfonnance. They contend that the role of independent directors on the board of 
directors is to effectively monitor and control firm activities in reducing opportunistic 
managerial behaviors and expropriation of firm resources. 
Studies by Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) have observed that the proportion of 
independent directors is correlated to firm performance. 
You, Caves, Smith and Henry (1986) find in their research studies that companies 
with more independent directors tend to be more profitable than those with fewer 
independent directors. Finns that substantially increase the proportion of independent 
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directors have above-average stock price returns (Denis & Sarin 1997). In their 
research studies, Adams and Mehran, (2003) find that increasing the level of the 
proportion of independent directors increases finn performance as they are more 
effective monitors of managers. 
In their studies in emerging markets, Yuetang, Ziye and Xiaoyan (2007) observe that 
in Chinese companies the proportion of independent directors to all directors is 
positively related to companies' financial performance. Further their study results 
indicate that agency theory is suitable for China's capital market. 
Lefort and Urzua (2007) in their study about firms in Chile over a four year period 
find that, the proportion of outside directors affect company values and companies 
having proportional directors improve Corporate Governance and ameliorate the 
agency problem. 
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance recommends that a significant 
proportion of the board's tasks be fulfilled by "non-executive board members capable 
of exercising independent judgment". In 2003, the Higgs report on Corporate 
Governance also advanced the concept of the independent directors, which offers a 
fijrther locus of independent power on the board. Such a strong emphasis on director 
independence is borne from a concern about the distribufion of power at the top of a 
company. Just as there exists a separation of powers in the broader political system, 
e.g. between the executive, legislature, and judiciary, more responsible Corporate 
Governance is expected to occur, if the inherent power of company insiders (led by 
the CEO) is countered by independent non-executives. According to this perspective, 
if board members are not independent, they are vulnerable to management 'capture". 
This may lead them to sanction corporate behavior that runs contrary to their fiduciary 
duties to external shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Farinha and Viana (2006) found that board diligence and independence matters about 
modified opinion in financial statements. In recent studies about Indian finns, 
Jackling and Johl (2009) provide support for the agency theory stating that the outside 
directors on boards are associated with improved finn perfonnance. Based on a 
sample of 500 large Indian firnis, Sarkar, Sarkar and Sen (2006) analyzed the effect of 
board independence on earnings management and their research results indicate that it 
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is not board independence per se, but rather board quality that is important for 
earnings management. With respect to inside directors, their study results indicate that 
CEO-duality and presence of controlling shareholders on the board increases earnings 
management. Morck (2010) finds that independent directors are more ethical and 
rational in their approach. 
On the contrary proponents of stewardship theory opine that independent directors 
will reduce board's efficiency and alleviate companies' financial achievements 
(Caselli & Gatti, 2007;Hemialin & Wesbach, 2000; Yermack, 1996; Klein, 1998). In 
the Indian context Balasubramanian et al (2010); Lange and Sahu (2008) contend that 
the proportion of independent directors may not matter much in finn valuation. 
Studies on Board independence 
Authors 
Sarkar, Sarkar and 
Sen, 2006 
Caselli and Gatti,2007 
Bhagat and Black, 
2008 
Black, Kim and Jang, 
2008 
Morck, 2010 
Focus of study 
Board of Directors and 
Opportunistic. Earnings 
Management: Study of Indian 
firms 
Corporate governance and 
independent Directors: Study of 
Italian firms 
The Non-Correlation Between 
Board Independence and Long-
Term Firm Performance 
Corporate Governance and Firms' 
Market Values: Study of Korean 
firms 
Coiporate Governance Behavior of 
independent directors and Non-
Executive Chairman 
Findings 
Board quality is more important rather 
than mere independence to avoid 
earnings management 
Independent directors impact the rate 
of return only on deals which require 
very specific skills, i.e. during 
turnaround and acquisitions 
Firms with more independent boards do 
not perform better than other firms. 
A minimum number of outside 
directors, without significant ties to 
management or controlling 
shareholders, constitute good corporate 
governance. 
Independent directors, non-executive 
chairman induce greater rationality and 
are more ethical 
2.4 Other Governance mechanisms 
Corporate governance mechanisms and controls are designed to reduce the 
inefficiencies that arise from moral hazard, adverse selection, agency conflicts and 
agency costs. Agency conflicts are an inherent feature of modern corporates. Berle 
and Means (1932) have argued that separation of ownership from management leads 
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to agency costs. Governance literature identifies various internal and external control 
mechanisms to contain the agency costs. Some of these mechanisms are briefly 
discussed in the following section 
2.4.1 Internal mechanisms 
Corporate Governance and Auditors role 
Effective internal Corporate Governance mechanisms are associated with lower agency 
conflicts (Klapper & Love, 2004).The internal mechanisms include internal and 
external auditors, audit committees and management (Cohen et al. 2004). Both 
internal and external auditors have complementary roles to play for implementing 
Corporate Governance effectively thereby reducing some of the agency costs. 
However the auditors must maintain their independence, for their roles to be effective. 
This gives assurance to the board, management and investors on the adequacy of 
internal controls and on the integrity of financial statements. 
2.4.1.1 The Role of Internal auditors in Corporate Governance 
Internal auditors are personnel within an organizafion who test the design and 
implementation of the entity's internal control procedures and the reliability of its 
financial reporting. According to a model of Corporate Governance put forth by the 
Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), the internal audit function is one of the four 
cornerstones of effecfive Corporate Governance, along with the audit committee of 
the board of directors, executive management, and the external auditor(IIA 
2005a).This is because it evaluates corporate activities, helps a firm adhere with 
regulatory standards and industry practices, ensures sound financial reporting and 
facilitates full-time focus on risks and controls. In this context, the primary role of 
internal auditors is to focus on the implementation of accounting standards and 
control systems (Fanning & Piercey, 2010).Thus Internal auditors have two roles to 
play a) provide independent, objective assessment of the organization's activities b) 
act as catalysts for change, advising or advocating improvements to enhance the 
organization's structure (Abhudabhi centre of Corporate Governance). 
The collapse of corporate giants in the past decade has shown that there has been 
failure in the internal control systems. Thus there is an increased emphasis on internal 
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auditing to implement monitoring and control systems over management's financial 
reporting decisions (Archambeault et al. 2008). Research findings of Aggarwal, Erel, 
Stulz and Williamson (2008) are that, internal governance (part of internal auditing) 
and investor protection are complements rather than substitutes. Audit committees 
and Boards seek extensive assistance from internal auditors for addressing internal 
Corporate Governance issues (Prawitt, Smith & Wood, 2009). 
2.4.1.2 The Role of External Auditors in Corporate Governance 
Lutzenberger (2010) opines that external auditors fonn one of the four pillars of 
Corporate Governance. The external auditor attests the accuracy of information 
provided by management to investors. A "true and fair view" is the crux of an audit 
opinion as given by an Auditor which compels managers to implement appropriate 
accounting policies and also discourage creative accounting practices. This will 
monitor manager's behavior thereby addressing agency problems and facilitating 
better management of risk (Ojo, 2009). Finally the financial audit remains an 
important aspect of Corporate Governance that makes management accountable to 
shareholders for its stewardship of a company (Beattie et al., 2001). 
2.4.1.3 Corporate Governance tiirougli Audit committees 
The Audit Committee of the Board is today seen as a key fulcrum of any company. 
Being mandatory under Clause 49 and secfion 292A of the Companies Act -1956, the 
Audit Committee can be of great help to Board in implementing, monitoring and 
continuing good Corporate Governance pracfices to the benefit of the company and its 
stakeholders. The external auditor is under the fiduciary burden and to protect his 
independence, Audit committees can play an effective role by appointing the right 
type of external auditors and their terms of reference (Fan & Wong, 2002). The audit 
committee also assists the board of directors with its Corporate Governance oversight 
responsibilities in the areas of: 
* Finn's external auditing and the integrity of the finn's financial statements 
* Internal auditing processes to assure that the finn's internal controls are effective 
* Regulatory and legal compliance 
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* Risk management to assure effective allocation of the fimi's resources (financial, 
human, tangible assets and goodwill) 
Over a period of time, the role of the audit committee as a central facet in the 
execution of first-rate Corporate Governance has been continually evolving and in 
fiiture the audit committee may be called upon to address specific issues that fall 
outside of its primary role. 
Thus from the above literature review one can infer the inalienable relationship 
among the triad group (internal auditor, statutory external auditor and audit 
committee) and their critical role in transparency and accountability resulting in better 
Corporate Governance practices. 
2.4.1.4 Role of employees in Corporate Governance 
Employees have, traditionally been viewed as "outsiders" to the corporation (Hill, 
2006). The conventional model of the governance framework is built on the primacy 
of shareholders and accordingly the regulatory framework is built up. In reality many 
of the processes of Corporate Governance are implemented through the employees 
and their role is becoming important because their participation not only improves 
governance but also enhances wealth creation. Research findings of (Blair, 1995; 
Blair & Stout, 1999; Roberts & Steen, 2000) affirm that shareholders' long-run 
interests are well-served by including employees in Corporate Governance. 
Muthuswamy, Bobinsky and Jawahar (2009) state that in modem corporation 
employees implement the Corporate Governance systems and their role should be 
duly recognized. 
2.4,2 External mechanisms 
2.4.2.1 Tlie Legal System 
Research evidence shows that development of money and capital markets is largely 
dependent on investor protection in a country - de jure and de facto. Research by 
Khanna (2009), suggests that better corporate laws and governance tend to be 
correlated with better stock market development, more dispersed ownership 
structures, and higher firm values. Firms rely on external finance, both equity and 
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debt, in meeting their investment needs. This involves basically a set of complex 
contractual arrangements influenced primarily by the legal system of the country, 
within which the finn operates. With better investor protection and lower 
expropriation by controlling shareholders, outsider investors intend to invest more or 
pay higher share prices in the hope that more of the firm's profits would be returned 
back to them in the fonn of interest or dividends (La Porta et al., 2000). Klapper and 
Love (2004) suggest that better firm level governance mechanisms can improve the 
investors" protection to a certain degree, but firms alone cannot fully compensate for 
the absence of a strong legal system of the country thus complementing the role of 
better legal systems. 
Cross country studies covering 27 countries by La Porta et al., (2002) find that in 
countries where shareholder rights are better protected by the law, investors are 
willing to pay more premiums, resuUing in better firm valuations. As a consequence, 
they also contend that the cost of borrowing and equity is also low. 
In contrast to the legal systems in developed economies, the legal protection of the 
finn's shareholders or creditors in many developing economies tends to be very low 
because of the differences in interpretation of the legal systems and poor legal 
enforcement (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Similarly, debt contracts enforced through 
better legal systems help creditors to protect and exercise their rights through 
liquidation or bankruptcy process (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). All these will reduce the 
transaction costs (reduced controls and covenants) and consequently the agency costs. 
The legal system of a country also detennines the Corporate Governance structure in 
relation to the rules regarding the ownership and board structures, mergers and 
liquidations and shareholders' rights (Gugler et al., 2003). 
2.4.2.3 Role of financial regulatory Institutions in Corporate Governance: The 
role of capital markets 
Efficient capital market systems can mitigate the agency problems through 
disciplining the management and improving the firm's overall governance (Drobetz et 
al., 2004). Capital markets are an important source of finance for firms (Samuel, 
1996) and they can exert both direct and indirect influence on the governance 
practices of the listed firms (Singh, 2003).The direct governance measures include: 
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tightening listing requirements, controlling insider dealing arrangements (insider 
trading), imposing disclosure and accounting rules, ensuring protection of minority 
shareholders and attracting efficient managers (Claessens, 2003; Singh et al, 2002). 
From the investment perspective, research findings by Gugler et al., (2003) support 
the view that the strength of a country's external capital market detennines the degree 
of a fmn's investment perfomiance. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) contend that a firm is 
likely to get external finance not only because of the reputation of the capital market 
and excessive investor optimism, but also by adopting good governance practices. 
External investors take into account governance aspects such as better investor 
protection and lower expropriation in their investment decision (LLSV, 2002). As per 
them better governance quality reduces the agency costs to the external providers of 
funds in relation to their monitoring and auditing costs and expropriations by 
controlling shareholders' and insiders. 
However, in developing economies, the role of the capital markets in the Corporate 
Governance process is likely to be less effective (Iskander & Chamlou, 2000). This is 
because of weaker Corporate Governance practices, dominance of a few large firnis, 
low trading volumes and liquidity and dormant behavior of institutional shareholders. 
In the case of developing economies, the effectiveness of the pricing (e.g. both 
allocative and takeover) mechanisms tends to remain rudimentary because lack of 
transparency proper and disclosures (Alba et al., 1998; Tobin, 1984). In this context 
Indian capital markets are reasonably efficient. 
2.4.2.4 Competition in Product Markets as Corporate Governance Control 
mechanisms 
Friedman (1953) says that perfect competition in product markets solves the 
associated problems of Corporate Governance and agency costs. This is because 
perfect competition would ensure economic efficiency. Gillan (2005) examines 
different aspects of Corporate Governance, including compensation structure and 
CEO turnover and affirms the findings of Friedman (1953). Tobin (1984) dissects 
share price efficiency of the stock market into information arbitrage efficiency and 
fundamental valuation efficiency. Valuation efficiency means where share prices are 
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fairly reflected in the future discounted earnings of the firm which is dependent on 
operating perfonnance. Koke and Renneboog's (2003) study investigates the impact 
of Corporate Governance and product market competition on total factor productivity 
growth in Germany and the UK. For Gennany, productivity grows faster in firms 
controlled more by financial institutions, such as banks and insurance companies, and 
intense compefition reinforces this beneficial impact. For the UK, they find that 
shareholder control leads to substantial increases in productivity in poorly perfonning 
finns and product market competition is a subsfitute for block holder control. In both 
the countries their research findings support the general nofion that competition 
mitigates managerial agency problems because managerial slack is avoided. Sales of a 
firm are one of the measures of effectiveness of managing competition. 
2.4.2.5 The Monitoring Role of Takeover reducing agency costs 
Various researchers have been suggesfing that an active takeover market, controls 
agency costs. Research findings by Manne (2008) suggest that the market for 
corporate control can be one of the important tools for improving the efficiency of 
fimis, thereby contain the agency costs. Cyert, Kang and Kumar (2002) find that 
effective internal governance by the Board of Directors and external takeover threats 
by large shareholders act as subsfitutes in imposing managerial control. Empirical 
evidence shows that firms in active capital markets, which do not demonstrate 
expected performance, face the risk of being taken over, resulting in managerial 
redundancies and loss of reputafion. This forces them to be efficient thus reducing 
agency costs. Albuquerque and Wang (2008), find that the managerial expropriation 
depends upon both internal and external control systems. A strong disciplinary role of 
the market for corporate control is a good supplement to internal governance failures 
scheme and imperfect competition in the product market. This is because efficient 
competitors always plan growth strategies for scaling up using the M&A route. Weir 
and Laing (2002) found that takeovers play a positive monitoring role on the poor 
internal governance pracfices of offeree companies. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) 
observe that large shareholder plays an important role in takeovers and serves as a 
monitor of the managers and in this process they can create value for the firni. 
Cremers and Nair (2005), and Cremers, Nair and John (2009) suggest that good 
50 
Corporate Governance and the threat of takeovers improve fmii values. Extending this 
argument Ruback and Jensen (1983), find that hostile takeovers improve firm values. 
While the above researchers find positive relationship between active takeovers and 
good Corporate Governance practices, there are certain research findings which have 
contrasting views. Research finding of Franks and Mayer (2001) is that hostile 
takeovers do not perform their disciplinary role as expected, as directors from both the 
badly and normally performing offeree companies are removed from their positions. 
They also found that not all offeree companies in hostile takeovers are bad perfonners 
as their peer companies. In another study, Herman and Lowerstein (1986) observe that 
offeror companies are not necessarily better performers than offeree companies before 
takeovers. 
To summarize, overall evidence points out to the fact that active market for corporate 
control forces managers to focus on efficiency thereby reducing agency costs. 
2.4.2.6 Shareholder Activism 
Effective and acfive participation by shareholders can lead to better Corporate 
Governance reforms. Planned activism checks managerial discretion thereby 
curtailing misappropriafions and agency costs (Monks and Minow, 2001). Activism is 
exercised through vofing and managerial engagement. As per the principal-agent 
framework of Jensen and Meckling (1976), proper activism is one of the important 
Corporate Governance monitoring devices. Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998) 
say that active investors may engage and consult with management and non-executive 
directors to resolve any governance issues behind the scenes. Becht, Franks, Mayer, 
and Rossi (2008) conducted an in-depth analysis of the activism undertaken by 
Hermes UK Focus Fund and find that abnonnal returns of 4.5% for the period 1998-
2004 was attributable to the effectiveness of its activism. 
However there are contradicting views of the positive effect of shareholder activism. 
Webb, Beck, and McKinnon (2003) found that active intervention by shareholders in 
the decision making process could be self-defeating. There is a considerable amount 
of research evidence indicating negative impact of such shareholder activism (Pound, 
1992; Black, 1998; Gillan & Starks, 2000; Bhagat & Romano, 2001). Kaipoffs 
(2001) study about the impact of shareholder activism shows that only improvement 
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in the governance structures without changes in the strategies of firms may not 
improve fmn's earnings. 
2.4.2.7 Shareholder Voting 
Voting is the cheapest form of activism. Since it obviates other costly mechanisms, 
regulators have placed increased emphasis on informed voting as a means of 
improving governance. Shareholders use voting as a channel of communication with 
boards of directors, and protest voting can lead to significant changes in Corporate 
Governance and strategy (Yennack, 2010).The researcher further states that market-
based methods are being used to establish the value of voting rights. Signals sent by 
shareholders who vote against the incumbent management have negative market 
reactions, if dissent signals fundamental problems with the company's governance 
structure and its bleak perfonnance. This prompts institutions such as pension funds, 
mutual funds and local authorities to vote their shares in an infomied and responsible 
manner (Myners, 2004). 
There is also specific provision in the Combined Code to facilitate engagements 
between management and major shareholders (Section l.D Combined Code, 2006). 
2.4.2.8 Institutional investors and Corporate Governance 
The influence exerted by institutional shareholders differs between developed markets 
and emerging markets. In the developed markets, institutional investors, being an 
important part of the capital market, tend to influence the process of Corporate 
Governance. Study by Samuel (1996) finds that institutional investors tend to be more 
efficient than individual investors in collecfing, analyzing and acting on objectives, 
finn specific fundamental information, and thus influence a finn's investment and 
other financial decisions. As per Mailings (2004) research findings, effecfive 
engagement of the finns by the institutional investors solves the agency problems. 
Engagement process includes; periodic evaluation of overall governance disclosures; 
Exercising voting power; Intervening whenever necessary 
In line with the above findings, the Institutional Shareholders" Committee (ISC), 
California Public Employees' Retirement System (CaLPERS) and other acfive 
organizations believe that good Corporate Governance leads to better performance. 
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They seek corporate refonns to protect their investments. Their Corporate 
Governance team challenges companies and the status quo-by proxy voting and 
closely working with regulatory agencies to strengthen financial markets. They also 
focus on the governance processes of ailing companies to turn them around. 
Hermes Funds of UK also operate the same way as that of CaLPERS. Their practices 
also are rooted in the fundamental belief that companies which involve such 
institutional shareholders are more likely to achieve superior long-term financial 
perfonnance than those without. Regular communication with companies is core to 
Hennes' approach to applying its Corporate Governance policy. Mohanty (2003) 
finds that institutional investors in India base their decisions of investment on the 
Corporate Governance pracfices of the firms. 
In contrast, Samuel (1996) does not find any evidence of the impact of insfitutional 
ownership on investment perfonnance in developed markets. However his research 
evidence shows that the monitoring and disciplinary activities of institutional 
investors may act as a viable alternative to debt finance as well as the market for 
corporate control, particularly in finns in developing countries which rely more on 
debt than equity. The reason for lack of control is because institutional investors in 
developing economies generally represent only a small part of a diversified portfolio 
and also may not be strong enough to impose fairness, efficiency, and transparency 
(Iskander and Chamlou, 2000). Similar findings are also reported by Sarkar and 
Sarkar (2000) who do not find an important role played by institutional investors in 
the Corporate Governance aspects of Indian companies. 
Overall there has been a growing trend among institutional investors, even in 
emerging markets, to pursue active engagement policies. 
2.4.2.9 Corporate governance: The role of creditors-lending institutions 
An active debt market can mitigate the agency problem by providing the debt holders 
with the incentives and power to monitor and control insiders' expropriation (Sfiglitz 
1985; Gul & Tsui, 1998). According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997) the strong 
covenants help creditors to reduce agency costs by controlling cash flow rights as well 
as control rights. Creditors can liquidate a firm, acquire the assets used as collateral, 
and convert the debt into equity, so on (Shleifer & Vishny 1997). Among S & P 500 
5: 
firms based in the US, Anderson et al., (2000) found cost of debt to be inversely 
related to board size, audit committee independence, size and meeting frequency. This 
demonstrates the selective approach adopted by the lenders. 
2.4.3 Corporate Governance and Cost of Equity Capital 
Better governed finTis have better access to equity finance at lower rates which 
reduces agency costs (Claessens, 2003; LLSV, 2000; Singh, 2003). Gompers et al, 
(2003) observe that poor Corporate Governance provisions can mean additional 
agency costs to the firms in the form of inefficient investment and other capital 
expenditure decisions (additional cost of capital). 
The conventional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) states that expected return is 
equal to the sum of the risk free return plus beta fimes the market premium. This 
'Concept is valid where there are no transaction costs. There are additional transaction 
costs due to inefficient investments and borrowings. Drobetz et al., (2004) argue that, 
apart from the systematic risks embedded in the beta. Corporate Governance could be 
treated as an additional risk factor for which investors require an adequate 
compensation in terms of higher expected returns. Lombardo and Pagano (2002) 
indicate that investors expect additional compensation for their expected monitoring 
costs, auditing costs, and other forms of expropriations associated with the firm's 
governance process. They find that Outsiders are likely to provide more finance and 
expect lower rates of return if they are given greater assurance of a return on their 
investment (through better governance). 
Based on the CLSA survey of emerging markets Chen et al., (2007) find that 
improvements in both disclosure and non-disclosure aspects of Corporate Governance 
mechanisms reduces the cost of equity capital. They find that cost of equity capital 
reduces by 1.26% when there is improvement in Corporate Governance rankings 
(non-disclosure aspects) fi"om the 25'^  percentile to the 75''^  percentile. Similar 
improvements in disclosure segment reduce the cost of equity by 0.47%. This 
observation substantiates the arguments of Aggarwal and Williamson (2006) that 
investors appreciate adoption of voluntary governance practices beyond the mandated 
ones. Research findings by Hail and Leuz (2006) indicate that in countries with legal 
protection of minority shareholders, extensive disclosure lowers the cost of capital. 
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Legal protection encompasses both rights stipulated by laws and tne"Bffe(?ti'veness of 
enforcement of those laws (La Porta et al., 2006). Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007) 
further add that besides the country and firm level Corporate Governance factors, 
levels of financial development and access to capital also reduce the cost of capital. 
Findings of Zhu (2009) are also similar. While investigating the linkages between 
Corporate Governance and cost of equity capital associated among developed 
commonwealth countries, Gupta, Krishnamurti and Rad (2010) find better governance 
reduces the cost of equity. 
Studies on the relationship between Corporate Governance and cost of equity 
Authors 
LLSV, 2000 
Lombardo and 
Pagano, 2002 
Gompers et al., 
2003 
Claessens, 2003 
Hail and Leuz, 2006 
Doidge, Karolyi 
and Stulz, 2007 
Chen et al, 2007 
Zhu, 2009 
Gupta, Krishnamurti 
and Rad, 2010 
Focus of study 
Legal determinants of equity;study 
covering 49 countries 
Legal determinants of the rehim on 
equity; 
Study covering 183 firms in developed 
economies spread across 22 countries 
CG and equity prices 
Study coveringL500 large firms 
In S&P list 
CG and equity prices 
Study covering 1,198 Czech and Slovak 
firms (1992-93) 
Differences in legal enforcement and 
cost of equity;study covering 40 
countries 
Protection for minority investors and 
financial development; 
Study covering495 firms spread across 
2.5coun tries 
Cost of equity based on CLSA survey of 
emerging markets of Asia 
Corporate Governance, Equity and debt 
study spanning 22 countries 
Corporate Governance and cost of 
equity: 
7380 firm years spanning across 22 
developed countries 
Findings 
Better quality of law enforcement 
reduces the cost of equity 
Shareholder rights is negatively 
associated with cost of equity 
capital 
Firms with stronger shareholder 
rights have higher firm values, 
higher profits and higher sales 
growth and lower cost of equity 
Outside controlling shareholding 
and domestic shareholding are 
posifively related with firm value 
Better enforcement reduces cost of 
equity 
Better legal protecfion and 
financial development reduces the 
cost of equity 
Cost of equity is reduced by 1.26% 
points when the non-disclosure CG 
ranking is improved from 25 th 
percentile to 75th percentile 
Good CG practices reduces the 
cost of equity 
Better firm level governance 
attributes reduces the cost of equity 
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2.5 Research studies about Corporate Governance in India 
This section deals with research studies on Corporate Governance in hidia. The 
literature review covers studies on ownership structures, board structures and other 
mechanisms. It also covers studies on Corporate Governance index and financial 
perfonnance. 
Indian Corporate Governance system is considered as a hybrid of the outsider-
dominated market-based systems of the UK and the US, and the insider-dominated 
bank-based systems of Germany and Japan (Sarkar and Sarkar, 1999). Regarding the 
legal system, India has one of the best Corporate Governance laws but 
implementation of the same has been poor (Chakrabarti, 2005). In India the Corporate 
Governance systems are enunciated in the companies Act of 1956 and SEBI's Clause 
49 of the listing agreements. There have been quite a few studies about the adoption 
of clause 49 of the listing agreements which came into force from l" January, 2006. 
Bhattacharyya and Rao (2005) examined whether adoption of Clause 49 predicts 
lower volatility and returns for large Indian firnis and find no difference in volatility 
in firm's returns and mixed results for share price returns. Black and Khanna (2007) 
conducted an 'event study' of the adoption of Clause 49. The regulatory requirement 
compliance was phased in such a way that 'large' firms were required to comply 
before 'small' firms. The event study report showed higher positive returns to a 
treatment group of large firms when compared to a control group of small firms. 
Allen, Chakrabarti and De (2007) find significant improvements in the current 
Corporate Governance nornis and practices and find that investor protection still 
needs improvement and social governance has improved due to improvements in 
institufions' providing microfinance. 
Another interesting feature of research study in India has been about the governance 
aspect of Indian software companies. Software companies are new type of business 
structures which emerged in the Indian corporate scene with an average age of firms 
being less than two decades. They are deemed to adopt good governance practices, 
perhaps because of their business affiliafions with Europe and US where SOX Act is 
being followed. 
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Arora and Athreye (2002) find that Indian software companies have good Coiporate 
Governance practices when compared to the rest of companies. Their study approach 
is an interview based survey of 60 Indian software companies. They find that the 
trend to be gi"owing. Similar observations have been made by Khanna and Palepu 
(2006) in their study about hidian software fimis. 
Kumar, Pedersen and Zattoni (2008) studied 547 hidian firms over a 17 year period 
from 1990 to 2006. The premise of their study is based on institutional theory and 
transaction cost based theory. Their research findings are that when governance of the 
state improves and institutional factors are more democratic, then the perfonnance 
benefits of group affiliation wears away. Further, in case of asset intensive 
manufacturing firms, older affiliated Indian fmns are able to manage transition better 
than newer affiliated firms. 
Afsharipour (2009) opines that Indian Corporate Governance systems are still shaped 
by political, social forces and closed ownership structures and much needs to be done 
to improve the CG practices. 
Commercial agencies have also studied the Corporate Governance systems in India. 
Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) conducted governance survey in 2001 
covering 68 Indian companies. S&P had conducted 'transparency and disclosure 
survey' in the year 2002, covering 42 Indian companies. Commercial Rating agencies 
in India, Moody's, ICRA, and CARE rate companies on Corporate Governance 
criteria adopting methods unique to each agency. However such a system is at the 
preliminary stage and only few companies have been rated so far. Rating companies 
primarily focus on rafing of debt instruments. Lenders of finance and investors in the 
capital markets view basically the debt rafings issued by these firms as a proxy for 
due diligence. 
Aggarwal and Klapper's (2003) study is based on 152 IPO's issued during the period 
1999-2001 and they find that there is a positive relationship between insfitutional 
investment and size of the firm and that foreign investors invest more in larger fimis 
because of transparency. 
As a part of case study about TATA group of companies, Kakani and Joshi (2008) 
find stronger ownership ties and cohesiveness among group affiliates and business 
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groups which affects the interests of the minority shareholders in the individual 
operating companies (i.e., its own affiliates). 
2.5.1 Studies on ownership structures 
Chibber and Majumdar (1999) studied the impact of Foreign and Domestic 
shareholding on firm's profitability. Their study, covering years 1992 and 1993, is 
about 800 Indian firms. Their findings are that foreign ownership holdings during the 
pre-refonn era had no effect on firm's profitability. However, during the post reform 
era, ownerships beyond 51 % show a positive relationship between the holdings and 
firm performance proxied by return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS). 
Besides, their studies show that equitable ownership (between Indian and foreign 
ownership) is the key factor among Indian companies to increase their exports on a 
sustainable basis and become global. 
Phani et al., 2005, based on their research, attribute Corporate Governance problems 
in India due to disproportionate differences between cash flow rights and control 
rights in different ownership structures. 
Chakrabarti, Megginson and Yadav (2007) find that Indian corporates are still 
dominated by the family groups and there is significant amount of pyramiding and 
tunneling among them. Their study has current relevance and pertains to the 500 
largest companies listed in BSE. 
Chakrabarti (2005) finds that in many Indian firms, ownership remains concentrated 
within the family business groups and despite India having finest legal systems, its 
implementafion has been very poor regarding investor protection. Besides earnings 
management is a common feature among Indian corporates. 
Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002) provide evidence on tunneling within 
Indian business groups. Their study is focused on fmns belonging to large groups but 
controlled by an ultimate owner through a pyramidal ownership structure resulting in 
disproportionately higher cash flow rights than control rights. They contend that 
transfer pricing, which affects the operating profits of the firm, is not an important 
source of tunneling in India. Khanna, Kogan and Palepu (2006) studied instances of 
minority shareholder expropriation by Indian fimis and affinn these views. 
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Contradictory views are held by Seigel and Choudary (2010) in their studies about the 
'tunneling" effects of "owner managers". 
During their study about the association between insider ownership and firm 
performance, Phani et al. (2005) find asset utilization and employee productivity 
higher at higher levels of insider shareholding. 
Study by Marisetty and Vedpuriswar (2005) is about two types of insider ownership-
first ternied as 'Manager-Owner' where managers are assigned ownership rights as a 
post facto incentive mechanism by the owners; the second being 'Owner-Manager' 
who is a promoter as well as a manager having de-facto ownership. As per the 
researchers, the pattern of Indian governance mechanisms is that of the Owner-
Manager type and that insider ownership has no influence on the perfonnance of the 
firm in majority of industries, in the Indian context. Their findings are that shares of 
good governance companies are less mispriced compared to badly governed 
companies. 
Following studies are on the relationship between promoter's holding and firm 
performance; 
Khanna and Palepu (1999) studied the problem of insider ownership and its linkage to 
performance. Their research study, covering 567 groups affiliated and 437 unaffiliated 
finns, found that there is a posifive relationship between insider ownership and 
performance of the firm using Tobin's Q as a proxy for firm performance. They also 
found that group affiliated firms are difficult to monitor and director's holding has no 
perceptible impact on the firm values. Based on the data of 1613 firms for the year 
1995-96, Sarkar and Sarkar's (1999) study shows a non-linear relafion between 
promoters' holding and firm values i.e., it first decreases up to 25 percent and 
increases thereafter. In case of corporate bodies' shareholding, beyond 15 percent, 
Tobin's Q shows a positive association with firm value. In another study, Sarkar and 
Sarkar (2005) find that promoter shareholding has no impact on finn value in case of 
low growth finns while it has positive impact on firni value for high growth firms. 
Kumar's study (2004) is also about ownership structures of Indian companies and 
dividend policies. His findings are that there exists a posifive association between 
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dividends and earning trends. Kumar's (2005) study examines, 2000 Indian fimis 
over the years 1994 to 2000.The empirical study is about the effects of Coiporate 
Governance (based on ownership structure) on the fmn perfonnance from an 'agency 
perspective'. His research evidence, suggests that firm size, measured by sales, is 
positively related to the finn perfonnance. He does not find any evidence about 
differences in ownership structure affecfing finn perfonnance. 
Pattanayak (2008) examines the effect of insider ownership on finn perfonnance in 
India for the period of 2000-04, covering 1833 listed finns. He finds that the relafion 
between insider shareholding and finn perfonnance is non-linear, which implicitly 
means the presence of monitoring and entrenchment roles of insiders at different 
levels of ownership. 
Saravanan (2009) has studied the Corporate Governance characteristics of Family 
Owned and Non-Family Owned Businesses of India. The number of firms was 771, 
covering a period 2001 to 2005. His study found that the finn values measured by 
Tobin's Q, are not significantly affected by the ownership type of the finn. 
From the above the studies it is evident that the results about the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm values are mixed and there is still difference of opinion 
among researchers. The purpose of this research study is to reexamine the relationship 
between promoters' holding and firm performance in the case of firms in the BSE 100 
index. 
2.5.2 Board structures and firm performance 
Sarkar and Sarkar (2005) examine the relafionship between multiple directorships, 
'busy' directors and firm performance. Their findings are that multiple directorships 
by independent directors correlate posifively with finn values. This finding supports 
the "quality hypothesis" which posits that busy directors are likely to be better 
directors depending on the institufional context and the type of director. 
Parthasarathy, Menon and Bhattacherjee (2006) investigated the detenninants of 
execufive compensation systems among Indian firms. Their findings are that CEO 
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compensation and incentives are related to the firm size. Besides CEO's who are 
promoters earn disproportionately higher than CEO's who are not. Varottil's (2010) 
study is about the evolution of independent directors in the hidian context. In hidia 
the concept of independent directors is different from other countries. For example 
financial institutions like LIC, IDBI have nominee directors who are considered to be 
independent, which is not so in other countries. His finding suggests the need for 
revamping of the regulatory and other support systems for their effecfive functioning. 
However, using a sample of 500 firms, Sarkar, Sarkar and Sen (2006) invesfigate the 
impact of board characteristics on opportunistic earnings management and find that 
the quality rather than independence of the board is an important factor in earnings 
management. 
There have been also studies regarding board size, board independence and CEO 
duality. Dwivedi and Jain's (2005) study is about 340 hidian companies having sales 
above Rs 2.5b covering a period froml997 to 2001. They find that bigger boards have 
a positive associafion with firm value. Kaur and Gill (2008) found that hidian firnis 
prefer smaller board size and increases in the proportion of independent directors does 
not have significant improvement on perfomiance of Companies. Lange and Sahu's 
(2008) research, covering 3 years from 2005 to 2007, is about the impact of regulatory 
changes (implementation of clause 49) in India, particularly the size and composition 
of boards. Their findings are that Indian firms prefer larger boards. Tackling and Johl s 
(2009) study of top Indian companies provides partial support to the two theories of 
Corporate Governance, namely agency and resource dependence theory. Their 
findings are that larger board size and a greater proportion of outside directors on 
boards are associated with improved firm performance and CEO duality does not 
affect finn performance. A joint study by Mayur and Saravanan (2008) examined the 
board structures (Board size) and financial performance measured by Tobin's Q and 
Market to Book ratio. The study relates to 37 banks for the period-2001 to 2005. Their 
findings are that board sizes do not really matter in the performance of these banks. 
Indian studies on board size 
Authors 
Dwivedi and Jain,2005 
Mayur and Saravanan, 2008 
Kaur and Gill, 2008 
Lange and Sahu, 2008 
Jackling and Johl, 
2009 
Focus of study 
Board size of firms and firm 
valuations 
Board size and firm valuations of 
Banks 
The Effects of Ownership 
Structure on Corporate 
Governance and performance; An 
Empirical Assessment in India 
117 companies listed in BSE 200 
mdex.2003-06 
The impact of 
changes to Clause 49 in India 
regarding Board structure and 
size:43 Firms listed in NIFTY50 
Board structure and firm 
performance: Study about Top 
Indian companies having 65% of 
market capitalization Year of 
study.2005-06 
Findings 
Positive and Significant 
relationship between board size 
and firm values. 
No significant relationship is 
found between Board size and 
performance of Banks 
Firms having smaller board sizes 
have better firm valuations. 
Board independence does not 
matter 
Firm values are positively related 
to board size. Board 
independence has no significant 
impact on firm values 
Larger board size is suggested. 
Independent directors are 
positively correlated-with firm 
perfonnance: supporting resource 
dependency theory. CEO duality 
is not detrimental: does not 
support agency theory. 
It can be seen that there are inconsistencies in the research outcomes to date with 
respect to all the three aspects of board structures. With respect to CEO duality, 
perhaps the divergence can be explained from the fact that there is a potential tradeoff 
regarding the benefits to a firni due to either duality or non-duality. With respect to 
board independence, Balasubramanian et al ., (2010) find that due to India's stringent 
regulatory requirements of the proportion of independent directors, additional 
numbers inay not have a significant impact on finn valuations. 
2.5.3 Index based studies in India 
From the point of Index based studies, there have been two studies so far (Mohanty, 
2003 & Balasubrainanian et al., 2010) and they are specific for one particular year 
only. 
Froin the institutional point of view, governance study by Mohanty (2003) is a 
pioneering one in the Indian context. He developed CG index using a unique 
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weightage method to examine how finn-level governance influences the behavior of 
institutional investors, or vice-versa. Corporate Governance index developed by him 
is based on 19 parameters. These parameters are related to the governance practices 
affecting stake holders. The weights are assigned based on their impact, positive, 
neutral and negative on the stake holders. The weights range from (Positve+2 to 10), 
(neutral being 0 in all cases) and negative (-3 to -15). He finds that institutional 
investors accord priority to good governance before investment decisions are made 
and that the institutional investors own a higher percentage of the shares of better-
governed Indian firms which is consistent with research in other countries (Aggarwal, 
Klapper & Wysocki, 2005; Ferreira & Matos, 2007). 
The latest research study of the relationship between Corporate Governance and firni 
perfonnance in India is by Balasubramanian et al., (2010).They have constructed a 
Corporate Governance Index (ICGI) of Indian companies based on the responses to 
the questionnaire mailed to the companies. The responses have been compiled by 
adopting binary method. Their findings are that Indian Corporate Governance rules 
appear appropriate for larger companies and the rules need some relaxation for 
smaller companies. They find evidence of a positive relationship between Corporate 
Governance and firm values measured by Tobin's Q. 
2.5.4 The need for country specific studies 
There have been cross country and country specific studies both in developed and 
emerging markets on various aspects of Corporate Governance. In their study of 
Korean companies. Black et al., (2006) have emphasized the need for country specific 
studies. Sarkar and Sarkar (2005) also support country specific studies because the 
findings of the research in the developed markets may not be in consonance with the 
Indian context. This is because over a period of time due to the impact of socio 
economic factors, the Governance parameters do change along with other related 
issues. In India too, there have been changes in different aspects of Governance, some 
of which have been made mandatory as per the listing agreements of SEBI (revised 
clause 49) for companies listed or intending to list in the Indian bourses. 
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While fundamentally U.K. and USA have the same goals, with respect to 
strengthening Corporate Governance, perspectives and approaches differ. In the U.S. 
it is the responsibility of the States and the stock exchanges to determine their 
Corporate Governance requirements. In the U.K. it is the responsibility of the Security 
Exchange Commission to overlook adherence to Corporate Governance regulations 
whereas it is the duty of the Sarbanes Oxley act (state) to overlook the Corporate 
Governance rules and regulations in U.S.A. All such factors support the case for 
country specific studies in Corporate Governance. 
There have been many changes in the Corporate Governance scenario in recent times 
in India. The Sub prime crisis, bankruptcy of Lehman brothers, Satyam scandal, etc 
have changed the Indian Corporate Governance landscape. 
This study captures the essence and impact of the recent regulations, on the Indian 
companies, belonging to BSE 100 index group. While the objective of this study is to 
examine the relationship between Corporate Governance and firm values, the 
approach is different from Balasubramanian et al., (2010) in terms of time span and 
firm clusters. A governance index has been developed as a proxy for Corporate 
Governance. The Governance index measures the overall governance practices rather 
than a single attribute. 
This research study is different from other studies on the same topic on three counts. 
First the index is based on the data available in the public domain which facilitates 
generalizability. Secondly the panel data of 5 years from 2004 - 2008 provides 
robustness to the results. Thirdly the companies listed in BSE 100 comprise of BSE 
30, NSE 50 and represents 60-70% market capitalization. There have been no studies 
on BSE 100 companies covering this period. 
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Studies on Corporate Governance in India 
Authors 
Khanna and 
Palepu(1999) 
Chibber and 
Majumdar(]999) 
Sarkar and 
Sarkar(2000) 
Aggarwal and 
Klapper(2003) 
Mohanty( 2003) 
Kumar (2005) 
Dwiedi and 
Jain(2005) 
Parthasarathy, 
Menon and 
Bhattacherjee(2006) 
Khanna and 
Palepu(2006) 
Black and 
Khanna(2007) 
Chaki'abarti, 
Megginson and 
Yadav(2007) 
Focus of study 
Governance and Investment decisions of 
Financial institutional Investors. 
567 group affiliated and 437 un affiliated 
companies 
Does Foreign ownership of Indian firms helps in 
globalization. 
800 firms listed in BSE covering years 1992 and 
1993 
Corporate governance and shareholder 
activism;2000 Indian firms covering years 1992-
1998 
Ownership Structure and Initial Public Offerings. 
152 Indian initial public offerings during the 
period 1999-2001 
Corporate Governance and investment decisions 
of institutional investors measured by CGI; 
Study of 113 Indian firms for the year 2002: 
adopted weightage method 
Effect of ownership on firm performance. 
2000 Indian firms covering a period from 1994-
2000. 
The Effect of Board Size and Ownership on firm 
values. 
340 large, listed firms spread across 24 industry 
groups. The periodof study covers 1997-2001 
Determinants of executive compensation 
Study covering 1600 managers belonging to 250 
firms 
Globalization & Convergence of 
C G among software firms; Study period 
covering years 1995 to 2000 
The impact of implementation of clause 49 on 
Firm values. Event study 
The impact of CG practices post clause 49 
implementation 
500 largest companies hsted in BSE 
Findings 
Foreign institutional investors 
prefer un affiliated firms. 
Group firms are difficult to 
monitor 
Equitable sharing of ownership 
between domestic and foreign 
shareholders helps in effective 
globalization and profitability. 
Block holders are benefited by 
disproportionate cash flows 
rights; Evidence of non-linearity 
in the relationship between 
ownership stakes and company 
value. 
No significant relationship is 
found between investment 
decisions by institutions and 
under-pricing of IPO 
Positive relationship between and 
Corporate Governance index and 
volume of investments made by 
institutional investors. 
Shareholding by institutional 
investors impacts firm 
performance, non linearly 
Poshive relationship between 
board size and firm values. 
Promoters CEO's receive 
disproportionately higher 
compensation than other CEO's 
Efforts to improve CG had not 
much of effect on convergence 
expect in few firms such as 
Infosys 
Targer firms are benefited 
compared to smaller firms in the 
first phase of implementation 
Pyramiding and tunneling still 
exists in Indian firms 
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Allen, Chakrabarti 
and De(2007) 
Lange and Sahu 
(2008) 
Mayur and 
Saravanan(2008) 
Kumar, Pedersen 
and Zattoni( 2008) 
Saravanan (2009) 
Jackling and Johl 
(2009) 
Siegel, Prithwiraj 
and 
Choudhury(2010) 
Varottil(2010) 
Balasubramanian et 
al.,2010 
Study of banking systems-A cross country study 
comprismg 20 countries, including India 
The Impact of changes in Clause 49 on India 
firms on Board Size 
Period ofstudy 2005 to 2007 
Board size and firm values in Banking firms. 
37 banks listed on BSE/ NSE 
Influence of state and institutional Governance 
systems on Group affiliated and non-affiliated 
firms 
547 firms : period of study; 1990 to 2006 
CG Characteristics of family owned and non-
family owned firms. 
:Study covering 771 firms for the years 
from2001 to 2005 
Board structure comprising of CEO duality, 
Board size, independence Director's busyness 
and firm performance. 
Tunneling among Business Groups. 
Period ofstudy coveringl989-2008. 
Comparison on Effectiveness Of Independent 
Directors: India, US and UK 
Corporate Governance Reforms and Firms' 
Market Values: Study covering 297 Firms listed 
in BSE 500; year of study 2006 adopting survey 
method. 
C G norms in India 
have improved, however, still 
family groups dominate the 
process 
Positive relationship between 
large board size and firm 
performance. 
No significant relationship 
between Board size and firm 
values in Banking firms . Firm 
values is are based on operating 
Performance of the banks 
When the governance systems of 
state and its Institutions improves 
non-affiliate firms are more 
benefitted than group affiliates 
Corporate Governance and firm 
performance; Firm values are not 
significantly affected by the 
ownership type of the firms. 
CEO duality does not matter. 
Indian firms favour large board 
sizes and more number of 
independent directors improves 
firm performance 
Tunneling is not observed and 
Indian business groups are 
exhibiting good corporate 
governance 
Board independence, in the form 
it originated in US does not 
provide a solution to the problems 
faced by Indian firms. 
Positive relationship between 
ICGI and Tobm's Q 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
This section deals with the methodology adopted in the research study. Section 3.1 
discusses the need for the present study. Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 discuss respectively, 
the objectives, hypotheses and data description. Section 3.5 discusses the 
methodologies adopted and parameters considered in the computation of governance 
index. 
3.1 Need for the present study 
a) Corporate Governance and financial performance: A number of studies to 
explore the relationship between Corporate Governance, as measured by index and 
firm performance have been conducted both in developed countries and in emerging 
markets. However, in India on this aspect, only two studies-l.Balasubramanian et al., 
(2010) covering the year 2005-06 and 2.Mohanty (2003) covering the year 2002, have 
been carried out. Therefore, there is a dearth of index-based studies on Corporate 
Governance in India. Mohanty's (2003) study is on general Corporate Governance 
attributes with a focus on stakeholders (Customers, society, employees and others). It 
does not cover any of the regulations of clause 49 which came into force in the year 
2000. The study of Balasubramanian et al., (2010) is a survey based one. This kind of 
study has its limitations. Moreover, this was conducted prior to the amendment to 
clause 49 of the listing agreements which came into force Irom l'^ ' January, 2006. The 
amendment reflects many of the provisions of the post Enron's SOX Act, 2002. As 
these studies cover only one year period, dynamics of the relations between Corporate 
Governance and firm value using panel data could not be examined. 
Apart from the Corporate Governance Index based study, this study covers other 
individual attributes of Corporate Governance mechanisms and financial 
perfomiance. 
b) Board size, Board independence and CEO duality and firm values: Some 
research studies in Indian context about board size, board independence and CEO 
duality are; Jackling and JohEs (2009) study covering a period of one year (2005-06) 
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about large companies; Lange and Sahu's (2008) study covering a period of 3 years 
from 2005 to 2007 of NIFTY 50 companies; Kaur and Gill's (2008) study covering a 
period from 2001 to 2006; Dwivedi and Jain's (2005) study covering a period of 
Syears from 1997 to 2001.The findings of these researchers are mixed. Hence there is 
a need to revisit the issue. 
c) Promoters' holding and firm performance: The ownership structure influences 
the Corporate Governance and finn value. Khanna and Palepu (1999) and Pattanayak 
(2008) report that the insider ownership has positive and significant impact on firm 
value. Sarkar and Sarkar (1999, 2005); Saravanan (2009) investigate the relation 
between promoters' shareholding and its impact on firm values. The first study of 
Sarkar and Sarkar reports a non-linear relafionship between promoters' holding and 
firm values. On the other hand, in their second study, they find that promoters' 
holding has no impact on firai values in case of low growth firais while it has positive 
impact on firm values for high growth firms. Saravanan (2009) studied the Corporate 
Governance characterisfics of Family Owned (not less than 51% shareholding) and 
Non-Family Owned businesses of India. He documents that value of the finn as 
measured by Tobin's Q is not affected by type of the firm. The results of these studies 
are ambiguous. Therefore, it warrants closer scrutiny. 
d) Other governance mechanisms: Corporate Governance is affected by the size and 
sector of the firm and lisfing on foreign bourses. There have been few studies in India 
on these aspects. Kumar (2005) and Pattanayak (2008) have used sales as a proxy for 
firm size in their study about ownership structures and firm values. Mohanty (2003), 
Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) have used log of assets as a control variable. To the best of 
my knowledge, the impact of GDR/ADR on finn valuation has only been examined 
by Balasubramanian et al., (2010). Again no study has been conducted on the non-
linear relationship between CGI and Financial performance in India. The present 
study aims to examine these issues. 
There is a boom in the Indian Economy. Business firms are pursuing growth strategies 
acquiring foreign fimis. In the recent past there has been financial crisis in US and 
Europe affecting the economies of many countries of the world including India. All 
these have a profound impact on the Governance processes, wananting a fresh study. 
3.2 Objectives of the study 
a) To examine the relationship between Corporate Governance index and fimi 
values/ performance of companies as measured by Tobin's Q, MVBV and ROA. 
b) To ascertain whether the relationship between Corporate Governance index and 
firm values is linear or not. 
c) To assess the impact of Board structures comprising of Board size, Board 
independence, CEO Duality on finn values as measured by Tobin's Q. 
d) To explore the relation between sales, assets and margin on finn perfonnance/ 
valuation. 
e) To investigate the relationship between promoters' holding and financial 
performance as measured by Tobin's Q. 
f) To examine the differences in valuation/ perfonnance across manufacturing and 
services sectors as measured by Tobin's Q, MVBV and ROA 
g) To ascertain the differences in perfonnance/ valuation between large tangible 
and small tangible asset intensive companies. 
h) To examine the impact of sales differentials on firm performance/ valuation, 
i) To examine the differences in firm values/ perfonnance between the firms 
which have issued ADRs/GDRs and those which have not. 
3.3 Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses have been evaluated: 
Hoi: There is no relationship between Corporate Governance index and financial 
performance as measured by Tobin's Q, MVBV and ROA. 
H02: There is no relationship between sales and financial perfonnance as measured by 
Tobin's Q, MVBV and ROA. 
H03: There is no relationship between assets and financial perfonnance as measured 
by Tobin's Q, MVBV and ROA. 
H04: There is no relationship between margin and financial perfonnance as measured 
by Tobin's Q, MVBV and ROA. 
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Ho5: There is no relationship between promoters" holding and financial perfomiance 
as measured by Tobin's Q, MVBV and ROA. 
H()6: The relationship between Corjjorate Governance index and financial 
performance measured by Tobin's Q is not linear. 
Ho7: There is a no relationship between the Board size and finn values as measured 
byTobin's Q 
Hos: The number of independent directors in the board composition does not impact 
finn performance measured by Tobin's Q. 
Ho9: CEO duality has no impact on firm value. 
Hio: There is no difference in financial perfonnance/ valuation across sectors. 
Hii: There is no difference in firm valuafions/ performance between large tangible 
asset companies and small tangible asset companies 
H12: The impact of sales differential on financial perfonnance/ valuation is non-
existent. 
Ho: Margin differentials cast no influence on valuation/ perfonnance of the firms. 
H14: There is no difference in firm valuations/ performance between firms which have 
issued Depository receipts and which have not. 
3,4 Data description and sample 
The study comprises of BSE 100 index companies. The sample is representative of 
the market as it accounts for 70% of market capitalization. The sample period is from 
2004-2008. The data required to construct Corporate Governance index and board 
structure and composition were obtained from the annual reports of the companies. 
Research literature provides evidence that annual report disclosures reveal credible, 
relevant infonnation that is priced by investors, reduces estimation risk and 
infomation asymmetry (Lang & Lundholm 1996; Botosan & Plumlee 2002; 
Lundholm & Myers 2002). 
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The following are the sources of Annual reports; 
1. Company web sites 
2. SEBI EDIFAR site 
3.NSE/BSEwebsite 
4. Commercial agencies like Report junction, Cygnus etc. 
The purpose of using the data available in the public domain is that it circumvents 
potential problems of survey-based governance rating such as incomplete respondent 
knowledge, self reporting bias and other factors (Cheung et al., 2007). 
The financial data used in the study has been obtained from the data base of Centre 
for Monitoring of Indian Economy (CMIE).The data consisted of sales, assets, 
promoters' holding, EBIT, book value of debt and Market price of equity shares. For 
the purposes of unifonnity all financial data is for the month ending December of the 
particular year. 
Some of the companies were eliminated from the sample due to non- availability of 
data. The number of companies that formed the sample, ranged from 78 to lOO.The 
number of companies in the years 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 were 78, 83, 91, 
96 and 100 firms respectively. In all, 448 firm-years observafions were available. 
3.5 Methodology adopted in analyzing the relationship between Corporate 
Governance index and financial performance 
3.5.1 Construction of Corporate Governance Index 
This has been done in three stages. First stage consisted of the selection of parameters 
which form the basis of Governance index. Second stage consists of assigning binary 
values-'r for positive factor of governance and '0" otherwise. Finally computafion of 
the index scores for each year for each finn over the 5 year period was done. 
3.5.1.ISelection of parameters for this research study 
21 parameters have been considered in this research study for the computation of 
overall Corporate Governance index. The reasons for selecting 21 parameters are: 
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a) The reporting of these parameters in the Annual reports has been consistently 
available which facilitated panel data analysis. 
b) They are unifonn across all the sectors and all firms. 
The 21 parameters have certain commonality with the parameters considered by 
researchers like Balasubramanian et al., (2010) who have considered 49 parameters in 
their survey and most of them are privy in nature or not mandatory. 
In the Governance index constructed by Mohanty (2003) almost all the parameters are 
not the reporting requirements of clause 49 of the listing agreement, old and revised. 
Perhaps this is the reason for the same not being considered in the survey of 
Balasubramanian et al., (2010). 
These 21parameters have been categorized into the following four sub-indices. 
1 Board structure index 
Bl Attendance-75% and above 
B2 Board meetings 5 and above 
B3 Remuneration/compensation committee composed of fully independent 
directors 
B4 Nomination committee exists 
B5 Attendance of each Director is indicated in the last Annual General Meeting 
2 Auditing systems index 
Al Totally independent audit committee 
A2 Audit committee attendance-75% and above 
A3 Audit committee meetings 5 and above 
A4 No Qualified audit report .ie no adverse remarks from the statutory Auditors 
regarding financial statements. 
3 Investor management & Disclosures index 
11 The composition of investors' Grievance committee consists of independent 
directors. 
12 Finn puts annual/auarterly financial statements on web 
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13 Share holding pattern indicated. 
14 Not accused of insider trading. 
15 Provision of postal ballot facility 
16 No significant changes are made in accounting policies impacting sales and 
profits 
4 External Control Mechanisms index 
El Listing on foreign bourses including its parent company 
E2 Existence of Whistle Blower policy 
E3 Issuance of ESOPS to its employees and Directors. 
E4 Whether Management Discussion and analysis report is a part of annual 
report. 
E5 Whether disclosures of materially significant related party transactions have 
been indicated. 
E6 Whether disclosure of contingent liabilities, which are likely to impact on 
the future, is made. 
Each firm was studied for Corporate Governance practices based on the above 
mentioned parameters. Score of 1 was assigned in case the company was adopting a 
particular parameter or the reply is affinnative, if not 0 score was assigned. Thus each 
firm could score a maximum of 21 and a minimum of 0 depending on the firm's 
Corporate Governance practices. This formed the basis for overall Corporate 
Governance index of a firm. Thus the overall Corporate Governance index is the sum 
of values of each sub index. 
BRD-IND + ADT-IND + INV-IND + ECM-IND=5+4+6+6-21 
Based on this method Corporate Governance indices have been computed for each of 
the firms belonging to the BSE 100 index of the Bombay stock exchange for each 
year over a five year period from 2004-2008. 
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3.5,1.2 Basis of selection of parameters 
1. Board attendance 
Directors do their job by exercising tlieir judgment on various crucial issues during 
board meetings. Attendance tells shareholders as to how seriously the governance 
responsibilities are met. Not attending meetings is a visible way that investors might 
construe that a director is evading the responsibility (Jirapom et ah,2008).The number 
of board meetings captures the impact of board diligence on the auditor's opinion. If a 
board meets often, this might be interpreted as a signal that an active monitoring is 
taking place. Vafeas (1999) and Carcello and Neal (2000), report a mean (median) of 
7.54 (7) meetings while Abbott, Park and Parker (2000) document a figure of 6.94 
meetings. Aggarwal and Williamson (2006), Brown and Caylor (2006), 
Balasubramanian et al., (2010), have considered this aspect in the construction of 
Governance indices. 
2. Number of Board meetings 
The number of board meetings is a signal that an active monitoring is taking place. 
Attendance in the meetings, in ways, is the most basic measure of effectiveness of 
corporate directors (Aggarwal & Williamson, 2006). Stewart and Munro (2007) found 
that the frequency of the meetings was significantly associated with a reduction in 
audit risk. Similar is the experience of the researcher Cotter et al, (1997) who 
considered the number of board and audit committee meetings in the construction of 
index as a further measure of the strength of the oversight role performed by the 
board. Following the Horwath Report (2002) recommendations, strong oversight was 
defined as the board, meeting at least six times annually and the audit committee at 
least four times annually. 
3. Independence of Remuneration Committee 
Constituting a Remuneration Committee is a non mandatory requirement. To avoid 
conflicts of interest, independence is desirable. Good monitoring reduces the agency 
costs. Ferrarini et al., (2009) suggest that the remuneration committee should consist 
of exclusively non-executive and independent members for better governance. In 
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2001, Plot's (2001) analysis suggests that independence of the Remuneration 
Committee contains manager's opportunism and controls agency costs. 
Remuneration Committees have evolved from ad hoc committees with few defined 
responsibilities to committees with growing responsibilities that are accountable to the 
board of directors, and ultimately to shareholders. Brought to prominence in 1995 
through Sir Richard Greenbury's report on Directors' Remuneration, the duties of 
Remuneration Committees have grown with successive Corporate Governance 
reports. These culminated in the Financial Reporting Council's revised Combined 
Code on Corporate Governance and the related guidance for non-executive directors 
by Sir Derek Higgs, issued in 2003. 
4. Existence of Nomination committee 
Nomination committee facilitates selection of board of directors, including the 
chainnan, in a transparent manner and has a major role to play in the performance 
evaluation. A research study by Barnes (2009) analyzing the listing rules of nine 
international stock exchanges , finds that all of them encourage the use of nominafion 
committees to encourage further involvement of independent directors and for 
creating an International Governance Regime. 
5. Attendance of each Director in the last AGM 
This invokes responsibility of the Directors and is an extension of "reputation 
hypothesis". The classic argument put forth by Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen 
(1983) is that directors' incentives come from their desire to develop a reputation as 
expert decision makers and their presence instill confidence measure among investors 
6. Complete Independence of Audit Committee 
Of the many demands of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, none has had more far-reaching 
consequences than the requirement of more number of independent directors and that 
audit committees are composed entirely of independent directors. The objective is to 
oversee the related party transactions and earnings management. Requiring more 
independent directors on audit committees or boards was done in order to obtain 
better governance, not better perfomiance, and better governance could be considered 
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a value in itself, irrespective of its effect on corporate performance. SEBI's 
requirement is that the chainnan of the Audit committee should be an independent 
director. However, good Corporate Governance measures necessitate fully 
independent Audit committee. Anderson et al., (2004) examined board characteristics 
and the cost of debt for S&P finns in the US and found cost of debt to be inversely 
related to board size and independence and audit committee independence, size and 
meeting frequency. 
7. Audit committee attendance 
Attendance in ways is the most basic measure of effectiveness of corporate directors 
(Aggarwal and Williamson, 2006).The clause 49 requires that the Audit committee 
should meet at least thrice in a year. The quorum should be a minimum of two 
members or one third of the strength of Audit committee which ever is higher. As a 
logical extension 75% attendance has been extended to this aspect also. This will 
monitor manager's behavior thereby addressing agency problems and facilitating 
better management of risk (Ojo, 2009). 
9. No qualified audit report 
Auditors do qualify reports in cases where financial statements of the company may 
not reflect 'the true and fair view of the company'. When there are no qualified audit 
reports, it means adoption of good Corporate Governance practices (Lutzenberger, 
2010). 
9. Independence of the Investors' Grievance Committee 
If the Remuneration Committee consists solely of independent directors there is a 
possibility of fair redressal of grievances of share holders. Gompers et al., (2003) has 
stressed on mechanisms for protection of shareholder, particularly the minority 
shareholders. Redressal of grievances and transfer of shares ensures better protection 
and fully independent Investors Grievance Committee can ensure transparency. 
10. Firms put annual/quarterly financial statements on website 
This ensures transparency, fewer manipulations and facilitates better monitoring 
(Davies and Whittred, 1980). Rating agencies like S & P consider this as an important 
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factor. Financial statements published on time facilitate investors in better decision 
making. (Aktas & Kargin, 2011; Velury & Jenkins, 2006) . « - ' ' 
11. Share-holding patterns are indicated 
Investors are informed indirectly about the proxy controls and undue influence ih'tlie 
related party transactions. Bertrand et al., (2002) has observed the tunneling effect in 
the Indian context. Family control seems to affect finn perfonnance depending on the 
level of transparency and regulation in the country (La Porta et al., 2000). Proper 
disclosure can facilitate traceability and the extent of control. 
12. Insider trading 
If insider trading is unregulated dominant shareholderwill collude with the 
management at the expense of minority shareholders as a result of which the 
effectiveness of Corporate Governance and finns values are reduced (Maug, 1999) 
13. Postal ballot facility 
Postal ballot facilitates exercising share holder rights (La Porta et al, 2002). Section 
192A of the Companies Act, 1956 provides for passing of resolutions by postal ballot. 
Since share holders are geographically dispersed it would be difficult for them to 
exercise their votes physically during passing of resolutions by the companies and 
hence the need for postal ballots. 
14. Accounting policy changes 
Companies do make changes in accounting policies. If the purpose of changing is to 
comply with mandatory requirements then it is considered to be fair. If not, the 
changes made to inflate the profitability are considered to be bad governance 
15. Listing on Foreign Bourses: (Parent or subsidiary companies) 
This ensures greater transparency in the management process and disclosures, 
particularly when complying with SOX Act requirements. 
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16. Whistle Blower policy 
Employees and other stakeholders are sometimes aware of the bad governance 
practices which cannot be communicated in the normal course. Provision of whistle 
blower policy facilitates communication and acts as an external control mechanism. 
17. ESOPS to its employees and Directors 
Issue of ESOPS is one of the governance mechanisms to reduce agency costs.When 
employees become shareholders of the company alignment of interest takes place and 
thereby agency cost is reduced (Donaldson & Davies, 1991). 
18. Management Discussion and analysis Report 
Management Discussion and analysis statements forming a part of annual reports 
provides a 'bird's eye view' of the strategies of the company. Analysts and investors 
can use these statements to decide upon their investment strategies. 
19. Related party transactions 
Companies have to report all transactions with related parties including their bases. 
Records of such transactions should be placed before the independent Audit 
committee for fonnal approval or ratification. Good Corporate Governance means 
that the transaction should be on an "arm's length" basis. If not the management 
should justify the same to the Audit committee. This aspect is an extension of Jensen 
and Meckling's (1976) Agency theory. Related party transactions are a source of 
diversion of funds and indirectly increase the agency costs. Accounting standard 
AS 18 of ICAI and Para 26 of the Cost Audit reports cover these aspects. 
20. Contingent liabilities 
Companies have to make disclosures of all contingent liabilities which have a bearing 
on the future performance as a good governance practice. 
21. Audit committee meetings 
Audit committee size, independence and number of meetings are considered proxies 
for audit committee effectiveness and governance (Dhaliwa! et al., 2007). Audit 
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committee effectiveness over financial reporting is a multidimensional one. This is 
affected by number of factors and the number of meetings is one such important 
factor (Menon & Williams, 1999; Chen & Zhou, 2007). 
3.5.1.3 Computation of financial data 
Financial data, collected from the Prowess CMIE data base for the companies 
belonging to the BSE 100, group was analyzed. 
The following table describes the principal variables used in this study: 
Table 3.1 
Variables Description 
Dependent variables 
Tobin's Q 
MVBV 
ROA 
Proxy for 
Financial performance 
/Firm value 
Financial performance 
/Firm value 
Financial performance 
Description 
(Mkt Cap + Total debt)/TA 
Market Value of the share/book 
value of the share 
EBIT/Assets 
Independent Variables 
CGI 
Log assets 
Asset dum' 
Log sales 
Sales dum^ 
Margin 
Mrgn dum' 
Pro hoi 
GDR dum 
Description 
Corporate Governance index 
Natural logarithm of book value of assets 
Asset dummy is set to one if the firm belongs to the above 
median asset group and '0' otherwise 
Natural logarithm of Sales 
Sales dummy is set to one if the firm belongs to the above 
median sales group and '0' otherwise 
EBIT/Saies or income 
Margin dummy is set to one if the firm belongs to the above 
median margin group and '0' otherwise 
Percentage share ownership by promoters ie Promoters' 
holding 
GDR dummy is set to one if the finn has issued depository 
receipts /Foreign currency convertible bonds and '0' 
otherwise 
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Sect dum 
Brd Siz 
Brd ind 
Log Brd Siz 
Log Brd ind 
CEO duality 
Sector dummy is set to one if the finn belongs to 
manufacturing sector and '0' otherwise 
Number of directors in the board 
Number of independent directors in the board 
Natural Logarithm of number of directors in the board 
Natural Logarithm of number of independent directors in the 
board 
value 'I'is assigned in case the post of CEO and Chairman 
is held by the same person, otherwise '0' 
1 also referred to as large/small tangible asset intensive companies 
2 also referred to as sales differentials 
3 also referred to as margin differentials 
3.5.2 Estimation metliods 
Multiple regressions using Tobin's Q, MVBV and ROA as dependent variables have 
been conducted. 
Tobin's Q has been widely used by many researchers as financial 
performance/valuation measure (Khanna & Palepu, 1999; Sarkar & Sarkar, 2000; 
Balasubraminam et al, 2010; Keil & Nicholson, 2003; Surroca & Tribo, 2009; Chung 
& Pruitt, 1994; Dowell et al, 2000). 
MVBV is considered as another important measure for firm values. Researchers use 
this as an additional financial measure. Mohanty (2003); Fich and Shivdasani (2004); 
Sarkar and Sarkar (2005); Garay and Gonzalez (2009) and others have adopted this 
ratio as proxy for financial performance/firm value in their governance studies. 
Similarly the financial measure Return on Assets (ROA) has been considered as a 
dependent variable in the regressions by researchers. Bhagat and Bolton (2008); 
Brown and Caylor (2006); Kumar (2005) have considered this as one of the financial 
measures. 
In several studies, the con-elation between Tobin's Q and MVBV is found to be high 
and accordingly they are not considered as separate dependent variables. In their 
studies, Villalonga (2004): Chung and Pruitt (1994) have found the correlation 
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between Tobin's Q and MVBV to be 0.97, which is high and so separate regressions 
were not conducted in their studies. However in this study the correlation between 
Tobin's Q and MVBV; Tobin's Q and ROA; MVBV and ROA are not high. Hence 
separate regressions have been run using the three financial perfomiance measures as 
dependent variables. The correlation between these dependent variables is shown in 
the table below: 
Table: 3.2 
Correlations between the dependent variables 
This table presents the minimum and maximum correlation values between Tobin's Q 
and MVBV; Tobin's Q and ROA; MVBV and ROA over the five year period 2004-
2008 
Variables 
Tobin's Q and MVBV 
Tobin's Q and ROA 
MVBV and ROA 
Minimum 
0.0495 
0.3750 
-0.0781 
Maximum 
0.7719 
0.6280 
0.2698 
The above table shows the correlation values between the dependent variables over a 
period of five years which ranges from low to medium and hence separate regressions 
have been run using them as dependent variables. 
The independent variables considered in the multiple regressions are CGI index, Log 
sales, Log assets. Margin and promoter's holding. The regressions also include sales, 
asset, margin, GDR and sector dummy variables. 
Sector dummy is set to one if the firm belongs to manufacturing sector and '0' 
otherwise. Assets have been divided into two groups based on the median value of 
assets. Asset dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median asset group and 
'0" otherwise. Similarly based on the median values of sales finns are divided into 
two groups.Sales dummy is set to one if the finn falls in the above median sales group 
and '0" otherwise. Based on the median values of margin (EBIT/Sales) finns are 
divided into two groups and Margin dummy is set to one if the finn falls in the above 
median margin group and '0" otherwise. Companies which have issued ADRs/GDRs 
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/FCCBs have been identified. GDR dummy is set to one if the firm has issued 
depository receipts and '0' otherwise. 
To analyze the non Hnear relationship of CGI, multiple regressions of Tobin's Q on 
CGI index, CGI square. Log sales. Log assets, margin and promoter's holding have 
been conducted. To analyze further the association between CGI and Tobin's Q, 
companies were sorted on the basis of the CGI score. The mean CGI score was used 
to divide the companies into two groups; one above mean and other below the mean. 
Non linearity of promoters' holding was analyzed using quadratic and cubic 
specifications as variables in the regressions. To analyze the reladonship between the 
components of Board structures and firm performance, regressions of Tobin's Q on 
Board size, Board independence, CEO duality , Log sales. Log assets, margin and 
promoter's holding have been run. 
Diagnostic test of regression consisted of multi-collinearity, hetroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation. Mutli collinearity was diagnosed using correlation and variance 
inflation factor. VIF values less than 10 have been considered (Myers, 1999). The 
standard errors were calculated using white's heteroskedasticity-consitent standard 
errors. The hypotheses were tested using usual t- test. 
3.5.2.IPanel regression 
Panel data refers to the combination of fime series and cross sectional observations. 
The data contains observafions on multiple parameters observed over multiple time 
series for the same firms. Panel data studies in Coiporate Governance have been one 
of the approaches which are gaining importance, of late. Research on the relationship 
between Corporate Governance and financial perfomiance faces a set of empirical 
challenges because of inferences being drawn on data for a year or two. Hence some 
researchers contend that, because of these challenges, little is known about how 
Corporate Governance affects share values or firm performance (Chidambaram, Palia 
& Zheng, 2006; Lehn, Patro & Zhao, 2007; Listokin, 2007; Wintoki, Linck & Netter, 
2007).This is because most governance-to-value studies lack time series data on 
governance. Usage of panel data helps in robustness checks (Black et al., 2010). 
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3.5.2.2 Pooled regression: 
Pooled regression analysis combines time series for several cross-sections and 
facilitates to test the impact of a large number of dependent variables within the 
framework of a multivariate analysis (Schmidt, 1997). Another reason to support 
pooled regression is that it is possible to capture not only the variation of what 
emerges through time or space, but the variation of these two dimensions, 
simultaneously (Pennings, Keman Kleinnijenhuis, 1999). It is extensively used in 
Corporate Governance and other studies (Kumar, 2005; Black et al., 2010). 
The equation for pooled regression 
Yt=C+Pi (log sales) + p2 (log assets) + PB (Margin)+ p4 (Pro hol)+ pj (CGI)+ pe (Sales 
dum) + p7(Asset dum) + ps (Mrgn dum) + PQ ( G D R dum) + p,o (Sect dum) + St 
(Eq for CG index... 1) 
Tobin's Q =C+pi (log sales) + P2 (log assets) + P3 (Margin)+ p4 (Pro hol)+ ps ( Log 
brd siz)+ P6(Logbrd ind)+ P7(CE0 duality )+ Si ( Eq for board structures 2) 
Where: C= intercept 
Pi, P2, P3 Pio are the slopes of the corresponding independent variables. 
8t = error term 
Yt- dependent variable (Tobin's Q/MVBV/ROA) 
3.5.2.3 Fixed and Random Effects 
The term "fixed effects model" is usually contrasted with "random effects model". In 
the classic view, a fixed effects model treats unobserved differences between 
individuals as a set of fixed parameters that can either be directly estimated, or 
partialed out of the estimating equations. In a random effects model, unobserved 
differences are treated as random variables with a specified probability distribution. 
Stafistically, fixed effects are always a reasonable thing to do with panel data (they 
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always give consistent results) but they may not be the most efficient model to run. 
Random effects will give better p-values as they are a more efficient estimator, so one 
should run random effects if it is statistically justifiable to do so. Random effects 
methods also typically have less sampling variability than fixed effects methods, hi 
general, random effects is efficient, and should be used (over fixed effects) if the 
assumptions underlying it are believed to be satisfied. 
The equation for fixed effects model /random effects model 
Yt=C+Pi (log sales) + ^2 (log assets) + pa (Margin)+ p4 (Pro hol)+ P5 (CGI)+ p6 (Sales 
dum) + p7(Asset dum) + Pg (Mrgn dum) + P9(GDR dum) + pio (Sect dum) + |i, +Uit ... 
(EqforCGIndex. ..3) 
Yt=C+pi (log sales) + P2 (log assets) + P3 (Margin)+ P4 (Pro hol)+ Ps (Log brd siz)+ p6 
( Log brd ind) + P7(CE0 duality) + jx^ +Uit... (Eq for Board structures 4) 
Where: C= intercept 
Pi, P2, P3 PIO are the slopes of the corresponding independent variables. 
Where: |ii is the individual error component and Uit is the combined time series and 
cross-section error component 
Yt= dependent variable (Tobin's Q/MVBV/ROA) 
However for the selection, between Random and Fixed effects models, Hausman 
specification test needs to be conducted after running both these tests. In addition to 
this Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for Random effects are also run. 
Estimation with the panel data has been undertaken by testing the null that all 
intercepts are equal. If this null is accepted then the data is poolable. If the null is 
rejected, Hausman test is applied. If the null is not rejected, random effects are used. 
The equality of the intercept can be tested by using Lagrangian multiplier test for 
random effects developed by Breusch and Pagan. The null here is that there is no 
random effect (Kennedy, 2008). 
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3.5.2.4 Dynamic panel data: 
Arellano, Bond, and Bover developed one and two step general methods of moments 
(GMM) estimators for panel data analysis. GMM is usually robust to deviations of the 
underlying data generation process to violations of heteroskedasticity. Arellano and 
Bond estimator uses moment conditions in which lags of the dependent variable and 
first differences of the exogenous variables are instruments for the first-differenced 
equation. Robust estimation, when one has heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, or 
outliers to contend with, may be perfomied with the general methods of moments and 
combination to obtain robust panel standard errors. They introduced lagged dependent 
variables into their model to account for dynamic effects. Maia-Ramires (2009); 
Kyereboah et al, (2007); Rashid (2008) and others have conducted similar studies in 
Corporate Governance. 
CHAPTER 4 
Results and Discussions 
4.1 Analysis of results of Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
This section shows year wise results of cross sectional regressions using three 
financial performance measures namely Tobin's Q, MVBV and ROA along with 
other variables. This type of analyses has its own merits.The use of multivariate 
framework and different financial measures facilitate robustness checks (Chong et al., 
2009). 
Table 4.1 
Descriptive Statistics of different variables for the year 2004 
Variables 
Tobin's Q 
MVBV 
ROA 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
Mean 
2.524 
.5.642 
0.166 
8.270 
8.838 
0.305 
47.226 
14.705 
0.500 
0.500 
0.500 
0.641 
0.692 
Std. Dev. 
2.281 
8.031 
0.126 
1.511 
1.546 
0.233 
21.291 
1.737 
0.503 
0.503 
0.503 
0.483 
0.465 
Min 
0.837 
0.642 
0.003 
3.512 
5.030 
0.020 
0.000 
12.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
Max 
14.774 
56.271 
0.738 
11.971 
13.039 
0.936 
89.500 
19.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
The above table provides the descriptive statistics for the year 2004 for the main 
variables used.The mean value of CGI is 14.705 
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Figure 4.1 Distribution of CGI values of the firms for tiie year 2004 
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The mean values of CGI is 14.705 and for majority of the firms the CGI values are 
between 12 and 17 
Table 4.2 
Correlation Matrix of Tobin's Q and other independent variables used in the 
multiple regression for the year 2004 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
Tobin's 
Q 
-0.13 
-0.35 
-0.11 
0.15 
0.32 
0.02 
-0.04 
0.07 
0.03 
-0.12 
Log 
sales 
1 
0.74 
-0.20 
0.18 
0.09 
0.56 
0.66 
-0.14 
-0.22 
0.21 
Log 
assets 
1 
0.38 
0.12 
0.05 
0.61 
0.71 
0.27 
-0.18 
-0.30 
Margin 
1 
0.02 
0.08 
0.21 
0.19 
0.75 
-0.06 
-0.72 
Pro 
hoi 
1 
-0.30 
0.01 
0.07 
0.24 
-0.46 
-0.08 
CGI 
1 
0.17 
0.17 
0.02 
0.21 
-0.10 
Sales 
dum 
1 
0.85 
0.18 
-0.05 
-0.17 
Asset 
dum 
1 
0.18 
-0.05 
-0.17 
iVIrgij 
dum 
1 
-0.05 
-0.67 
GDR 
dum 
1 
-0.15 
Sect 
dum 
1 
The above table shows the results of Correlation coefficients of different variables. 
The negative correlation of log assets and asset dummy with Tobin's Q means that 
physical assets alone do not matter. 
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Table 4.3 
Collinearity statistics of different independent variables used in mulitiple 
regresion 
Var 
VIF 
1/VIF 
Log 
sales 
7.76 
0.13 
Log 
assets 
7.54 
0,13 
Margin 
5.05 
0.11 
Asset 
dum 
4.8 
0.21 
Sales 
dum 
3.67 
0.27 
Sect 
dum 
2.95 
0.34 
Mrgn 
dum 
2.83 
0.35 
Pro 
ho! 
1.73 
0.58 
GDR 
dum 
1.54 
0.65 
CGI 
1.27 
0.79 
Mean 
VIF 
3.91 
The above table shows the values of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). All the values 
are less than 10. According to Myers (1990) a VIF value of more than 10 is an area of 
concern and such control variables are to be excluded.Since all the VIF values of the 
variables are less than 10 the same have been considered in the regression. 
Table 4.4 
Cross sectional regression 2004: Tobin's Q 
The table reports the regression results of Tobin's Q on CGI index, Log sales, Log assets, margin and promoter's 
holding. The regression also includes sales, asset, margin, GDR and Sector dummy variables. Sector dummy is set 
to one if the tinn belongs to manufacturing sector and "0' otherwise. GDR dummy is set to one if the firm has 
issued depository receipts and '0" otherwise. Asset dummy is set to one if the finn falls in the above median asset 
group and '0' otherwise. Sales dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median sales group and "0' 
otherwise. Margin dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median margin group and "0' otherwise, t-
values are based on White's heteroskedasticity- consistent standard eirors. ***, (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, (5%) and (10%) level. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hol 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
cons 
Number of obs 
F( 10,68) 
Prob > F 
Coef. 
0.892** 
-1.689*** 
-0.625 
0.018 
Q 4]3*** 
0.814* 
0.306 
0.353 
-0.457 
-2.468*** 
4.601** 
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4.62 
0.000 
Std. Err. 
0.435 
0.498 
1.781 
0.013 
0.099 
0.449 
0.551 
0.511 
0.451 
0.919 
1.756 
t 
2.050 
-3.390 
-0.350 
1.400 
4.170 
1.810 
0.560 
0.690 
-1.010 
-2.690 
2.620 
RSq 
Adj R Sq 
P>t 
0.044 
0.001 
0.727 
0.166 
0.000 
0.075 
0.581 
0.492 
0.315 
0.009 
0.011 
0.521 
0.450 
The coefficient of CGI is positive and significant at 1% level (p-value 0.000). The 
coefficient of log sales is positive and significant at 5% level. This indicates that fimis 
having higher sales have relatively higher valuations measured by Tobin's Q. The 
coefficient of Log assets is negative and significant at 1% level and that of asset 
dummy is positive but not significant which implies that firm valuations measured by 
Tobin's Q is lower among fmns with higher physical assets. The coefficient of 
Margin is negative but not significant and that of Margin dummy is positive but not 
significant and this indicates that the impact of margin on Tobin's Q is not significant. 
The coefficient of promoters' holding is positive but not significant. The coefficient 
of GDR dummy is positive but not significant implying that there are no significant 
differences between finns which have issued depository receipts and which have not 
issued the same. The coefficient of Sectoral dummy is negative and significant at 1% 
level which means that finn valuations of Service sector firms is higher when 
compared to that of manufacturing firms. Adjusted R square value is 0.450. 
Table 4.5 
Descriptive Statistics of different variables for the Year 2005 
Variables 
Tobin's Q 
MVBV 
ROA 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
Mean 
3.509 
14.230 
0.166 
8.470 
9.023 
0.307 
47.47 
15 
0.493 
0.493 
0.493 
0.638 
0.662 
Std. Dev. 
4.420 
62.232 
0.113 
1.461 
1.529 
0.232 
22.33 
1.880 
0.503 
0.503 
0.503 
0.483 
0.475 
Min 
0.992 
0.850 
-0.008 
3.985 
4.767 
-0.119 
0 
11 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Max 
37.673 
567.301 
0.592 
12.215 
13.110 
0.942 
99.33 
20 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
The mean value of CGI is 15. 
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Figure 4. 2 Distribution of CGI values of the firms for the year 2005 
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The mean value of the CGI for the year 2005 is 15 which is relatively higher when 
compared to 14.705 of the previous year 
Table 4.6 
Correlation Matrix of Tobin's Q and other independent variables used in the 
multiple regression for the year 2005 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset duin 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect Duin 
Tobin's 
Q 
-0.32 
-0.44 
0.04 
0.07 
0.17 
-0.12 
-0.26 
0.13 
0.15 
-0.12 
Log 
sales 
1 
0.74 
-0.24 
0.20 
0.06 
0.76 
0.58 
-0.16 
-0.22 
0.20 
Log 
assets 
1 
0.30 
0.03 
0.08 
0.61 
0.77 
0.20 
-0.24 
-0.23 
Mar 
1 
-0.11 
0.13 
-0.05 
0.22 
0.74 
-0.12 
-0.66 
Pro 
hoi 
1 
-0.41 
0.21 
0.01 
0.12 
-0.39 
-0.04 
CGI 
1 
0.04 
0.18 
0.12 
0.12 
-0.12 
Sales 
dum 
1 
0.57 
-0.01 
-0.26 
-0.01 
Asset 
dum 
1 
0.18 
-0.21 
-0.21 
Mrgn 
Dum 
1 
-O.ll 
-0.57 
GDR 
dum 
1 
-0.06 
Sect 
dum 
1 
This table presents the coirelation matrix of the variables used in the multiple 
regressions. 
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Table 4.7 
Collinearity statistics of independent variables: Year 2005 
Var 
VIF 
1/VIF 
Log 
sales 
8.28 
0.12 
Log 
assets 
7.58 
0.13 
Margin 
4.45 
0.23 
Sales 
duni 
2.79 
0.36 
Asset 
dum 
2.7 
0.37 
Mrgn 
dum 
2.58 
0.39 
Sect 
dum 
2.29 
0.44 
Pro 
hoi 
1.92 
0.52 
GDR 
dum 
1,43 
0.70 
CGI 
1.42 
0.70 
Mean 
VIF 
3,55 
From the above it can be seen that all the VIF values are less than the maximum 
acceptable value of 10. 
Table 4.8 
Cross sectional regression 2005: Tobin's Q 
The table reports the regression results of Tobin's Q on CGI index, Log sales, Log assets, margin and promoter's 
holding .The regression also includes sales, asset, margin, GDR and Sector dummy variables. Sector dummy is set 
to one if the finn belongs to manufacturing sector and '0' otherwise, GDR dummy is set to one if the firm has 
issued depository receipts and '0' otherwise. Asset dummy is set to one if the finn falls in the above median asset 
group and "0' otherwise. Sales dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median sales group and "0' 
otherwise. Margin dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median margin group and '0' otherwise, t-
values are based onWhite's heteroskedasticity- consistent standard errors, ***, (**) and (*) indicate significance at 
1%, (5%) and (10%) level. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dmn 
Assetdum 
Mrgn dura 
GDR dum 
Sectdum 
_cons 
Number of obs 
F( 10, 72) 
Prob > F 
Coef. 
0.588 
-2.541** 
4.065 
0.032* 
0.497*** 
1.955 
0.676 
0.598 
1.074 
-1.181 
9.754 
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2.68 
0.0076 
Std. Err. 
0.544 
1.160 
4.281 
0.017 
0.163 
1.390 
1.438 
0.853 
0.756 
1.086 
8.911 
t 
1.080 
-2.190 
0.950 
1.870 
3.050 
1.410 
0.470 
0.700 
1.420 
-1.090 
1.090 
RSq 
Adj R Sq 
P>t 
0.283 
0.032 
0.346 
0.066 
0.003 
0.164 
0.640 
0.485 
0.160 
0.281 
0.277 
0.3763 
0.2897 
The Coefficient of CGI is positive and significant at 1% level in this year also (p-
value 0.003). The coefficients of log sales and sales dummy are positive but not 
significant. The coefficient of Log of assets is negative and significant at 5% level and 
that of asset dummy is positive but not significant. Coefficient of Promoters" holding 
is significant at 10% level. Coefficients of Sales Dummy, Asset Dummy, GDR 
Dummy and Margin Dummy are positive but not significant. Coefficient of Sect 
Dummy is negative but not significant. 
Table 4.9 
Descriptive Statistics of different variables: Year 2006 
Variables 
Tobin's Q 
MVBV 
ROA 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
Mean 
3.072 
5.619 
0.169 
8.508 
9.262 
0.328 
48.640 
15.165 
0.495 
0.495 
0.495 
0.648 
0.626 
Std. Dev. 
2.352 
6.761 
0.109 
1.682 
1.459 _j 
0.302 
21.638 
1.668 
0.503 
0.503. 
0.503 
0.480 
0.486 
Min 
0.895 
0.776 
-0.003 
3.298 
5.625 
-1.377 
0.000 
12.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
Max 
12.080 
34.560 
0.518 
12.406 
13.248 
0.951 
99.330 
20.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
The above table provides the descriptive statistics for the year 2006 for the main 
variables used. The mean value of CGI is 15.165 
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Figure 4.3 
The bar chart shows the distribution of CGI values of the firms for the year 2006 
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The mean value of the CGI for the year 2006 is 15.165. 
Table 4.10 
Correlation matrix of Tobin's Q and other independent variables used in 
multiple regression for the year 2006 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
Tobin's 
Q 
-0.24 
-0.51 
-0.01 
0.13 
0.27 
-0.12 
-0.32 
0.06 
0.08 
-0.09 
Log 
sales 
1 
0.63 
-0.05 
0.13 
0.08 
0.73 
0.49 
-0.25 
-0.08 
0,20 
Log 
assets 
I 
0.18 
0.07 
-0.03 
0.60 
0.79 
0.13 
-0.18 
-0.20 
Margin 
1 
-0.08 
0.00 
-0.02 
0.10 
0.67 
-0.03 
-0.56 
Pro 
hoi 
1 
-0.33 
0.12 
0.06 
0.07 
-0.46 
-0,01 
CGI 
1 
0.07 
0.06 
-0.02 
0.28 
-0.09 
Sales 
dum 
1 
0.56 
-0.06 
-0.05 
-0.01 
Asset 
dum 
1 
0.12 
-0.15 
-0.14 
IVIrgn 
dum 
1 
-0.10 
-0.51 
GDR 
dum 
1 
-0.09 
Sect 
dum 
1 
The above table presents the con-elation matrix of the variables used in the multiple 
regressions. 
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Table 4.11 
Collinearity statistics of different independent variables used in multiple 
regressions 
Var 
VIF 
1/VIF 
Log 
assets 
4.21 
0.24 
Log 
sales 
3.87 
0.26 
Asset 
duni 
2.85 
0.35 
Sales 
dum 
2.56 
0.39 
Margin 
2.43 
0.41 
Mrgn 
dum 
2.35 
0.43 
Sect 
dum 
2.01 
0.41 
Pro 
hoi 
1.57 
0.64 
GDR 
dum 
1.43 
0.70 
CGI 
1.27 
0.79 
Mean 
VIF 
2.46 
The VIF value is less than the maximum acceptable level of 10 and accordingly all 
the varibles are included in the study. 
Table 4.12 
Cross sectional regression 2006: Tobin's Q 
The table reports the regression results of Tobin's Q on CGI index, Log sales, Log assets, margin and promoter's 
holding .The regression also includes sales, asset, margin, GDR and Sector dummy variables. Sector dummy is set 
to one if the finn belongs to manufacturing sector and '0' otherwise. GDR dummy is set to one if the firm has 
issued depositoi-y receipts and "0" otherwise. Asset dummy is set to one if the firni falls in the above median asset 
group and '0' otherwise. Sales dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median sales group and "0' 
otherwise. Margin dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median margin group and '0' otherwise, t-
values are based on White's heteroskedasticity- consistent standard ertors. ""'"'', {**) and (*) indicate significance at 
1%, (5%) and (10%) level. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
cons 
No of obs 
F( 10,80) 
Prob > F 
Coef. 
0.120 
.1280*** 
-0.084 
0.024'^ '^  
Q 355*** 
1.041* 
0.547 
0.441 
-0.080 
-0.926 
7.309** 
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5.22 
0.00 
Std. Err. 
0.197 
0.314 
0.895 
0.010 
0.143 
0.554 
0.639 
0.557 
0.503 
0.598 
2.951 
t 
0.610 
-4.390 
-0.090 
2.480 
2.760 
1.880 
0.860 
0.790 
-0.160 
-1.550 
2.480 
RSq 
Adj R Sq 
P>t 
0.546 
0.000 
0.926 
0.015 
0.007 
0.064 
0.394 
0.431 
0,875 
0.125 
0.015 
0.4801 
0.4203 
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In line with the previous years the Coefficient of CGI is positive and significant at 1% 
level (p-value 0.007).The coefficient of log sales is positive but not significant. 
Coefficient of Sales Dummy is positive and significant at 10% level which means that 
the Tobin's Q values of firms having above the median sales is relatively higher. The 
coefficient of asset dummy is positive but not significant. Coefficient of Log assets is 
negative and significant in line with the previous years. This means that the impact of 
physical assets is not positive on firm valuations. The coefficient of Margin is 
negative but not significant and that of Margin Dummy is positive but not significant 
indicating a weak relationship between higher margin level and Tobin's Q values. The 
coefficient of promoters' holding is posifive and significant at 10% level. Coefficient 
of GDR dummy is negafive and insignificant indicafing a reversal in the sign from 
positive to negative when compared to the previous year. Coefficient of Sectoral 
dummy is negative but not significant. The R-sq and Adj R-sq values are 0.4901 and 
0.4203 respecfively. 
Table 4.13 
Descriptive Statistics of different variables for the Year 2007 
Variables 
Tobin's Q 
MVBV 
ROA 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
Mean 
2.928 
6.527 
0.160 
8.779 
9.571 
0.368 
50.378 
15.395 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.625 
0,635 
Std. Dev. 
2.031 
11.674 
0.110 
1.408 
1.355 
0.270 
21.921 
1.762 
0.503 
0.503 
0.503 
0.487 
0.484 
Min 
0.747 
0.499 
-0.112 
4.723 
6.616 
-0.320 
0 
12 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Max 
12.897 
94.315 
0.628 
12.523 
13.490 
0.959 
99.33 
20 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
The mean value of CGI re has increased when compared to the previous year 
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Figure 4.4 Distribution of CGI values of firms for the year 2007 
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The mean value of the CGI for the year 2006 is 15.395. 
Table 4.14 
Correlation Matrix of Tobin's Q and other independent variables used in the 
multiple regression for the year 2007 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Assetdum 
Mrgn duin 
GDR dum 
Sec duni 
Tobin's 
Q 
-0.29 
-0.51 
-0.10 
0.25 
0.08 
-0.17 
-0.34 
0.05 
-0.08 
-0.07 
Log 
sales 
1 
0.65 
-030 
0.06 
0.09 
0.76 
0.49 
-0.31 
-0.08 
0.19 
Log 
assets 
1 
030 
0.06 
-0.02 
0.59 
0.80 
0.19 
-0.21 
-0.28 
Margin 
1 
0.03 
-0.09 
-0.15 
0.26 
0.79 
-0.28 
-0.63 
Pro 
hoi 
1 
-0.36 
0.00 
0.02 
0.09 
-0.42 
-0.10 
CGI 
1 
0.17 
0.10 
-0.11 
0.25 
-0.14 
Sales 
dum 
1 
0.50 
-0.17 
-0.04 
0.02 
Asset 
dum 
1 
0.17 
-0.09 
-0.24 
Mrgn 
dum 
1 
-0.26 
-0.50 
GDR 
dum 
1 
0.04 
Sec 
dum 
1 
This table presents the coiTelation matrix of the variables used in the multiple 
regressions. 
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Table 4.15 
CoUinearity statistics of different independent variables used in multiple 
regressions: 
Var 
VIF 
1/VIF 
Log 
assets 
5.81 
0.17 
Log 
sales 
4.71 
0.21 
margin 
4,39 
0.23 
Asset 
dum 
2.94 
0.34 
Mrgn 
dum 
2.74 
0.37 
Sales 
dum 
2.58 
0.39 
Sect 
dum 
2.12 
0.47 
Pro 
ho! 
1.5 
0.67 
GDR 
dum 
1.5 
0.67 
CGI 
1.4 
0.71 
Mean 
VIF 
2.97 
The values of VIF are less than the maximum acceptable value of 10. 
Table 4.16 
Cross sectional regression 2007: Tobin's Q 
The table reports the regression resuhs of Tobin's Q on CGI index, Log sales, Log assets, margin and promoter's 
holding.The regression also includes sales, asset, margin, GDR and Sector dummy variables. Sector dummy is set 
to one if the firm belongs to manufacturing sector and '0' otherwise. GDR dummy is set to one if the firm has 
issued depositoiy receipts and '0' otherwise. Asset dummy is set to one if the firni fails in the above median asset 
group and '0' otherwise. Sales dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median sales group and 'O' 
otherwise. Margin dummy is set to one if the tlmi falls in the above median margin group and '0' otherwise, t-
values are based on White's heteroskedasticity- consistent standard eiTors. ***, (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, (5%) and (10%) level. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dura 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
Cons 
Number of obs 
F( 10, 85) 
Prob > F 
Coef. 
0.207 
-1.523*** 
-1.354 
0.020** 
0.081 
0.903* 
0.820 
0.987** 
-0.636 
-1.207 
13.732*** 
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5.66 
0.000 
Std. Err. 
0.241 
0.306 
1.259 
0.008 
0.121 
0.464 
• 0.538 
0.404 
0.481 
0.815 
3.902 
t 
0.860 
-4.970 
-1.080 
2.500 
0.670 
1.950 
1.520 
2.450 
-1.320 
-1.480 
3.520 
RSq 
Adj R Sq 
P>t 
0.393 
0.000 
0.285 
0.014 
0.505 
0.055 
0.131 
0.017 
0.189 
0.142 
0.001 
0.4953 
0.4359 
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The coefficient of CGI is positive but not significant only in this year. The CGI 
coefficient becomes significant when all the dummy variables are excluded in the 
regression. Similar effect is observed in the study by Balasubramanian et al., (2010). 
The coefficient of log sales is positive but not significant. However the coefficient of 
Sales dummy is positive and significant at 10 % level. Coefficient of promoters' 
holding is positive and significant at 5%. The Coefficient of Log assets being negative 
is observed in this year also. This is in line with the study by Ammann et al., (2011) 
covering the period of 2003 to 2007. Coefficient of Asset Dummy is positive but not 
significant. Coefficient of margin is negative and not significant while Margin 
Dummy is positive and significant at 10%. Coefficients of GDR dummy and Sector 
Dummy are negative but not significant. 
Table 4.17 
Descriptive Statistics of different variables for the Year 2008 
Variables 
Tobin's Q 
MVBV 
ROA 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
Mean 
1.809 
3.463 
0.1373 
8.900 
9.738 
0.355 
51.046 
15.610 
0.500 
0.500 
0.500 
0.620 
0.610 
Std. Dev. 
1.352 
6.754 
0.0963 
I.49I 
1.365 
0.278 
22.051 
1.797 
0.503 
0.503 
0.503 
0.488 
0.490 
Min 
0.59 
0.36 
-0.II21 
4.74 
7.07 
-0.32 
0.00 
12.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Max 
8.805 
58.249 
0.4999 
12.722 
13.780 
0.941 
99.330 
20.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
The above table provides the descriptive statistics for the year 2008 for the main 
variables used. The mean value of CGI is 15.610. 
Figure 4.5 
Chart shows the distribution of CGI values of the firms for the year 2008 
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The mean value of CGI is 15.610 
Table 4.18 
Correlation matrix of Tobin's Q and other independent variables used in 
multiple regressions for the year 2008 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales duiii 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Seel dum 
Tobin's 
Q 
-0.032 
-0.361 
-0.146 
0.225 
0.090 
0.015 
-0.277 
-0.093 
-0.244 
0.062 
Log 
sales 
1 
0.670 
-0.328 
0.011 
0.062 
0.751 
0.579 
-0.358 
-0.097 
0.086 
Log 
assets 
1 
0.301 
0.055 
0.040 
0.594 
0.797 
0.191 
-0.144 
-0.279 
Margin 
1 
0.097 
-0.076 
-0.140 
0.200 
0.804 
-0.287 
-0.611 
Pro 
hoi 
1 
0.24 
-0.053 
0.007 
0.185 
-0.483 
-0.107 
CGI 
1 
0.218 
0.151 
-0.084 
0.267 
-0.106 
Sales 
dum 
1 
0.560 
-0.200 
0.000 
-0.021 
Assets 
dum 
1 
0.080 
-0.041 
-0.226 
Mrgn 
dum 
1 
-0.247 
-0.513 
GDR 
dum 
1 
0.050 
Sect 
dum 
1 
The above table presents the con-elation matrix of the variables used in the multiple 
regressions. 
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Table 4.19 
CoUinearity statistics of independent variables: Year 2008 
Var 
VIF 
1/VIF 
Log 
sales 
6,38 
0.16 
Log 
assets 
5.83 
0.17 
Margin 
5.53 
0.18 
Mrgn 
dum 
3.09 
0.32 
Asset 
dum 
2.96 
0.34 
Sales 
dum 
2.63 
0.38 
Sect 
dum 
1.84 
0.54 
GDR 
dum 
1.77 
0.57 
Pro 
hoi 
1.44 
0.69 
CGI 
1,23 
0.81 
Mean 
VIF 
3.27 
All the values of VIF are less than the maximum acceptable value of 10 
Table 4.20 
Cross sectional regression 2008: Tobin's Q 
The table reports the regression results of Tobin's Q on CGI index, Log sales, Log assets, margin and promoter's 
holding.The regression also includes sales, asset, margin, GDR and Sector dummy variables. Sector dummy is set 
to one if the firm belongs to manufacturing sector and '0' otherwise, GDR dummy is set to one if the firni has 
issued depository receipts and '0' otherwise. Asset dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median asset 
group and '0' otherwise. Sales dummy is set to one if the finn falls in the above median sales group and '0' 
otherwise. Margin dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median margin group and "0' otherwise, t-
values are based on White's heteroskedasticity- consistent standard errors, ***, (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, (5%) and (10%) level. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
cons 
Number of obs 
F( 10, 89) 
Prob > F 
Coef. 
0.451** 
-0.908*** 
0.935 
0.011** 
0.127* 
0.596* 
-0.128 
0.152 
-0.594* 
-0.130 
3.869** 
100 
3.68 
0.0004 
Std. Err. 
0.206 
0.239 
1.000 
0.005 
0.073 
0.323 
0.395 
0.341 
0.335 
0.383 
1.896 
t 
2.19 
-3.79 
0.93 
2.09 
1.73 
1.85 
-0.33 
0.45 
-1.77 
-0.34 
2.04 
RSq 
Adj R Sq 
P>t 
0.031 
0.000 
0.353 
0.039 
0.087 
0.068 
0.745 
0.657 
0.08 
0.734 
0.044 
0.4039 
0.3441 
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The Coefficient of CGI is positive and significant at 10% level. The coefficients of 
log sales and sales dummy are positive and significant at 5% and 10% respectively. It 
can be inferred that Sales has a positive impact on finn values measured by Tobin's 
Q. The coefficient of Log assets is negative and significant at P/o level. The 
coefficient of asset dummy is negative but not significant. This can be inteipreted to 
mean that finDS having smaller amounts of physical assets have relatively better firm 
valuations measured by Tobin's Q than the other group of firms. The coefficient of 
Promoter's holding is positive and significant at 5% level. Coefficients of Margin and 
Margin Dummy are posifive but not significant indicating margins do not impact fmn 
performance/values proxied by Tobin's Q. Coefficient of GDR dummy is negative 
and significant at 5% level. Sect Dummy is negative but not significant. The R-square 
value is 0.4039 which is fairly high. 
Summary of year wise analyses of cross sectional regressions in relation to 
Tobin's Q: 
The coefficients of CGI are positive and significant in all the years except for the year 
2007.This affirms the findings of research studies in this regard. 
Out of five years of the study, the coefficients of Log sales are positive and significant 
in two years and that of sales dummy is significant in 3 years. Based on this it can be 
inferred that the relafionship between sales and Tobin's Q is positive implying that 
finn valuafions of the companies are relatively higher with respect to sales. 
The coefficients of log assets are negafive and significant. This means that fimi values 
are relatively lower corresponding to the physical assets. In other words intangible 
assets which are not recorded in the books are valued higher. Similar findings are 
observed by Black et al., (2006). The coefficient of Asset dummy is positive and not 
significant in 4 years and it is negative and not significant in one year. 
The coefficients of Margin and Margin dummy are not significant indicating that 
there is no significant relationship between Tobin's Q and Margin /Margin dummy. 
The coefficient of promoters' holding is positive in all the 5 years and it is significant 
in 4 years. 
The coefficients of Sector dummy are negative in all the cases and significant in one 
year. This indicates that the service sector firms have relatively higher valuations 
when compared to manufacturing finns. 
The coefficient of GDR dummy is significant in only one year implying that there are 
no significant differences between firms which have issued GDRs/ADRs and which 
have not issued, in terms of finn valuations measured by Tobin's Q. 
The coefficient of sectoral dummy is negative and not significant in all the 5 years 
except one year where it is significant which means that finn valuations of Service 
sector finns are higher when compared to that of manufacturing finns. 
Table 4.21 
Correlation Matrix of independent variables used in the regression for the year 
2004 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
MVBV 
-0.08 
-0.21 
-0.07 
-0.15 
0.25 
-0.01 
-0.05 
-0.07 
0.08 
0.02 
Log 
Sales 
1 
0.74 
-0.20 
0.18 
0.09 
0.56 
0.66 
-0.14 
-0.22 
0.21 
Log 
Assets 
1 
0.38 
0.12 
0.05 
0.61 
0.71 
0.27 
-0.18 
-0..30 
Margin 
1 
0.02 
0.08 
0.21 
0.19 
0.75 
-0.06 
-0.72 
Pro 
liol 
1 
-0.30 
0.01 
0.07 
0.24 
-0.46 
-0.08 
CGI 
1 
0.17 
0.17 
0.02 
0.21 
-0.10 
Sales 
Dum 
1 
0.85 
0.18 
-0.05 
-0.17 
Asset 
Dum 
1 
0.18 
-0.05 
-0.17 
Mrgn 
Dum 
1 
-0.05 
-0.67 
GDR 
dum 
1 
-0.15 
Sect 
dum 
1 
The above table shows the results of Correlafion of different variables with MVBV 
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Table 4.22 
Collinearity statistics of different independent variables used in multiple 
regressions 
Var 
Vlf 
1/VIF 
Log 
sales 
7.76 
0.13 
Log 
assets 
7.54 
0.13 
Margin 
5.05 
0.11 
Asset 
dum 
4.8 
0.21 
Sales 
dum 
3.67 
0.27 
Sect 
dum 
2.95 
0.34 
Mrgn 
dum 
2.83 
0.35 
Pro 
hoi 
1.73 
0.58 
GDR 
dum 
1.54 
0.65 
CGI 
1.27 
0.78 
Mean 
VIF 
3.91 
The above table shows the values of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). All the Values 
are less than 10. According to Myers (1990) VIF values of more than 10 is an area of 
concern and such control variables are to be excluded. Since all of the VIF values 
being less than the same have been considered for multiple regressions (Brown and 
Caylor, 2006).The dependent variable is MVBV. 
Table 4.23 
Cross sectional regression 2004: MVBV 
The table reports the regression resuUs of MVBV on CGI index, Log sales, Log assets, margin and promoter's 
holding. The regressions also include sales, asset, margin, GDR and Sector dummy variables. Sector dummy is set 
to one if the fmn belongs to manufacturing sector and "0" otherwise. GDR dummy is set to one if the firm has 
issued depository receipts and '0" otherwise. Asset dummy is set to one if the finn falls in the above median asset 
group and "0' otherwise. Sales duminy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median sales group and "0' 
otherwise. Margin dummy is set to one if the finn falls in the above median margin group and "0' otherwise, t-
values are based on White's heteroskedasticity- consistent standard errors. ***, (*'") and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, (5%) and (10%) level. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
cons 
Number of obs 
F( 10, 67) 
Prob > F 
Coef. 
2.122 
-3 491*** 
4.378 
-0.051 
0.806** 
0.814 
0.844 
-0.745 
-1.205 
-3.246 
10.734 
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2.23 
0.0259 
Std. Err. 
1.371 
1.316 
6.322 
0.079 
0.368 
1.580 
2.204 
2.964 
1.537 
2.257 
6.731 
t 
1.550 
-2.650 
0.690 
-0.640 
2.190 
0.510 
0.380 
-0.250 
-0.780 
-1.440 
1.590 
RSq 
Adj R Sq 
P>t 
0.126 
0.010 
0.491 
0.524 
0.032 
0.608 
0.703 
0.802 
0.436 
0.155 
0.115 
0.1539 
0.1246 
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The above table shows the results of regression for the year 2004.The coefficient of 
CGI is positive and significant at 5% level. Coefficients of Sales dummy and log sales 
are positive but not significant. Coefficient of log assets is negative and significant 
while asset dummy is positive and not significant. The coefficient of margin is 
positive but not significant. The coefficient of promoters" holding is negative and not 
significant. The coefficients of Sectoral dummy, Margin dummy and GDR dummy 
are negative but not significant. 
Table 4.24 
Correlation Matrix of MVBV and other independent variables used in the 
multiple regression for the year 2005 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
MVBV 
-0.19 
-0.13 
-0.06 
0.13 
-0.11 
-0.14 
-0.15 
-0.11 
-0.11 
0.07 
Log 
sales 
1 
0.74 
-0.24 
0.20 
0.06 
0.76 
0.58 
-0.16 
-0.22 
0.20 
Log 
assets 
1 
0.30 
0.03 
0.08 
0.61 
0.77 
0.20 
-0.24 
-0.23 
Margin 
1 
-0.11 
0.13 
-0.05 
0.22 
0.74 
-0.12 
-0.66 
Pro 
lio! 
1 
-0.41 
0.21 
0.01 
0.12 
-0.39 
-0.04 
CGI 
1 
0.04 
0.18 
0.12 
0.12 
-0.12 
Sales 
dum 
1 
0.57 
-0.01 
-0.26 
-0.01 
Asset 
dum 
1 
0.18 
-0.21 
-0.21 
Mrgn 
dum 
1 
-0.11 
-0.57 
GDR 
dum 
1 
-0.06 
Sec 
dum 
1 
This table presents the correlation matrix for the variables used in the multiple 
regressions 
Table 4.25 
CoUinearity statistics of independent variables: Year 2005 
Var 
VIF 
1/VIF 
Log 
sales 
8.28 
0.12 
Log 
assets 
7.58 
0.13 
Margin 
4.45 
0.23 
Sales 
dum 
2.79 
0.36 
Asset 
dum 
2.7 
0.37 
Mrgn 
dum 
2.58 
0.39 
Sect 
dum 
2.29 
0.44 
Pro 
hoi 
1.92 
0.52 
GDR 
dum 
1.43 
0.70 
CGI 
1.42 
0.70 
Mean 
VIF 
3.55 
The above table shows the values of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and they are less 
than the maximum acceptable value of 10. 
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Table 4.26 
Cross sectional regression 2005: MVBV 
The tabic reports the regression resuUs of MVBV on CGI index. Log sales, Log assets, margin and promoter's 
holding. The regressions also include sales, asset, margin, GDR and Sector dummy variables. Sector dummy is set 
to one ii' the firm belongs to manufacturing sector and '0' otherwise. GDR dummy is set to one if the firm has 
issued depositoi7 receipts and "0' otherwise. Asset dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median asset 
group and "0" otherwise. Sales dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median sales group and '0" 
otherwise. Margin dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median margin group and '0' otherwise, t-
values are based on White's heteroskedasticity- consistent standard errors. ***, (**) and {*) indicate significance 
at 1%, (5%) and (10%) level. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
cons 
Number of obs 
F( 10,72) 
Prob > F 
Coef. 
-31.738 
22.785 
-36.808 
0.691 
2.593 
10.376 
-17.805 
-22.287 
-11.753 
18.193 
27.176 
83 
0.34 
0.9679 
Std. Err. 
32.149 
25.544 
52.979 
0.671 
3.107 
12.934 
18.033 
24.287 
13.775 
23.049 
47.342 
t 
-0.990 
0.890 
-0.690 
1.030 
0.830 
0.800 
-0.990 
-0.920 
-0.850 
0.790 
0.570 
RSq 
Adj R Sq 
P>t 
0.327 
0.375 
0.489 
0.306 
0.407 
0.425 
0.327 
0.362 
0.396 
0.433 
0.568 
0.1484 
0.1198 
Coefficients of CGI, Log assets, Sales dummy, promoters' holding and Sect Dummy 
are positive but not significant. Coefficients of Asset Dummy, log sales, Margin, 
Margin Dummy and GDR Dummy are negative and not significant. 
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Table 4.27 
Correlation matrix of indedependent variables for the year 2006 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
MVBV 
-0.14 
-0.37 
-0.04 
0.18 
0.14 
-0.14 
-0.24 
-0.02 
-0.14 
0.13 
Log 
sales 
1 
0.63 
-0.05 
0.13 
0.08 
0.73 
0.49 
-0.25 
-0.08 
0.20 
Log 
assets 
1 
0.18 
0.07 
-0.03 
0.60 
0.79 
0.13 
-0.18 
-0.20 
Margin 
1 
-0.08 
0.00 
-0.02 
0.10 
0.67 
-0.03 
-0.56 
Pro 
hoi 
1 
-0.33 
0.12 
0.06 
0.07 
-0.46 
-0.01 
CGI 
1 
0.07 
0.06 
-0.02 
0.28 
-0.09 
Sales 
dum 
1 
0.56 
-0.06 
-0.05 
-0.01 
Asset 
dum 
1 
0.12 
-0.15 
-0.14 
iVlrgn 
dum 
1 
-0.10 
-0.51 
GDR 
dum 
1 
-0.09 
Sect 
dum 
1 
This table presents the correlation matrix of the variables used in the multiple 
regressions with MVBV as the dependent variable. 
Table 4.28 
CoUinearity statistics of independent variables: Year 2006 
Var 
VIF 
1/VIF 
Log 
assets 
4.21 
0.24 
Log 
sales 
3.87 
0.26 
Asset 
dum 
2.85 
0.35 
Sales 
dum 
2.56 
0.31 
Margin 
2.43 
0.41 
Mrgn 
dum 
2.35 
0.43 
Sect 
dum 
2.01 
0.41 
Pro 
hoi 
1.57 
0.64 
GDR 
dum 
1.43 
0.70 
CGI 
1.27 
0.79 
Mean 
VIF 
2.46 
The above table shows the values of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and the values 
are less than the maximum acceptable value of 10. 
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Table 4.29 
Cross sectional regression 2006: MVBV 
The table reports the regression results of MVBV on CGI index, Log sales, Log assets, margin and promoter's 
holding. The regressions also include sales, asset, margin, GDR and Sector dummy variables. Sector dummy is set 
to one if the tinii belongs to manufacturing sector and "0' otherwise. GDR dummy is set to one if the firm has 
issued depository receipts and "0' otherwise. Asset dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median asset 
group and '0' otherwise. Sales dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median sales group and "0' 
otherwise. Margin dummy is set to one if the tlrni falls in the above median margin group and '0' otherwise, t-
values are based on White's heteroskedastieity- consistent standard eiTors. ***, (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, (5%) and (10%) level. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sectdum 
Cons 
Number of obs 
F( 10,80) 
Prob > F 
Coef. 
0.164 
-2.536*** 
2.725 
0.067** 
0.979* 
0.761 
1.221 
-0.143 
-2.488 
1.296 
8.609 
91 
5.22 
0.0041 
Std. Err. 
0.505 
0.821 
2.397 
0.027 
0.555 
2.396 
2.977 
1.717 
2.082 
1.590 
8.924 
t 
0.320 
-3.090 
1.140 
2.490 
1.770 
0.320 
0.410 
-0.080 
-1.200 
0.820 
0.960 
RSq 
Adj R Sq 
P>t 
0.747 
0.003 
0.259 
0.015 
0.081 
0.751 
0.683 
0.934 
0.235 
0.417 
0.338 
0.2723 
0.2093 
Coefficient of CGI is positive and significant at 10% level. Coefficients of log sales 
and margin are positive but not significant. Coefficients of Sales Dummy, Asset Dummy 
and Sect dummy are positive but not significant. Coefficients of Margin Dummy and 
GDR Dummy are negative and not significant. Coefficient of Promoters' Holding is 
positive and significant at 5%.The Adjusted R square value is 0.2093 
107 
Table 4.30 
Correlation matrix of independent variables for the year 2007 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
MVBV 
-0.03 
-0.23 
-0.11 
0.21 
-0.04 
-0.04 
-0.23 
-0.05 
-0.20 
-0.02 
Log 
sales 
1 
0.65 
-0.30 
0.06 
0.09 
0.76 
0.49 
-0.31 
-0.08 
0.19 
Log 
assets 
1 
0.30 
0.06 
-0.02 
0.59 
0.80 
0.19 
-0.21 
-0.28 
Margin 
1 
0.03 
-0.09 
-0.15 
0.26 
0.79 
-0.28 
-0.63 
Pro 
hoi 
1 
-0.36 
0.00 
0.02 
0.09 
-0.42 
-0.10 
CGI 
1 
0.17 
0.10 
-0.11 
0.25 
-0.14 
Sales 
dum 
1 
0.50 
-0.17 
-0.04 
0.02 
Asset 
dum 
1 
0.17 
-0.09 
-0.24 
iVlrgn 
dum 
1 
-0.26 
-0.50 
GDR 
dum 
1 
0.04 
Sect 
dum 
1 
The above table presents the correlation matrix of the variables used in the multiple 
regressions with MVBV as the dependent variable. 
Table 4.31 
CoUinearity statistics of independent variables: Year 2007 
Var 
VIF 
1/VIF 
Log 
assets 
5.81 
0.17 
Log 
sales 
4.71 
0.21 
Margin 
4.39 
0.23 
Asset 
dum 
2.94 
0.34 
Mrgn 
dum 
2.74 
0.37 
Sales 
dum 
2.58 
0.39 
Sect 
dum 
2.12 
0.47 
Pro 
hoi 
1.5 
0.67 
GDR 
dum 
1.5 
0.67 
CGI 
1.4 
0.71 
Mean 
VIF 
2.97 
The above table shows the values of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and the values 
are less than the maximum acceptable value of 10. 
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Table 4.32 
Cross sectional regression 2007: MVBV 
The table reports the regression results oF MVBV on CGI index, Log sales, Log assets, margin and promoter's 
holding. The regression also includes sales, asset, margin, GDR and Seetor dummy variables. Scetor dummy is set 
to one if the firm belongs to manufacturing sector and "0' otherwise. GDR dummy is set to one if the firm has 
issued depository receipts and "0' othenvise. Asset dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median asset 
group and '0' othenvise. Sales dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median sales group and "0" 
otherwise. Margin dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median inargin group and "0' otherwise, t-
values are based on White's heteroskedasticity- consistent standard en'ors. ***, (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, (5%) and (10%) level. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dura 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
cons 
Number of obs 
F( 10,85) 
Prob > F 
Coef. 
2.281 
-4.423** 
-5.644 
0.038 
0.212 
1.403 
-1.019 
0.781 
-6.421* 
-6.733 
39.982 
96 
1.39 
0.1994 
Std. Err. 
1.877 
1.869 
11.365 
0.046 
0.792 
2.905 
3.150 
2.000 
3.452 
7.691 
25.272 
t 
1.220 
-2.370 
-0.500 
0.830 
-0.270 
0.480 
-0.320 
0.390 
-1.860 
-0.880 
1.580 
RSq 
Adj R Sq 
P>t 
0.228 
0.020 
0.621 
0.407 
0.789 
0.630 
0.747 
0.697 
0.066 
0.384 
0.117 
0.2048 
0.1575 
Coefficients of log sales, Promoters' holding, Sales Dummy and Margin Dummy are 
positive but not significant. Coefficients of CGI are positive while Coefficients of 
Asset Dummy, Margin and Sect Dummy are negative and not significant. Coefficient 
of log assets and GDR Dummy are negative but significant. 
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Table 4.33 
Correlation matrix of independent variables for the year 2008 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
MVBV 
0.06 
-0.20 
-0.15 
0.26 
-0.03 
0.09 
-0.23 
-0.09 
-0.21 
-0.04 
Log 
sales 
1 
0.67 
-0.33 
0.01 
0.06 
0.75 
0.58 
-0.36 
-0.10 
0.09 
Log 
assets 
1 
0.30 
0.05 
0.04 
0.59 
0.80 
0.19 
-0.14 
-0.28 
Mar 
gin 
1 
0.10 
-0.08 
-0.14 
0.20 
0.80 
-0.29 
-0.61 
Pro 
liol 
1 
-0.23 
-0.05 
0.01 
0.18 
-0.48 
-0.11 
CGI 
1 
0.22 
0.15 
-0.08 
0.27 
-0.11 
Sales 
dum 
1 
0.56 
-0.20 
0.00 
-0.02 
.Asset 
dum 
1 
0.08 
-0.04 
-0.23 
Mrgn 
dum 
1 
-0.25 
-0^51 
GDR 
dum 
1 
0.05 
Sect 
dum 
1 
The above table presents the correlation matrix for the variables used in the multiple 
regressions with MVBV as the dependent variable 
Table 4.34 
Collinearity statistics of independent variables: Year 2008 
Var 
VIF 
1/VIF 
Log 
sales 
6.38 
0.16 
Log 
assets 
5.83 
0.17 
Margin 
5.53 
0.18 
Mrgn 
dum 
3.09 
0.32 
Asset 
dum 
2.96 
0.34 
Sales 
dum 
2.63 
0.38 
Sect 
dum 
1.84 
0.544 
GDR 
dum 
1.77 
0.57 
Pro 
hoi 
1.44 
0.69 
CGI 
1.23 
0.81 
Mean 
VIF 
3.27 
The above table shows the values of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and the values 
are less than the maximum acceptable value of 10. 
Table 4.35 
Cross sectional regression 2008: MVBV 
The table reports the regression resuhs of MVBV on CGI index, Log sales, Log assets, margin and promoter's 
holding. The regressions also include sales, asset, margin, GDR and Sector dummy variables. Sector dummy is set 
to one if the tlnn belongs to manufacturing sector and '0' otherwise. GDR dummy is set to one if the firm has 
issued depository receipts and '0' otherwise. Asset dummy is set to one if the ilrm falls in the above median asset 
group and "0' otherwise. Sales duinmy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median sales group and '0' 
otherwise. Margin dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median margin group and '0' otherwise, t-
values are based on White's heteroskedasticity- consistent standard errors. ***, (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, (5%) and (10%) level. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
cons 
Number of obs 
F( 10, 89) 
Prob > F 
Coef. 
1.039 
-2.089** 
-2.556 
.0608 
0.029 
3.963* 
-3.159 
0,325 
-2.412 
-3.447 
14.945 
100 
1.7 
0.0929 
Std. Err 
0.759 
0.862 
5.361 
0.038 
0.375 
2.154 
2.474 
1.609 
1.611 
3.447 
10.99 
t 
1.37 
-2.42 
-0.48 
1.59 
0.08 
1.84 
-1,28 
0.20 
-1.5 
-1 
1.36 
RSq 
Adj R Sq 
P>t 
0.175 
0.017 
0.635 
0.116 
0.938 
0.069 
0.205 
0.84 
0.138 
0.32 
0.177 
0.2921 
0.2246 
Coefficient of Sales Dummy is positive and significant at 10% level. Coefficients of 
CGI, Margin Dummy, log sales. Promoters' holding are positive but not significant. 
Asset dummy, Margin, Sector dummy and GDR dummy are negative and not 
significant. Coefficient of log assets is negative but significant. 
Summary of 5 year cross sectional regressions with MVBV as the dependent 
variable: 
The relationship between CGI and MVBV is positive and significant in two years 
only. It is positive but not significant in other years. Hence fimi conclusions cannot be 
drawn. The coefficients of log sales are positive and not significant in 4 years and 
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negative and not significant in one year. The coefficients of sales dummy are positive 
in all the years and significant in one year. This shows that there is a weak but 
positive relationship between MVBV and sales. 
The signs of the coefficients of Log assets are negative and significant in all years 
except one year and coefficients of asset dummy are negative and not significant in 
three years and positive in 2 years. This means that the firm valuations measured by 
MVBV are negative with respect to assets. 
Coefficient of margin is posifive in 2 years and negative in 3 years and it is not 
significant in both the cases. The same is the case with margin dummy. 
Coefficient of promoters' Holding is positive in 4 years and significant in one year. It 
is negative and insignificant in one year. 
The coefficients of GDR dummy are negative and not significant in all years except 
one year implying that there is no significant relationship between the two. 
The coefficients of Sectoral dummy are not significant in all the cases. This indicates 
that the relationship is not significant with respect to MVBV. 
Table 4.36 
Correlation Matrix of independent variables used in the regression for the year 
2004 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
ROA 
0.18 
-0.21 
-0.09 
0.18 
0.18 
0.17 
0.09 
0.12 
-0.21 
0.24 
Log 
sales 
1 
0.74 
-0.20 
0.18 
0.09 
0.56 
0.66 
-0.14 
-0.22 
0.21 
Log 
asets 
1 
0.38 
0.12 
0.05 
0.61 
0.71 
0.27 
-0.18 
-0.30 
Margin 
1 
0.02 
0.08 
0.21 
0.19 
0.75 
-0.06 
-0.72 
Pro 
tiol 
1 
-0.30 
0.01 
0.07 
0.24 
-0.46 
-0.08 
CGI 
1 
0.17 
0.17 
0.02 
0.21 
-0.10 
Sales 
dum 
1 
0.85 
0.18 
-0.05 
-0.17 
Asset 
dum 
1 
0.18 
-0.05 
-0.17 
Mrgn 
dum 
1 
-0.05 
-0.67 
GDR 
dum 
1 
-0.15 
Sect 
dum 
1 
The above table shows the results of Correlation of different variables with ROA 
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Table 4.37 
CoIIinearity statistics of independent varaibles 
Var 
VIF 
I/VIF 
Log 
sales 
7.760 
0.13 
Log 
assets 
7.540 
0,13 
Margin 
5.050 
0.11 
Asset 
duni 
4.800 
0.21 
Sales 
dum 
3.670 
0.27 
Sect 
dum 
2.950 
0.34 
Mrgn 
dum 
2.830 
0.35 
Pro 
hoi 
1.730 
0.58 
GDR 
dum 
1.540 
0.65 
CGI 
1.270 
0.79 
Mean 
VIF 
3.910 
The variance inflation factor is less than the maximum acceptable level of 10 (Myers, 
1990). 
Table 4.38 
Cross sectional regression 2004: ROA 
The table repoiLs the regression results of ROA on CGI index, Log sales, Log assets, margin and promoter's 
holding. The regressions also include sales, asset, margin, GDR and Sector dummy variables. Sector dummy is set 
to one if the finn belongs to manufacturing sector and '0' otherwise. GDR dummy is set to one if the finn has 
issued depository receipts and '0' otherwise. Asset dummy is set to one if the firni falls in the above median asset 
group and '0' otherwise. Sales dummy is set to one if the finn falls in the above median sales group and '0" 
otherwise. Margin dummy is set to one if the finn falls in the above median margin group and '0' otherwise. /-
values are based on White's heteroskedasticity- consistent standard errors. ***, (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, (5%) and (10%) level. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
_cons 
No of obs 
F( 10,67) 
Prob > F 
Coef. 
Q 1 j Q * * * 
-0.139*** 
0.340*** 
0.001 
0.006 
0.061* 
-0.008 
0.091*** 
-0.033 
0,042 
0.131 
78 
13.77 
0.000 
Std. Err. 
0.025 
0.026 
0.117 
0.000 
0.004 
0.031 
0.034 
0.026 
0.021 
0.028 
0.083 
t 
4.740 
-5.350 
2.910 
0.150 
1.580 
1.980 
-0.220 
3.440 
-1.570 
1.510 
1.580 
RSq 
Adj R Sq 
P>t 
0.000 
0.000 
0.005 
0.881 
0.120 
0.052 
0.823 
0.001 
0.121 
0.137 
0.120 
0.7193 
0.5532 
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Coefficients of CGI, Promoters' holding and Sect Dum are positive but not 
significant. Coefficients of Log sales, Sales Dummy and Margin Dummy are positive 
and significant at 1% level. Coefficient of log Assets is negative and significant. 
Coefficients of Asset Dummy and GDR Dummy are negative and not significant. 
Coefficients of Log Sales and Margin are positive and significant at 1 % level and 
sales dummy is positive and significant. The R square value is 0.7193 and Adjusted R 
square is 0.553 
Table 4.39 
Correlation matrix of independent variables for the year 2005 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
ROA 
0.02 
-0.34 
-0.05 
0.16 
0.16 
0.13 
-0.21 
0.18 
-0.02 
0.22 
Log 
sales 
1 
0.74 
-0.24 
0.20 
0.06 
0.76 
0.58 
-0.16 
-0.22 
0.20 
Log 
assets 
1 
0.30 
0.03 
0.08 
0.61 
0.77 
0.20 
-0.24 
-0.23 
Margin 
1 
-O.ll 
0.13 
-0,05 
0.22 
0.74 
-0.12 
-0.66 
Pro 
hoi 
1 
-0,41 
0,21 
0,01 
0.12 
-0.39 
-0.04 
CGI 
1 
0,04 
0,18 
0,12 
0.12 
-0,12 
Sales 
dum 
1 
0,57 
-0.01 
-0,26 
-0.01 
Asset 
dum 
1 
0.18 
-0.21 
-0,21 
Mrgn 
dum 
1 
-0.11 
-0.57 
GDR 
dum 
1 
-0.06 
Sect 
dum 
1 
The above table shows the results of correlation of different variables with ROA 
Table 4.40 
CoUinearity statistics of independent variables: Year 2005 
Variables 
VIF 
1/VIF 
Log 
sales 
8.28 
0.12 
Log 
assets 
7.58 
0,13 
Margin 
4,45 
0,23 
Sales 
dum 
2.79 
0.36 
Asset 
dum 
2.7 
0.37 
Mrgn 
dum 
2.58 
0.39 
Sect 
dum 
2.29 
0,44 
Pro 
hoi 
1.92 
0.52 
GDR 
dum 
1.43 
0.70 
CGI 
1.42 
0,70 
Mean 
VIF 
3,55 
The variance inflation factor is less than the maximum acceptable level of 10 (Myers, 
1990). 
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Table 4.41 
Cross sectional regression 2005: ROA 
The table reports the regression results of ROA on CGI index, Log sales, Log assets, margin and promoter's 
holding. The regressions also include sales, asset, margin, GDR and Sector dummy variables. Sector dummy is set 
to one if the firm belongs to manufacturing sector and "0' otherwise. GDR dummy is set to one if the firm has 
issued depository receipts and "0' otherwise. Asset dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median asset 
group and "0' otherwise. Sales dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median sales group and "0' 
otherwise. Margin dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median margin group and "0' otherwise, t-
values are based on White's heteroskedasticity- consistent standard errors. ***, (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, (5%) and (10%) level. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
Cons 
Number of 
F( 10,72) 
Prob > F 
Coef. 
0.077*** 
-0.105*** 
0.249** 
0.001 
0.008** 
0.057** 
0.004 
0.090*** 
0.012 
0.068** 
0.119 
83 
15.09 
» 
Std. Err. 
0.024 
0.019 
0.097 
0.000 
0.004 
0.027 
0.026 
0.024 
0.023 
0.029 
0.098 
t 
3.220 
-5.450 
2.570 
0.730 
2.050 
2.130 
0.160 
3.670 
0.540 
2.380 
1.310 
RSq 
Adj R Sq 
P>t 
0.002 
0.000 
0.012 
0.470 
0.044 
0.037 
0.870 
0.000 
0.592 
0.020 
0.231 
0.6652 
0.5115 
Coefficients of CGI, Sect Dummy, Margin and Sales Dummy are positive and 
significant at 5% level. Coefficients of margin dummy and log sales are positive and 
significant at 1% level, Coefficients of GDR Dummy and Asset Dummy are positive 
but not significant. Coefficient of promoters' holding is positive and not significant 
while that of log assets is negative and significant. 
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Table 4.42 
Correlation matrix of independent variables used in the regression for the year 
2006 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
ROA 
0.23 
-0.31 
-0.08 
0.11 
0.21 
0.13 
-0.17 
0.00 
-0.02 
0.32 
Log 
sales 
1 
0.63 
-0.05 
0.13 
0.08 
0.73 
0.49 
-0.25 
-0.08 
0.20 
Log 
assets 
1 
0.18 
0.07 
-0.03 
0.60 
0.79 
0.13 
-0.18 
-0,20 
Margin 
1 
-0.08 
0.00 
-0.02 
0.10 
0.67 
-0.03 
-0.56 
Pro 
hoi 
1 
-0.33 
0.12 
0.06 
0.07 
-0.46 
-0.01 
CGI 
1 
0.07 
0.06 
-0.02 
0.28 
-0,09 
Sales 
dum 
1 
0.56 
-0.06 
-0.05 
-0.01 
Asset 
dum 
1 
0.12 
-0.15 
-0,14 
Mrgn 
dum 
1 
-0.10 
-0.51 
GDR 
dum 
1 
-0,09 
Sect 
Dum 
] 
The above table shows the resuhs of Correlation of different variables with ROA 
Table 4.43 
CoUinearity statistics of independent variables: 
Var 
VIF 
1/VlF 
Log 
assets 
4.21 
0.24 
Log 
sales 
3.87 
0.26 
Asset 
dum 
2.85 
0.35 
Sales 
dum 
2.56 
0.39 
Margin 
2.43 
0.41 
Mrgn 
dum 
2.35 
0.43 
Year 2006 
Sect 
dum 
2.01 
0.41 
Pro 
hoi 
1.57 
0.64 
GDR 
dum 
1.43 
0.70 
CGI 
1.27 
0.79 
Mean 
VIF 
2.46 
The variance inflation factor is less than the maximum acceptable level of 10 (Myers, 
1990). 
16 
Table 4.44 
Cross sectional regression 2006: ROA 
The table reports the regression results of ROA on CGI index, Log sales, Log assets, margin and promoter's 
holding .The regression also includes sales, asset, margin, GDR and Sector dummy variables. Sector dummy is set 
to one if the tlnn belongs to manufacturing sector and '0' otherwise. GDR dummy is set to one if the llrni has 
issued depositoi7 receipts and '0" otherwise. Asset dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median asset 
group and '0" otherwise. Sales dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median sales group and "0" 
otherwise. Margin dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median margin group and "0' otherwise, t-
values are based on White's heteroskedasticity- consistent standard errors. ***, (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, (5%) and (10%) level. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
cons 
No ofobs 
F( 10,80) 
Prob > F 
Coef. 
0.047*** 
-0.069*** 
-0.020 
0.001 
0.012** 
0.023 
0.022 
0.093*** 
-0.013 
0.045 
0.136 
91 
11.57 
0,000 
Std. Err. 
0.011 
0.012 
0.055 
0.000 
0.005 
0.023 
0.025 
0.025 
0.024 
0.031 
0,104 
t 
4.180 
-5.560 
-0.360 
0.800 
2.210 
1.020 
0.850 
3.710 
-0.550 
1.450 
1.310 
RSq 
Adj R Sq 
P>t 
0.000 
0.000 
0.718 
0.426 
0.030 
0.308 
0.396 
0.000 
0.581 
0.150 
0.194 
0.5624 
0.4327 
Coefficients of CGI and log sales are positive and significant at 5% and 1% level 
respectively. Sales Dummy, Asset Dummy and promoters' holding are positive but 
not significant. Coefficients of GDR Dummy and margin are negative and not 
significant. Coefficient of Margin Dummy is positive and significant at 1% level. 
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Table 4.45 
Correlation matrix of ROA and other independent variables used in the multiple 
regressions for the year 2007 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sectdum 
ROA 
0.06 
-0.38 
-0.01 
0.00 
0.17 
0.02 
-0.26 
0.03 
-0.02 
0.16 
Log 
sales 
1 
0.65 
-0.30 
0.06 
0.09 
0.76 
0.49 
-0.31 
-0.08 
0.19 
Log 
assets 
1 
0.30 
0.06 
-0.02 
0.59 
0.80 
0.19 
-0.21 
-0.28 
Margin 
1 
0.03 
-0.09 
-0.15 
0.26 
0.79 
-0.28 
-0.63 
Pro 
hoi 
1 
-0.36 
0.00 
0.02 
0.09 
-0.42 
-0.10 
CGI 
1 
0.17 
0.10 
-0.11 
0.25 
-0.14 
Sales 
dum 
1 
0.50 
-0.17 
-0.04 
0.02 
Asset 
dum 
1 
0.17 
-0.09 
-0.24 
Mrgn 
dum 
1 
-0.26 
-0.50 
GDR 
dum 
1 
0.04 
Sec 
Dum 
1 
The above table shows the results of correlation of different variables with ROA 
Table 4.46 
CoUinearity statistics of independent variables: Year 2007 
Var 
VIF 
1/VIF 
Log 
assets 
5.81 
0.17 
Log 
sales 
4.71 
0.21 
Margin 
4.39 
0.22 
Asset 
dum 
2.94 
0.34 
Mrgn 
dum 
2.74 
0.36 
Sales 
dum 
2.58 
0.39 
Sect 
dum 
2.12 
0.47 
Pro 
hoi 
1.5 
0.67 
GDR 
dum 
1.5 
0.67 
CGI 
1.4 
0.71 
Mean 
VIF 
2.97 
The variance inflation factor is less than the maximum acceptable level of 10 (Myers, 
1990). 
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Table 4.47 
Cross sectional regression 2007: ROA 
The table reports the regression resuUs of ROA on CGI index, Log sales. Log assets, margin and promoter's 
holding .The regression also ineludes sales, asset, margin, GDR and Sector dummy variables. Sector dumiriy is set 
to one if the firm belongs to manufacturing sector and '0" otherwise. GDR dummy is set to one if the firm has 
issued depository receipts and '0' otherwise. Asset dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median asset 
group and "()' otherwise. Sales dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median sales group and '0' 
otherwise. Margin dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median margin group and '0" otherwise, t-
values are based on White's heteroskedasticity- consistent standard errors. ***, (**) and (*) indicate significance 
at 1%, (5%) and (10%) level. 
ROA is the dependent variable 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
Cons 
Number of obs 
F( 10,85) 
Prob > F 
Coef. 
0.090*** 
-0.123*** 
0.311*** 
0.000 
0.008* 
0.021 
0.029 
0.034* 
0.006 
0.032 
0.229 
96 
10.8 
0 
Std. Err. 
0.020 
0.019 
0.103 
0.000 
0.005 
0.018 
0.023 
0.020 
0.021 
0.024 
0.163 
t 
4.440 
-6.440 
3.010 
0.630 
1.680 
1.200 
1.260 
1.730 
0.270 
1.360 
1.410 
RSq 
Adj R Sq 
P>t 
0.000 
0.000 
0.003 
0.529 
0.096 
0.235 
0.212 
0.088 
0.787 
0.177 
0.163 
0.6595 
0.5071 
Coefficients of CGI and Margin Dummy are positive and significant at 10% level 
while the Coefficients of Sales Dummy, Assets Dummy, GDR Dummy and Sect 
Dummy are positive but not significant. Coefficient of log assets is negative and 
significant. Coefficients of log sales and Margin are positive and significant at 1% 
level. 
Table 4.48 
Correlation matrix of independent variables for the year 2008 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
ROA 
0.10 
-0.31 
-0.03 
0.07 
0.12 
0.10 
-0.17 
0.01 
-0.18 
0,11 
Log 
sales 
1 
0.67 
-0.33 
0.01 
0.06 
0.75 
0.58 
-0.36 
-0.10 
0.09 
Log 
assets 
1 
0.30 
0.05 
0.04 
0.59 
0.80 
0.19 
-0.14 
-0.28 
Margin 
1 
0.10 
-0.08 
-0.14 
0.20 
0.80 
-0.29 
-0.61 
Pro 
hoi 
1 
-0.23 
-0.05 
0.01 
0.18 
-0.48 
-0.11 
CGI 
1 
0.22 
0.15 
-0.08 
0.27 
-0.11 
Sales 
dum 
1 
0.56 
-0.20 
0.00 
-0.02 
Asset 
dum 
1 
0.08 
-0.04 
-0.23 
Mrgn 
dum 
1 
-0.25 
-0.51 
GDR 
dum 
1 
0.05 
Sect 
Dum 
1 
The above table shows the resuUs of Correlation of different variables with ROA as 
the dependent variable 
Table 4.49 
CoUinearity statistics of independent variables: Year 2008 
Var 
VIF 
1/VIF 
Log 
sales 
6.38 
0.15 
Log 
assets 
5.83 
0.17 
Margin 
5.53 
0.18 
Mrgn 
dum 
3.09 
0.32 
Asset 
dum 
2.96 
0.33 
Sales 
dum 
2.63 
0.38 
Sect 
dum 
1.84 
0.54 
GDR 
dum 
1.77 
0.56 
Pro 
hoi 
1.44 
0.69 
CGI 
1.23 
0.81 
Mean 
VIF 
3.27 
The variance inflation factor is less than the maximum acceptable level of 10 (Myers, 
1990). 
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Table 4.50 
Cross sectional regression 2008: ROA 
The lablc repoits the regression results of ROA on CGI index. Log sales, Log assets, margin and promoter's holding. The 
regressions also include sales, asset, margin, GDR and Sector dummy variables. Sector dummy is set to one il'the linn belongs to 
manul'aeturing sector and 0' othei-wise, GDR dummy is set to one il'the tlrni has issued depositoiy receipts and 0' otherwise. 
Asset dummy is set to one if the ttnn falls in the above luedian asset group and '0' otherwise. Sales dummy is set to one if the 
linn falls in the above median sales group and '0' otherwise. Margin dummy is set to one if the finii falls in the above median 
margin group and '0' otherwise, t-values are based on White's heteroskedasticity- consistent standard enors. ***, (**) and (*) 
indicate significance at 1%, (5%) and (10%) level. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
cons 
Number of obs 
F( 10, 89) 
Prob > F 
Coef. 
0.093*** 
-0 117*** 
0.306*** 
0.001 
0.010*** 
0.019 
0.017 
0.054*** 
0.005*** 
0.050*** 
0.078 
100 
11.73 
0 
Std. Err. 
0.015 
0.015 
0.064 
0.001 
0.003 
0.018 
0.021 
0.019 
0.015 
0.016 
0.102 
t 
5.89 
-7.81 
4.77 
1.24 
2.89 
1.05 
0.8 
2.84 
0.33 
3.05 
0.77 
RSq 
Adj R Sq 
P>t 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.22 
0.005 
0.297 
0.425 
0.006 
0.744 
0.003 
0.444 
0.6798 
0.5334 
Coefficients of CGI, Margin, log sales. Margin Dummy, GDR Dummy and Sect 
Dummy are positive and significant at 1% level. Coefficients of Sales Dummy, 
Promoters' holding and Asset Dummy are positive but not significant. 
Summary of 5 year cross sectional regressions with ROA: 
The coefficients of CGI are positive and significant in four years and positive in the 
other year. Based on this it can be said that the relationship between CGI and is ROA 
is positive. 
The coefficients of log sales are positive and significant in all the years and that of 
sales dummy is positive in two years of the study. In the other years it is positive but 
not significant. This means that there is a positive and significant relationship between 
sales and finn performance measured by ROA. 
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From the data it is observed that coefficients of log assets is negative and significant 
in all the five years This indicates that the relationship is negatively related to finn 
values measured by ROA. The coefficients of asset dummy are insignificant meaning 
that there is no significant relationship between the two. 
Coefficient of Margin is positive and significant in four years and negative and not 
significant in one year. Coefficient of Margin dummy is positive and significant in all 
the years. 
The coefficient of GDR Dummy is posifive in three out of five years. \t is significant 
in the year 2008.This can be interpreted as firms which issue GDRs/ADRs have 
positive valuations with respect to ROA. 
Coefficient of promoters' holding is positive and not significant in all the years. The 
coefficient of sector dummy is positive and significant in two years and positive and 
not significant in the other years. It can be said that the manufacturing firms have 
better firm values measured by ROA. 
4.1.2 This section provides summary of the results of cross sectional regressions 
with three dependent variables and other independent variables for each of the 5 
years of the study. 
Table 4.51 
Summary Table of coefficients of variables for the year 2004 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
_cons 
RSq 
Adj R Sq 
Tobin's Q 
0.892** 
-1.689*** 
-0.625 
0.018 
0.413*** 
0.814* 
0.306 
0.353 
-0.457 
-2.468*** 
4.601 
0.5215 
0.450 
MVBV 
2.122 
-3 491*** 
4.378 
-0.051 
0.806** 
0.814 
0.844 
-0.745 
-1.205 
-3.246 
10.734 
0.1539 
0.1246 
ROA 
Q119*** 
-0.139*** 
0.340*** 
0.001 
0.006 
0.061* 
-0.008 
0.091*** 
-0.033 
0.042 
0.131 
0.7193 
0.5532 
The Coefficient of CGI is posifive and significant in relafion to Tobin's Q and MVBV. 
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Table 4.52 
Summary Table of coefficients of dependent and independent variables for the year 
2005 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
cons 
RSq 
Adj R Sq 
Tobin's Q 
0.588 
-2.541** 
4.065 
0.032* 
0.497*** 
1.955 
0.676 
0.598 
1.074 
-1.181 
9.754 
0.3763 
0.2897 
MVBV 
-31.738 
22.785 
-36.808 
0.691 
2.593 
10.376 
-17.805 
-22,287 
-11.753 
18.193 
27.176 
0.1484 
0.1198 
ROA 
0.077*** 
-0.105*** 
0.249** 
0.001 
0.008** 
0.057** 
0.004 
0.090*** 
0.012 
0.068** 
0.119 
0.6652 
0.5115 
The Coefficient of CGI is positive and significant in relation to Tobin's Q and ROA 
Table 4.53 
Summary Table of coefficients of dependent and independent variables for the year 
2006 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
cons 
R-sq 
Adj R Sq 
Tobin's Q 
0.120 
-1.380*** 
-0.084 
0.024** 
0.395*** 
1.041* 
0.547 
0.441 
-0.080 
-0.926 
7.309 
0.4801 
0.4203 
MVBV 
0.164 
-2.536*** 
2.725 
0.067** 
0.979* 
0.761 
1.221 
-0.143 
-2.488 
1.296 
8.609 
0.2723 
0.2093 
ROA 
0.047*** 
-0.069*** 
-0.020 
0.001 
0.012** 
0.023 
0.022 
0.093*** 
-0.013 
0.045 
0.136 
0.5624 
0,4327 
The Coefficient of CGI is positive and significant in relation to Tobin's Q at 1% level, 
MVBV at 10% level and ROA at 5% level. 
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Table 4.54 
Summary Table of coefficients of dependent and independent variables for the year 
2007 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sectdum 
Cons 
RSq 
Adj R Sq 
Tobin's Q 
0.207 
-1.523*** 
-1.354 
0.020** 
0.081 
0.903* 
0.820 
0.987** 
-0.636 
-1.207 
13.732 
0.4953 
0.4359 
MVBV 
2.281 
-4.423** 
-5.644 
0.038 
0.212 
1.403 
-1.019 
0.781 
-6.421* 
-6.733 
39.982 
0.2048 
0.1575 
ROA 
0.090*** 
-0.123*** 
Q T J J * ! ) : * 
0.000 
0.008* 
0.021 
0.029 
0.034* 
0.006 
0.032 
0.229 
0.6595 
0.5071 
The Coefficient of CGI is positive and significant in relation to ROA at 10% level. In 
relation to Tobin's Q and MVBV it is positive but not significant. 
Table 4.55 
Summary Table of coefficients of dependent and independent variables for the year 
2008 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
cons 
RSq 
Adj R Sq 
Tobin's Q 
0.451** 
-0.908*** 
0.935 
0.011** 
0.127* 
0.596* 
-0.128 
0.152 
-0.594* 
-0.130 
3.869* 
0.4039 
0.3441 
MVBV 
1.039 
-2.089** 
-2.556 
.0608 
0.029 
3.963 * 
-3.159 
0.325 
-2.412 
-3.447 
14.945 
0.2921 
0.2246 
ROA 
0.093*** 
-0 117*** 
0.306*** 
0.001 
0.010*** 
0.019 
0.017 
0.054*** 
0.005*** 
0.050*** 
0.078 
0.6798 
0.5334 
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The Coefficient of CGI is positive and significant in relation to Tobin's Q at 10% 
level and ROA at 1% level. In the case of MVBV it is positive but not significant. 
Summary of Cross sectional regressions for 5 years from 2004 to 2008: 
In the first set of robustness tests, analyses have been made on a year-by-year basis 
with finn-year observations. This is line with the analyses made by Ammann et al., 
(2011) and others. 
The results show that there is a positive effect of Corporate Governance on firm 
values measured by Tobin's Q, MVBV and ROA. The coefficient of CGI is positive 
and significant in four years with respect to Tobin's Q and ROA.The coefficient of 
CGI with respect to MVBV is posifive and significant in two out of five years of this 
study and posifive but not significant in the years 2005, 2007 and 2008.This could be 
attributed to sporadic fluctuations in the market values of the firms. Besides, in the 
studies by Berglof and Perotfi (1994); Claessens et al., (2000); La Porta et al., (2000), 
it is observed that the relafionship between Corporate Governance and firm values 
could be insignificant or negative in certain countries. 
These findings are in line with the cross sectional studies in the developed markets by 
Gompers et al., (2003); Aggarwal et al, (2006); Drobetz et al., (2004); Klapper and 
Love (2004). 
In the emerging market studies, the study findings are in line with Black et al., 
(2006); Chong et al, (2009); Garay and Gonzalez (2008). 
In the Indian context these findings are in line with Mohanty (2003) and 
Balasubramanian et al, (2010). 
Mostly the coefficients of Log sales (except for one year) are positive. With relation 
to Tobin's Q Sales Dummy is significant in three years; with relation to MVBV it is 
significant in one year and significant in two years with relation to ROA. This shows 
that sales and finn values are positively associated. 
In product market competition, better sales are one of the outcomes of better 
Corporate Governance practices. The findings of this study are in line with the 
findings of Saravanan (2009): Pant and Pattanayak (2008); Friedman (1953). 
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Research studies by Fich and Shivdasani (2004); Kumar (2005) also indicate a 
positive relationsliip between liigher proportional sales and fimi values measured by 
Tobin's Q. 
Coefficient of Log Assets is negative and significant in all the years when regressed 
with Tobin's Q and ROA, In the case of MVBV also it is negative and significant in 
four out of five years. 
Coefficient of Assets dummy is positive and not significant in four out of five years 
and negative and not significant in one year with respect to Tobin's Q. It is negative 
and not significant in three years and positive and not significant in two years with 
MVBV. With respect to ROA, Asset dummy is positive and not significant in four 
years and negative and not significant in one year. 
Coefficient of margin is not significant in all the years with respect to Tobin's Q and 
it is positive for two years and negative for the rest. Same is the case with MVBV. 
With ROA, Margin is positive and significant for three years. Coefficient of Margin 
dummy is positive for all the years and significant for one year with Tobin's Q. It is 
not significant in MVBV for all the years and positive for two years and negative for 
three years. With ROA it is positive and significant for all the years. 
Coefficient of promoters' holding is posiUve in all the years and significant in four 
years with Tobin's Q. With MVBV it is posifive for four years and significant for one 
year. It is posifive and not significant in all the years with respect to ROA. 
Coefficient of GDR Dummy is negafive for 4 years and significant for one year with 
Tobin's Q. It is negative and insignificant for all the years except one year with 
respect to MVBV. With ROA it is posifive for three years and significant in one year. 
Coefficient of Sectoral dummy is negative for all years with Tobin's Q and 
significant in one year. With MVBV it is negative and not significant in three years 
and positive in two years. With ROA it is positive in all the years and significant in 
two years. 
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4.1.3 Panel regressions: 
This section deals with analyses using panel regressions. 
Table 4.56 
Pooled regression for the years 2004-08: Tobin's Q 
The table reports the pooled regression results of Tobin's Q on CGI index, Log sales, Log assets, margin and 
promoter's holding. The regressions also include sales, asset, margin, GDR and Sector dummy variables. Sector 
dummy is set to one if the firm belongs to manufacturing sector and '0' otherwise. GDR dummy is set to one if the 
firm has issued depository receipts and '0' otherwise. Asset dummy is set to one if the finn falls in the above 
median asset group and '0' otherwise. Sales dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median sales group 
and '0' otherwise. Margin dummy is set to one if the finn falls in the above median margin group and '0" 
otherwise, t-values are based on White's heteroskedasticity- consistent standard eiTors. ***, (**) and (*) indicate 
significance at 1%, (5%) and (10%) level. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
cons 
Number of obs 
F(10, 437) 
Prob > F 
RSq 
Coef. 
0.330** 
-1.525*** 
0.605 
0.021*** 
0.255*** 
1.080*** 
0.434 
0.318 
-0.112 
-1.098*** 
8.886*** 
448 
10.44 
0 
0.329 
Std. Err. 
0.157 
0.339 
0.911 
0.005 
0.047 
0.373 
0.474 
0.285 
0.226 
0.350 
2.830 
t 
2.100 
-4.490 
0.660 
4.410 
5.360 
2.890 
0.920 
1.120 
-0.490 
-3.140 
3.140 
P>t 
0.036 
0.000 
0.507 
0.000 
0.000 
0.004 
0.360 
0.265 
0.622 
0.002 
0.002 
The above table shows the results of pooled regressions of 448 finn years covering 
the period 2004-08.The coefficients of Promoter's Holding, CGI, Log sales and Sales 
dummy are positive and significant. The coefficients of Asset dummy and Margin 
dummy and Margin are positive but not significant. The coefficient of GDR dummy is 
negative but not significant. The coefficient of Sect dummy and log assets is negative 
and significant at 1% level. 
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Table 4.57 
Fixed-effects regression for the years 2004-08: Tobin's Q 
The table reports the fixed effects regression results of Tobin's Q on CGI index, Log sales, Log assets, margin and 
promoter's holding .The regressions also include sales, asset, margin, GDR and Sector dummy variables. Sector 
dummy is set to one if the firm belongs to manufacturing sector and '0' otherwise. GDR dummy is set to one if the 
firm has issued depository receipts and '0' otherwise. Asset dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above 
median asset group and "0' otherwise. Sales dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median sales group 
and "0' otherwise. Margin dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median margin group and '0' 
otherwise. ***, {**) and (*) indicate significance at 1%, (5%) and (10%) level. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
cons 
R-sq; within 
R-sq: between 
R-sq: overall 
F(10,338) 
Prob > F 
Coef 
0.465 
-1 957*** 
0.521 
0.019 
0.124 
0.402 
0.533 
0.530 
0.482 
-0.560 
13.342*** 
0.1100 
0.3839 
0.2725 
4.18 
0 
Std. Err. 
0.390 
0.429 
1.365 
0.030 
0.082 
0.444 
0.480 
0.462 
0.641 
0.903 
2.836 
t 
1.190 
-4.560 
0.380 
0.630 
1.500 
0.910 
1.110 
1.150 
0.750 
-0.620 
4.700 
Number of obs 
Number of groups 
Obs per group; min 
avg 
max 
P>t 
0.234 
0.000 
0.703 
0.532 
0.134 
0.365 
0.268 
0.252 
0.453 
0.536 
0.000 
448 
100 
1 
4.5 
5 
F test that all u_i=0: F(99, 338)= 2.65 Prob > F = 0.0000 
The above table shows the resuhs of fixed effects regression of the panel data of 448 
firm years covering a period of five years-2004-08. The coefficients of log sales, 
margin, Promoters' Holding, Sales dummy, GDR dummy, Asset dummy and Margin 
dummy are positive but not significant. The coefficient of sectoral dummy is negafive 
but not significant. The coefficient of Log assets is negative and significant at 1% 
level. 
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Table 4.58 
Random-effects regression for the years 2004-2008: Tobin's Q 
The table reports the randiini elTects regression resuks of Tohin's 0 o" CGI index. Log sales. Log assets, margin and promoter's 
holding .The regressions also include sales, asset, margin, GDR and Sector dummy variables. Sector dummy is set to one if the 
finii belongs to manufacturing sector and '0' olhcnvise. GDR dummy is set to one if the fimi has issued depository receipts and 
•()' othenvise. Asset dummy is set to one if the finn falls in the above median asset group and '0' otherwise. Sales dummy is set 
to one if the llrm falls in the above median sales group and '0' otherwise. Margin dummy is set to one if the finn falls in the 
above median margin group and '0' othenvise. ***, {**) and {*) indicate significance at 1%, (5%) and (10%) level. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Margn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
cons 
R-sq: within 
R-sq: between 
R-sq: overall 
Waldchi2(10) 
Prob > chi2 
Coeff 
0.343** 
-1.537*** 
0.382 
0.020*** 
0.189*** 
0.852** 
0.496 
0.444 
-0.064 
-1.049*** 
9 959*** 
0.0951 
0.4671 
0.3251 
125.57 
0 
Std. Err. 
0.165 
0.193 
0.787 
0.008 
0.065 
0.357 
0.380 
0.362 
0.324 
0.390 
1.795 
z 
2.070 
-7.980 
0.490 
2.630 
2.910 
2.390 
1.300 
1.220 
-0.200 
-2.690 
5.550 
Number of obs 
Number of groups 
Obs per group: min 
avg 
max 
P>z 
0.038 
0.000 
0.628 
0.009 
0.004 
0.017 
0.192 
0.221 
0.844 
0.007 
0.000 
448 
100 
1 
4.5 
5 
Hausman and Breusch-Pagan tests 
Hausman test chi2(10) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)'^(-l)](b-B)= 
9.76 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
chi2(l) = 60.83 
Prob>chi2= 0.4619 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Table 4.58 shows the results of random effects regression of the panel data of 448 
firm years covering a period of five years 2004-08. 
The coefficient of Promoters holding and CGI is positive and significant at 1% level. 
The coefficient of Log sales and Sales dummy are positive and significant at 5% 
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level. The coefficients of Sect dummy and log assets are negative and significant at 
1% level. The coefficients of Asset dummy and Margin dummy are positive but not 
significant. The coefficient of GDR dummy is negative but not significant. 
Results of Hausman and Breusch-Pagan tests confirm the appropriateness of random 
effects model. 
Table 4.59 
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation of the years 2004 to 2008: Tobin's 
Q 
The table reports the dynamic panel data regression results of Tobin's Q on CGI index, Log sales, Log assets, 
margin and promoter's holding .The regressions also include sales, asset, margin, GDR and Sector dummy 
variables. Sector dummy is set to one if the firm belongs to manufacturing sector and '0' otherwise. GDR dummy 
is set to one if the finn has issued depository receipts and '0' othei-wise. Asset dummy is set to one if the firm falls 
in the above median asset group and '0' otherwise. Sales dummy is set to one if the finn falls in the above median 
sales group and '0' otherwise. iVlargin dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median margin group and 
'0' otherwise. ***, (**) and (*) indicate significance at 1%, (5%) and (10%) level. 
Variables 
LI. 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
Waldchi2(ll) 
Prob > chi2 
Co.eff 
0.176*** 
0.651 
-4.334*** 
5.814*** 
0.088** 
0.034 
0.526 
1.969* 
0.141 
0.089 
0.243 
222.65 
0 
Std. Err. 
0.061 
0.436 
1.521 
1.456 
0.036 
0.043 
0.433 
1.048 
0.275 
0.264 
0.401 
z 
2.890 
1.490 
-2.850 
3.990 
2.410 
0.800 
1.210 
1.880 
0.510 
0.340 
0.610 
Number of obs 
Number of groups 
Obs per group: min 
avg 
max 
P>z 
0.004 
0.135 
0.004 
0.000 
0.016 
0.425 
0.224 
0.060 
0.608 
0.737 
0.544 
251 
90 
1 
2.788 
3 
The lagged value of Tobin's Q is positive and significant at 1% level. The coefficient 
of Log asset is negative at 1% level. Coefficient of Margin is positive and significant 
at 1% level. 
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Coefficient of Promoters' holding is significant at 5% level and that of Asset dummy 
is significant at 10% level. The coefficients of log sales, CGI, GDR dummy, sales 
dummy and margin dummy are positive and significant. 
Table 4.60 
Pooled regression for the years 2004-08: MVBV 
The table reports the pooled regression results of MVBV on CGI index, Log sales, Log assets, margin and 
promoter's holding. The regressions also include sales, asset, margin, GDR and Sector dummy variables. Sector 
dummy is set to one if the firm belongs to manufacturing sector and "0' otherwise.. GDR dummy is set to one if 
the firm has issued depository receipts and '0' otherwise. Asset dummy is set to one if the fimi falls in the above 
median asset group and '0' otherwise. Sales dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median sales groujj 
and "0' otherwise. Margin dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median margin group and "0' 
otherwise, t-values are based on White's heteroskedasticity- consistent standard errors. ***, (**) and (*) indicate 
significance at 1%, (5%) and (10%) level. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
cons 
Number of obs 
F( 10, 437) 
Prob > F 
RSq 
Coef. 
-1.830 
-1.665 
2.551 
0.102 
0.220 
1.690 
0.392 
-7.045 
-5.317* 
-0.840 
35.380*** 
448 
5.21 
0 
0.038 
Std. Err. 
3.468 
2.513 
4.331 
0.078 
0.258 
1.722 
2.643 
6.390 
3.161 
3.246 
12.844 
t 
-0.530 
-0.660 
0.590 
1.310 
0.850 
0.980 
0.150 
-1.100 
-1.680 
-0.260 
2.750 
P>t 
0.598 
0.508 
0.556 
0.192 
0.395 
0.327 
0.882 
0.271 
0.093 
0.796 
0.006 
The coefficient of GDR dummy is negative and significant at 10% level. The 
coefficients of Log sales, log assets, Margin dummy and Sector dummy are negative 
and not significant and the rest are positive and not significant. 
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Table 4.61 
Fixed-effects regression for the years 2004-08: MVBV 
The table reports the pooled regression results of MVBV on CGI index, Log sales. Log assets, margin and 
promoter's holding .The regressions also include sales, asset, margin, GDR and Sector dummy variables. Sector 
dummy is set to one if the fmn belongs to manufacturing sector and '0' otherwise. GDR dummy is set to one if the 
firm has issued depository receipts and "0' otherwise. Asset dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above 
median asset group and '0' otherwise. Sales dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median sales group 
and '0" otherwise. Margin dummy is set to one if the fmn falls in the above median margin group and '0' otherwise. ***, 
(**) and (*) indicate significance at 1%, (5%) and (10%) level. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
cons 
R Sq: within 
R Sq: between 
R Sq: overall 
F(10,338) 
Coef. 
-0.098 
-4.115 
-21.138 
0.666 
0.996 
4.763 
-11.871* 
-10.033 
-1.419 
1.615 
13.865 
0.0510 
0.0417 
0.0215 
1.82 
Std. Err. 
5.617 
6.176 
19.661 
0.428 
1.187 
6.389 
6.915 
6.650 
9.229 
13.006 
40.856 
t 
-0.020 
-0.670 
-1.080 
1.560 
0.840 
0.750 
-1.720 
-1.510 
-0.150 
0.120 
0.340 
Number of obs 
Number of groups 
Obs per grp: min 
avg 
max 
P>t 
0.986 
0.506 
0.283 
0.120 
0.402 
0.456 
0.087 
0.132 
0.878 
0.901 
0.735 
448 
100 
1 
4.5 
5 
F test that all u_i=0: F(99, 338)= 1.13 Prob > F = 0.2133 
The coefficient of Asset dummy is negative and significant. The coefficients of Log 
sales, Log assets, Margin, Margin dummy and GDR dummy are negative but not 
significant. The rest are positive and not significant. 
[32 
Table 4.62 
Random-Effects Regression for the Years 2004-08: MVBV 
The table reports the random effects regression re-suhs of MVBV on CGI index, Log sales, Log assets, margin and 
promoter's holding .The regressions also include sales, asset, margin, GDR and Sector dummy variables. Sector 
dummy is set to one if the firm belongs lo nianufacturing sector and '0' otherwise. GDR dummy is set to one if the 
firm has issued depository receipts and '0' otherwise. Asset duminy is set to one if the firin falls in the above 
median asset group and '0" otherwise. Sales duminy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median sales group 
and "0' otherwise. Margin dummy is set to one if the fmn falls in the above median margin group and '0" 
otherwise. ***, (**) and (*) indicate significance at 1%, (5%) and (10%) level. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales duni 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
_cons 
R-sq: within 
R-sq: between 
R-sq: overall 
Waldchi2(10) 
Prob > chi2 
Coef. 
-1.830 
-1.665 
2.551 
0.102 
0.220 
1.690 
0.392 
-7.045* 
-5.317* 
-0.840 
35.380* 
0.0272 
0.0786 
0.0380 
17.25 
0.069 
Std. Err. 
1.837 
2.044 
8.855 
0.074 
0.770 
4.185 
4.397 
4.157 
3.191 
3.865 
20.475 
z 
-1.000 
-0.810 
0.290 
1.390 
0.290 
0.400 
0.090 
-1.690 
-1.670 
-0.220 
1.730 
Number of obs 
Number of groups 
Obs per group: min 
avg 
max 
P>z 
0.319 
0.416 
0.773 
0.166 
0.775 
0.686 
0.929 
0.090 
0.096 
0.828 
0.084 
448 
100 
1 
4.5 
5 
Hausman and Breusch-Pagan tests 
Hausman test: chi2(10)=(b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-l)](b-B) =14.42 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
chi2(l) =0.62 
Prob>chi2 = 0.1548 
Prob>chi2=0.4319 
The coefficients of CGI, Sales Duminy, Margin, Promoters" holding and Asset 
Dummy are positive but not significant. The coefficient of Margin Dummy and GDR 
Dummy are negative and significant. The coefficient and Sect Dum of is negative but 
not significant. 
Based on the resuhs of Hausman and Breusch-Pagan tests, it is found that the pooled 
model is appropriate. 
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Table 4.63 
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data estimation of 5 years from 2004-08: MVBV 
The table reports the dynamic panel data regression results of MVBV on CGI index, Log sales, Log assets, margin 
and promoter's holding .The regressions also include sales, asset, margin, GDR and Sector dummy variables. 
Sector dummy is set to one if the firm belongs to manufacturing sector and '0' otherwise. GDR dummy is set to 
one if the firm has issued depositoiy receipts and "0' otherwise. Asset dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the 
above median asset group and 0' otherwise. Sales dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median sales 
group and '0' otherwise. Margin dummy is set to one if the finn falls in the above median margin group and '0' 
otherwise. ***, (**) and (*) indicate significance at 1%, (5%) and (10%) level. 
Variables 
LI. 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
cons 
Waldchi2(ll) 
Prob > chi2 
Coef. 
-0.024 
-0.718 
-15.829 
-169.000 
-0.001 
0.212 
11.138 
-37.693 
-2.235 
-1.374 
5.518 
229.102 
185.19 
0 
Std. Err. 
0.032 
5.672 
11.791 
158.233 
0.772 
0.774 
9.542 
36.624 
6.809 
3.601 
5.959 
161.668 
z 
-0.760 
-0.130 
-1.340 
-1.070 
0.000 
0.270 
1.170 
-1.030 
-0.330 
-0.380 
0.930 
1.420 
Number of obs 
Number of groups 
Obs per group: min 
avg 
max 
P>z 
0.450 
0.899 
0.179 
0.286 
0.999 
0.784 
0.243 
0.303 
0.743 
0.703 
0.354 
0.156 
251 
90 
1 
2.788 
3 
The lagged value of MVBV is not significant. 
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Table 4.64 
Pooled regression for five years 2004-08 ROA 
The table reports the pooled regression results of ROA on CGI index, Log sales, Log assets, margin and 
promoter's holding. The regressions also include sales, asset, inargin, GDR and Sector dummy variables. Sector 
dummy is set to one if the t1rin belongs to manufacturing sector and "0" otherwise. GDR dummy is set to one if the 
fmn has issued depositoiy receipts and "0' otherwise. Asset dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above 
median asset group and "0' othenvise. Sales dummy is set to one if the finn falls in the above median sales group 
and '0' otherwise. Margin dummy is set to one if the finn falls in the above median margin group and '0" 
otherwise, t-values are based on White's heteroskedasticity- consistent standard errors. ***, (**) and (*) indicate 
significance at 1%, (5%) and (10%) level. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
_cons 
Number of obs 
F( 10, 437) 
Prob > F 
RSq 
Coef. 
0.066*** 
-0.086*** 
0.112 
0.000 
0.008*** 
0.033*** 
-0.008 
0.085*** 
-0.016 
0.032** 
0.158*** 
448 
37.99 
0 
0.5524 
Std. Err. 
0.016 
0.016 
0.092 
0.000 
0.002 
0.011 
0.012 
0.015 
0.012 
0.013 
0.054 
t 
4.210 
-5.560 
1.220 
1.230 
3.870 
2.990 
-0.690 
5.690 
-1.340 
2.520 
2.940 
P>t 
0.000 
0.000 
0.224 
0.220 
0.000 
0.003 
0.489 
0.000 
0.182 
0.012 
0.003 
The above table shows the results of pooled regressions of 448 firm years covering 
the period 2004-08. 
The coefficients of CGI, Sales dummy, GDR dummy, Log sales. Margin and 
promoters" holding are positive and significant at 1% level. The coefficient of Sect 
dummy is positive and significant at 5% level. The coefficients of Asset dummy and 
Margin dummy are negative but not significant. The coefficient of Log assets is 
negative and significant at 1% level. 
135 
Table 4.65 
Fixed-effects regression for the years 2004-08: ROA 
The tabic reports the fixed effects regression results of ROA on CGI index. Log sales, Log assets, margin and 
promoter's holding. The regressions also include sales, asset, margin, GDR and Sector dummy variables. Sector 
dummy is set to one if the firm belongs to manufacturing sector and '0' otherwise. GDR dummy is set to one if the 
firm has issued depositoiy receipts and '0" otherwise. Asset dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above 
median asset group and '0' otherwise. Sales dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median sales group 
and "0' otherwise. Margin dummy is set to one if the fimi falls in the above median margin group and '0' 
otherwise. ***, (**) and (*) indicate significance at 1%, (5%) and (10%) level. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
cons 
R-sq: within 
R-sq: between 
R-sq: overall 
F(10,338) 
Prob > F 
Coef. 
0.073*** 
-0.075*** 
0.089*** 
-O.OOI 
0.003** 
-0.002 
-0.032 
0.047*** 
0.001 
-0.009 
0.185*** 
0.4041 
0.4100 
0.4508 
22.92 
0 
Std. Err. 
0.008 
0.009 
0.028 
0.001 
0.002 
0.009 
0.010 
0.009 
0.013 
0.018 
0.058 
t 
9.150 
-8.570 
3.210 
-1.170 
1.990 
-0.190 
-0.485 
4.950 
0.010 
-0.480 
3.190 
Number of obs 
Number of groups 
Obs per group: min 
avg 
max 
P>t 
0.000 
0.000 
0.001 
0.243 
0.048 
0.852 
0.631 
0.000 
0.996 
0.631 
0.002 
448 
100 
1 
4.5 
5 
F test that ah u_i=0: F(99, 338)= 13.15 Prob > F = 0.0000 
The coefficient of CGI is positive and significant at 5% level The coefficients of 
Margin and margin dummy are positive and significant at 1% level. The coefficient of 
Log assets is negative and significant at 1% level. The coefficient of Sales dummy is 
negative but not significant. The coefficient of Asset dummy is negative and not 
significant. 
The coefficient of GDR dummy is positive at 1% level and that of Sectoral dummy is 
negative but not significant. The results of Hausman and Breusch-Pagan tests given 
below confirm the fixed effects model. 
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Table 4.66 
Random-effects regression for the years 2004-2008: ROA 
The table reports the random effects regression results of ROA on CGI index, Log sales, Log assets, margin and 
promoter's holding .The regressions also include sales, asset, margin, GDR and Sector dummy variables. Sector 
dummy is set to one if the firm belongs to manufacturing sector and '0' otherwise. GDR dummy is set to one if the 
firm has issued depositoiy receipts and '0' otherwise. Asset dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above 
median asset group and "0' otherwise. Sales dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median sales group 
and "0' otherwise. Margin dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median margin group and '0" 
otherwise. ***, (**) and (*) indicate significance at 1%, (5"o) and (10%) level. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
cons 
R-sq: within 
R-sq: between 
R-sq: overall 
Waldchi2(10) 
Prob > chi2 
Coef. 
0.068*** 
-0.073*** 
0.096*** 
0.001 
0.003** 
0.004 
-0.027*** 
0.054*** 
-0.013 
0.004 
0.164*** 
0.3952 
0.4926 
0.5197 
320.34 
0 
Std. Err. 
0.005 
0.006 
0.022 
0.000 
0.002 
0.009 
0.009 
0.009 
0.011 
0.013 
0.049 
z 
12.890 
-11.900 
4.350 
0.150 
2.120 
0.420 
-2.870 
5.970 
-1.230 
0.280 
3.370 
Number of obs 
Number of groups 
Obs per group: min 
avg 
max 
P>z 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.878 
0.034 
0.673 
0.004 
0.000 
0.220 
0.779 
0.001 
448 
100 
1 
4.5 
5 
Hausman and Breusch-Pagan tests 
Hausman test chi2 (10) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-l)](b-B)= 26.25 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
chi2(l) = 429.05 
Prob>chi2= 0.0034 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Coefficient of CGI is positive and significant at 5% level and that of log sales, 
margin, margin dummy are positive and significant at l%level. Coefficients of Asset 
dummy and log assts are negative and significant at 1%. Coefficients of promoters' 
holding and sales dummy are positive and insignificant. 
Results of Hausman and Breusch-Pagan tests show that fixed effects model is 
appropriate. 
Table 4.67 
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation: ROA 
The table reports the dynaiiiie panel data regression resuhs of ROA on CGI index, Log sales, Log assets, margin 
and promoter's holding The regressions also inelude sales, asset, margin, GDR and Seetor dummy variables. 
Seetor dummy is set to one if the firm belongs to manufacturing sector and "0" otherwise. GDR dummy is set to 
one if the firm has issued depository receipts and '0' otherwise. Asset dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the 
above median asset group and '0" otherwise. Sales dummy is set to one if the firni falls in the above median sales 
group and '0' otherwise. Margin dummy is set to one if the firm falls in the above median margin group and "0" 
otherwise. ***, (**) and (*) indicate significance at 1%, (5%) and (10%) level. 
Variables 
LI. 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
_cons 
Waldchi2(ll) 
Prob > chi2 
Coef. 
-0.093 
0.078*** 
-0.110*** 
0.464*** 
0.002 
0.002** 
-0.012 
0.008 
0.015 
0.003 
0.005 
0.233* 
283.04 
0 
Std. Err. 
0.218 
0.027 
0.021 
0.088 
0.001 
0.001 
0.010 
0.013 
0.011 
0.005 
0.009 
0.120 
z 
-0.430 
2.940 
-5.200 
5.270 
1.600 
2.010 
-1.220 
0.590 
1.300 
0.710 
0.600 
1.940 
Number of obs 
Number of groups 
Obs per group: 
avg 
max 
P>z 
0.669 
0.003 
0.000 
0.000 
0.110 
0.044 
0.224 
0.556 
0.193 
0.477 
0.545 
0.052 
251 
90 
1 
2.788 
3 
The lagged coefficient of ROA is negative but not significant. The coefficients of Log 
sales and Margin is positive and significant at 1% level. The coefficient of Log asset 
is negative and significant at 1 % level. Coefficients of other variables are posifive but 
not significant. 
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4.1.4 Summary of panel data: 
In this section the coefficients of econometric regressions (Pooled, Fixed and 
Random) have been summarized to faciUtate an overall view. According to Black et 
al., (2006) "governance to value" studies relying on cross-sectional data, is much 
more susceptible to non-causal explanations. Hence these regressions substantiate the 
findings of cross sectional regression. 
Table 4.68 
Summary of panel data regressions for the years 2004-08 with Tobin's Q as the 
dependent variable. ***, (**) and (*) indicate significance at 1%, (5%) and (10%) 
level. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
_cons 
Pooled 
regression 
0.330** 
-1.525*** 
0.605 
0.021*** 
0.255*** 
1.080*** 
0.434 
0.318 
-0.112 
-1.098*** 
8.886 
R Sq = 0.329 
Fixed effects regression 
0.465 
-1 957*** 
0.521 
0.019 
0.124 
0.402 
0.533 
0.530 
0.482 
-0.560 
13.342 
RSq 
WithmO.llOO 
Between 0.3839 
Overall 0.2725 
Random effects 
regression 
0.343** 
-1.537*** 
0.382 
0.020*** 
0.189*** 
0.852** 
0.496 
0.444 
-0.064 
-1.049*** 
9.959 
RSq 
Within 0.0951 
Between 0.4671 
OveraU 0.3251 
F test that all u_i=0 F(99,338)= 2.65 Prob > F = 0.0000 
Hausman and Breusch-Pagan Tests 
Hausman test chi2(10) = (b-B)'[(V b-V B)^(-l)](b-B)= 9.76 Prob>chi2= 0.4619 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random 
effects chi2(l) = 60.83 
Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
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The tests suggest the appropriateness of the Random effects model. Random effects 
will give better p-values as they are a more efficient estimator. Hence random effects 
regression can be run if it is statistically justifiable to do so (Al- Haddad et al., 2011). 
The Coefficient of CGI is positive and significant at 1% level in the random effects 
regression which is in line with the findings of Black et al.,(2010-Korea); Black, 
Carvalho and Gorga (2010-Brazil). 
The coefficient of CGI is positive and not significant in the fixed effect model. 
However the findings of Ammann et al., (2011) and Black et al., (2010) are that the 
coefficients of CGI in the fixed effect model are posifive and significant. 
Log Sales value is positive and significant in random effects regression. Sales dummy 
is positive and significant at 5% level in the random effects models whereas it is 
insignificant in the fixed effects model. This is in line with the findings of Eberhart 
(2011) in the case of Japanese firms where the coefficients are posifive and 
insignificant. Black et al., (2010) find that coefficients of sales growth are posifive 
and insignificant. 
The coefficient of Log assets is negative and significant at 1 % level in all the models 
of regressions. This is in line with the findings of Black et al., (2010) in their study 
about Korean firms. The coefficient of Asset dummy is posifive but not significant in 
all the regressions. This means that large physical assets do not significantly add to 
firni values measured by Tobin's Q. Similar finding is observed by Black et al., 
(2010) in their study about Brazilian firms. However Zheka's (2007) findings are in 
contradiction, where it is positive and significant in all the models of regressions. 
The coefficients of Margin and Margin dummy are positive but not significant in all 
the regressions, which are not in line with the findings of Black et al., (2010) who find 
these coefficients to be negative and significant in the case of Korean firnis. In the 
case of Brazilian finns, Black et al., (2010) find that the coefficient of margin is 
positive and significant in pooled and random effects models of regression. 
The coefficient of promoters" holding is significant in the Random effects models. It 
is positive and insignificant in the fixed effect model. This result contradicts the 
results of Black et al., (2010T<:orea) who find the coefficients in the random effects 
models to be negative and significant at 5% level. Black et al., (2010) in their study 
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about Brazilian finns, find that the coefficients are positive in the random effects 
model. 
The coefficient of GDR dummy is negative and insignificant in the random effects 
model. In the study about Korean finns, Black et al., (2010) find the coefficient to be 
positive and insignificant in the random effects model. In the fixed effects model this 
dummy has been excluded from the regressions in his study. In their study about 
Brazilian finns Black et al., (2010) find that the coefficients are positive but not 
significant in the random effects models. 
Sector dummy is negative and significant in the random effects models. This means 
that the firai valuations of service sector finns measured by Tobin's Q are relatively 
higher than the manufacturing firms. In the case of Japanese firms Eberhart (2011) 
found negative but not significant relafionship with respect to Tobin's Q in the case of 
manufacturing finns in the random effects model. The findings of this study are in 
line with this. 
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Table 4.69 
Summary of panel data regressions for the years 2004-08 with MVBV as the 
dependent variable ***, (**) and (*) indicate significance at 1%, (5%) and (10%) 
level. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
cons 
Pooled 
regression 
-1.830 
-1.665 
2.551 
0.102 
0.220 
1.690 
0.392 
-7.045 
-5.317* 
-0.840 
35.380 
RSq = 0.038 
Fixed effects 
regression 
-0.098 
-4.115 
-21.138 
0.666 
0.996 
4.763 
-11.871* 
-10.033 
-1.419 
1.615 
13.865 
RSq 
Within 0.0510 
Between 0.0417 
Overall 0.0215 
Random effects 
regression 
-1.830 
-1.665 
2.551 
0.102 
0.220 
1.690 
0.392 
-7.045* 
-5.317* 
-0.840 
35.380 
RSq 
WithinO.0271 
BetweenO.4671 
Overah 0.3251 
F test that all uj=0: F(99, 338)= 1.13 Prob > F = 0.2133 
Hausman and Breusch-Pagan Tests 
chi2(10)=(b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)'^ (-l)](b-B) =14.42 Prob>chi2 = 0.1548 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for 
random effects chi2(l)= 0.62 
Prob >chi2 = 0.4319 
The results of the test imply that the pooled model is appropriate. 
The coefficient of CGI is positive and not significant in all the three models of 
regressions. 
The coefficient of Sales is negative and not significant in all the three models of 
regressions. The coefficient of sales dummy is positive but not significant. This means 
that impact of sales on firm values measured by MVBV is insignificant. 
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The coefficient of log assets is negative and not significant in all the models of 
regressions. The coefficient of asset dummy is positive but not significant in the 
pooled model. 
The coefficient of Margin is positive and not significant in the pooled and random 
effects model. It is negative and not significant in the fixed effect model. The 
coefficient of Margin dummy is negative and insignificant in the pooled and fixed 
effects model. It is negative and significant in the random effects model. 
The coefficient of promoter's holding is positive but not significant in all the models 
of regression. 
The coefficient of GDR dummy is negative and significant at 10% level in both the 
pooled and random effects models. It is negafive and insignificant in the fixed effects 
model. 
The coefficient of sector dummy is negative in the Pooled and random effects models. 
It is positive but not significant in the fixed effects model. 
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Table 4.70 
Summary of the panel data regressions for the years 2004-08 with ROA as the 
dependent variable ***, (**) and (*) indicate significance at 1%, (5%) and (10%) 
level 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
cons 
RSq 
Pooled 
regression 
0.066*** 
-0.086*** 
0.112 
0.000 
0.008*** 
0.033*** 
-0.008 
0.085*** 
-0.016 
0.032** 
0.158 
0.552 
Fixed effects regression 
0.073*** 
-0.075*** 
0.089*** 
-0.001 
0.003** 
-0.002 
-0.032 
0.047*** 
0.001 
-0.009 
0.185 
RSq 
Withm 0.404 
Between 0.410 
Overall 0.4508 
Random effects 
regression 
0.068*** 
-0.073*** 
0.096*** 
0.001 
0.003** 
0.004 
-0.027 
0.054*** 
-0.013 
0.004 
0.164 
RSq 
0.395 
0.492 
0.5197 
F test that all u_i=0: F(99, 338)= 13.15 Prob > F = 0.0000 
Hausman and Breusch-Pagan test 
Hausman test chi2(10) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-l)](b-B)= 26.25 Prob>chi2= 0.0034 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
chi2(l) =429.05 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Based on Hausman and Breusch-Pagan tests the fixed effects model is found to be 
appropriate. 
The coefficients of CGI are positive and significant in all the three models of 
regressions. This is in line with the findings of Bebczuk (2005) about Argentinean 
fii-ms and Al-Haddad et al., (2011). However the findings of Bhagat and Bolton 
(2008) are in contradicfion wherein the coefficients are negafive and significant. 
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The coefficient of Log sales is positive and significant in tlie case of pooled, fixed 
effects and Random effects regressions. In the case of Sales dummy it is positive in 
the pooled model. It is positive and insignificant in the random model and negative 
and insignificant in the fixed effects model. Overall it can be interpreted that the 
relationship between sales and fimi values measured by ROA is positive implying that 
increased sales improves ROA. 
The coefficient of Log assets is negative and significant at 1% in all the regressions. 
The coefficient of Assets dummy is negative and insignificant in the pooled 
regression and negative and insignificant in fixed and random regressions. Overall the 
conclusion is that the there is negative relationship between Return on assets and 
Physical assets which means that the value of the physical assets do not matter much 
in firm performance measured by ROA. However Al-Haddad et al, (2011) find the 
relationship to be positive and significant in the case of Jordanian finns. 
The coefficients of Margin are positive and significant in the fixed effects and random 
effects models. It is posifive and insignificant in the pooled regression. The coefficient 
of Margin dummy is positive and significant in all the regression models. 
The coefficient of GDR dummy is negative but not significant in the case of pooled 
and random effects models. It is positive but not significant in the case of fixed effects 
model. Similar negative and insignificant relationship between GDR dummy with 
ROA is observed by Bebczuk (2005). 
The coefficient of Sector dummy is positive and significant in the case of pooled 
model. It is negative and insignificant in the fixed effects model. It is posifive and not 
significant in the random effects model. Bebczuk (2005) also finds that the 
relationship with ROA is positive and not significant in the pooled model in case of 
manufacturing firms. 
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4.2 Analysis of other aspects of governance: 
Relationship between Promoters' Share holding and Firm performance: 
A further analysis on the relationship between promoters' shareholding and fimi 
performance has been carried out in this section, hi the first stage using panel data, 
Tobin's Q is regressed against promoters' holding (Pro hoi), promoters' holding 
square (Pro hoi Sq) and promoters' holding cube (Pro hoi cu) for studying the 
nonlinear effect. In the next stage the proportion of shareholding has been segmented 
into three groups and regressions have been carried out for these groups to analyze the 
non-monotonous nature of relationship between shareholding and finn performance. 
This type of analysis is in line with researchers Drobetz, Gugler and Hirschvogl 
(2004); Srivastava (2010) and others. 
Table 4.71 
Summary of the coefficients of multiple regressions for the years 2004-2008 (year 
wise) 
Tobin's Q is the dependent variable. *** (**) and (*) indicate significance at 1%, ( 
5%) and (10%) level 
Year 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
Variable 
Pro hoi 
Pro hoi 
Pro hoi 
Pro hoi 
Pro hoi 
Coef. 
0.018 
0.032* 
0.024** 
0.020** 
0.011** 
Std. Err. 
0.013 
0.017 
0.010 
0.008 
0.005 
t 
1.400 
1.870 
2.480 
2.500 
2.09 
P>t 
0.166 
0.066 
0.015 
0.014 
0.039 
The above table shows the coefficients of promoters' holding year wise. From the 
table it can be seen that the coefficients of Promoters' Holding are positive in all the 5 
years of the study and significant in 4 years. 
In line with the method adopted by Pattanayak (2008) for studying the non linear 
effect, Tobin's Q is regressed against promoters' holding (Pro hoi), promoters" 
holding square (Pro hoi Sq) and promoters" holding cube (Pro hoi cu) and other 
variables. 
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Table 4.72 
Pooled, fixed effects and random effects regression of Tobin's Q on promoters' 
holding and other variables 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
CGI 
Pro hoi 
Pro hoi sq 
Pro hoi cu 
Sales dum 
Asset dum 
Mrgn dum 
GDR dum 
Sect dum 
cons 
Pooled 
regression 
0.309** 
-1 532*** 
0.353 
0.242*** 
-8.906*** 
23.989*** 
-14.281** 
1 nyo*** 
0.296 
0.375 
0.011 
-1.031*** 
10.480*** 
RSq 0.344 
Fixed Effects 
regression 
0.534 
-1.967*** 
0.330 
0.114, 
55.342 
-132.762 
97.328 
0.351 
0.825* 
0.510 
0.453 
-0.624 
6.937*** 
RSq: 
within =0.1232 
between =0.187 
overall =0.135 
Random effects 
regression 
0.335** 
-1.560*** 
0.211 
0.183*** 
-8.744* 
21.626* 
-11.902 
0.847** 
0.392 
0.484 
0.049 
-0.961** 
11.540*** 
RSq: 
within = 0.0979 
between= 0.495 
overall =0.340 
Hausman and Breusch-Pagan tests 
Hausman test chi2(12) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V B)^(-l)](b-B) =13.66 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
chi2(l)= 55.07 
Prob>chi2 = 0.3229 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
The Hausman and Breusch-Pagan tests confirm the appropriateness of the random 
effects model. 
As can be seen from the above table, in the random effects model the coefficient of 
Pro hoi is negative and significant at 10% level showing entrenchment effect. Pro hoi 
sq is positive and significant at 10% level implying alignment effect. The sign of Pro 
hoi cu is negative but not significant (p value 0.187) showing weak signs of 
entrenchment effect, but it is not conclusive. 
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Hence in line with the studies by Sarkar and Sarkar (2005) and Pattanayak (2008), 
promoters' holding values have been split into three groups (based on the turning 
points) and separate regressions have been run. 
Table 4.73 
Results of regressions for different ranges of promoters' holding 
The table reports the results of regressions of Tobin's Q on CGI index, Log sales, Log assets, margin and 
promoter's holding. The figures in the parenthesis are t-values followed by p-values. t-values are based on White's 
heteroskedasticity- consistent standard errors. ***, (**) and (*) indicate significance at 1%, (5%) and (10%) level. 
Tobin's Q is the dependent variable: 
Variables 
Pro hoi 
Margin 
Log assets 
Log sales 
CGI 
cons 
Pro hoi 0-40% 
-0.017* 
(-1.70:0.091) 
1.490 
(2.42:0.017) 
-1.140 
(-6.85:0.000) 
0.591 
(4.02:0.000) 
0.283 
(4.20:0.000) 
3.222** 
(2.47:0.015) 
Pro hoi 40-60% 
0.074*** 
(3.23:0.002) 
4.794 
(1.85:0.067) 
-1.703 
(-3.22:0.002) 
0.631 
(2.24: 0.027) 
0.287 
(3.59:0.000) 
3.346 
(1.13:0.259) 
Pro hoi 60-100% 
0.032 
(1.19:0.237) 
0.505 
(0.67:0.502) 
-1.325 
(-5.72:0.000) 
0.370 
(2,25:0,026) 
0.374 
(2.76:0.007) 
4.614* 
(1.88:0.062) 
From the above table it can be seen that the coefficients of promoters' holding is 
negative when the holding is between 0-40%, it is positive and significant when the 
holding is between 40-60%, and positive but not significant when the holding is 
between 60-100%. Besides, the coefficient values for the range 40-60% are about 4.5 
times the value of the coefficients for the range 0-40%. This is in line with the 
findings of Sarkar and Sarkar (2000).Their findings are that the firm values decreases 
till 25 percent of insider share and increases thereafter. In the Indian context, findings 
of Pattanayak (2008) are that Tobin's Q first increases, then declines and finally 
moves up as ownership by insiders rises. Drobetz, Schillhofer, and Zimmennann 
(2004) find a non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and the quality 
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of firm level Corporate Governance as measured by the rating. Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) also find evidence of such variation of the relationship. 
Bai et al. (2004) find foreign investor ownership and high ownership concentration 
(among the second to the tenth largest shareholders) are positively related to finns" 
Tobin's Q and market to book value. 
Summary of the results: Based on the analysis it can be infen-ed that the relationship 
between promoters' holding and finn performance measured by Tobin's Q is positive 
on overall basis; however when segmented it shows that the relationship is not non 
linear. 
4.3 Non-linear relationship between Corporate Governance and Firm Values 
To analyze the functional relationship between CGI and Tobin's Q multiple 
regression analysis using linear, less than mean, greater than mean and CGI square 
has been run year wise. This method is based is on similar non-linearity tests 
conducted by Bahng (2002) on Korean companies and Zheka (2007) on Ukraine 
companies 
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Table 4.74 
Multiple regressions with all control variables, overall Corporate Governance 
Index, CGI < mean, CGI > mean and CGI Square for the year 2004 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro. Hoi 
CGI 
CGI-Sq 
CGI 
-0.131 
(2.006;0.049) 
-0.353 
(-3.593;0.001) 
-0.114 
(1.606;0.113 
0.151 
(2.774; 0.007) 
0.324*** 
(3.855;0.000) 
CGI < Mean 
-0.043 
(2.318; 0.032 
-0.350 
(-2.573;0.019 
-0.193 
(1.765;0.095 
0.529 
(2.124; 0.048) 
0.039 
(1.693;0.108) 
CGI > mean 
-0.273 
(0.996;.324) 
-0.485 
(-2.855; 0.006) 
-0.156 
(0.937; 0.353) 
-0.015 
(1.181; 0.244) 
0.271* 
(1.690; 0.098 
CGI Square 
-0.131 
(2.293; 0.025) 
-0.353 
(-3.880;0.000) 
-0.114 
(1.769; 0.081) 
0.151 
(2.989; 0.004) 
0.324 
(-1.329; 0.188) 
0.325 
(1.606; 0.113) 
Model Summary 
RSq 
Adj R Sq 
Durbin 
Watson 
F 
0.378 
0.335 
2.364 
8.759 
0.346 
0.278 
1.980 
5.077 
0.509 
0.372 
2.434 
3.730 
0.400 
0.349 
2.260 
7.889 
The above table shows the results of multiple regressions using different subsets of 
CGI. By running regressions separately for the subset of observations with Corporate 
Governance score less than its mean and for the subset of observations with CGI 
higher than the mean, the coefficients along with corresponding ^-values and/ji-values 
are shown in columns 3 and 4 respectively. From the data it can be observed that the 
coefficient of CGI is not significant for the first subset (CGKMean) and it is 
significant for the second subset (CGI>Mean) implying that companies with lower 
than mean Corporate Governance score might not see positive impact of improvement 
in their Corporate Governance on their performance until certain critical good 
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Coiporate Governance is established. Similar findings are observed by Zheka (2007) 
in his study about nonlinear effects of CGI. At the same time improvement by 
companies that have relatively better governance, results in increase in finn values. 
For analyzing the nonlinear effects, additional multiple regressions were run using 
CGI and CGI Square along with other variables. The coefficient values are shown in 
column 5, wherein the CGI values are negative and CGI^2 values are positive 
indicating non linear effect. 
In order to ascertain the reliability of the findings, regressions were run for another 
four years and they are shown in the series given below 
Table 4.75 
Multiple regressions with all control variables, overall Corporate Governance 
Index, CGI < mean, CGI > mean and CGI Square for the year 2005 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro. Hoi 
CGI 
CGISq 
Overall 
-0.315 
(1.412;0.162) 
-0.439 
(-3.700;0.000) 
0.037 
(2.290; 0.025 
0.072 
(1.637;0.106) 
0.175 
(2.33;0.022) 
CGI < mean 
-0.362 
(1.229;0.225) 
-0.526 
(-3.520;0.001) 
-0.051 
(1.999;0.051 
O.OOI 
(0.95I;0.346 
0.222 
(1.558; 0.126) 
CGI > mean 
-0.392 
(1.617;0.I19) 
-0.584 
(-3.053;0.005) 
-0.055 
(1.967; 0.061) 
0.269 
(1.049;0.304) 
0.188* 
(1.776; 0.088) 
CGISq 
-0.315 
(1.417;0.161) 
-0.439 
(-3.708; 0.000) 
0.037 
(2.2940;0.025) 
0.072 
(1.666;0.I00) 
0.175 
(-0.273; 0.786) 
0.166 
(0.464; 0.644) 
Model Summary 
RSq 
Adj R Sq 
Durbin 
Watson 
F 
0.321 
0.277 
1.836 
7.280 
0.387 
0.321 
2.389 
5.928 
0.458 
0.345 
1.933 
4.061 
0.023 
0.269 
2.201 
6.041 
.51 
In line with the resuhs of the year 2004, the coefficients of CGKMean is positive but 
not significant and that of CGI>Mean is significant for the year 2005 also. Similarly 
the coefficient of CGI is negative and that of CGI Sq is positive. 
Table 4.76 
Multiple regressions with all control variables, overall Corporate Governance 
Index, CGI < mean, CGI > mean and CGI Square for the year 2006: 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
CGISq 
Overall 
-0.245 
(.639;0.524) 
-0.514 
(5.304;0.000) 
-0.011 
(1.424;0.158) 
0.129 
(3.225;0.002 
0.268*** 
(3.846;0.000) 
CGI < mean 
-0.291 
(-.306;0.761) 
-0.547 
(-4.496;0.000) 
0.018 
(1.418;0.162) 
-0.038 
(L834;0.072 
0.117 
(0.182;0.856) 
CGI > mean 
-0.201 
(2.592;0.015) 
-0.466 
(4.148;0.000) 
-0.109 
(2.509;0.018) 
0.516 
(2.879; .008 
0.126*** 
(2.863;0.008) 
CGISq 
-0.245 
(.416;0.678) 
-0.514 
(5.811;0.000) 
-0.011 
{1.575;0.119) 
0.129 
(3.507; .001 
0.268** 
(-2.22 ;0.029) 
0.270** 
(2.529;0.013) 
Model Summary 
RSq 
Adj R Sq 
Durbin Watson 
F 
0.416 
0.381 
2.079 
12.090 
0.360 
0.297 
2.011 
5.729 
0.597 
0.525 
2.684 
8.287 
0.457 
0.418 
2.507 
11.780 
In the year 3 also the coefficients of CGKMean are relatively lesser and not 
significant and that of CGI> mean is significant and relatively higher when compared 
to CGKMean values.In this year the coefficient of CGI Sq is positive and significant 
at 5% level 
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Table 4.77 
Multiple regressions with all control variables, overall Corporate Governance 
Index, CGI < mean, CGI > mean and CGI Square for the year 2007: 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
CGISq 
Overall 
-0.289 
(1.248;0.215) 
-0.513 
(-4.711; 0.000) 
-0.096 
(1.523; 0.131) 
0.253 
(3.896;0.000) 
0.077** 
(2.061; 0.042 
CGI < mean 
-0.298 
(-.677; 0.502) 
-0.459 
(-2.371; 0.022) 
-0.098 
(-.280;0.781) 
0.327 
(4.159;0.000) 
0.100 
(0.375;0.709) 
CGI > mean 
-0.296 
(2.594; 0.013) 
-0.563 
(-5.389; 0.000) 
-0.089 
(2.677; 0.011) 
0.238 
(1.716; 0.093) 
0.065** 
(2.254;0.029) 
CGISq 
-0.289 
(1.147; 0.255) 
-0.513 
(-4.859; 0.000) 
-0.096 
(L398;0.166) 
0.253 
(3.866; 0.000 
0.077 
(-1.191;0.237 
0.074 
(1.368;0.175) 
Model Summary 
RSq 
Adj R Sq 
Durbin Watson 
F 
0.392 
0.359 
2.054 
11.627 
0.441 
0.375 
2.423 
6.635 
.527 
.471 
2.337 
9.356 
0.405 
0.365 
2.330 
10.095 
It can be seen from the above table that the coefficient of CGI> mean is positive and 
significant in this year also. 
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Table 4.78 
Multiple regressions with all control variables, overall Corporate Governance 
Index, CGI < mean, CGI > mean and CGI Square for the year 2008: 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
CGI 
CGISq 
Overall 
-0.032 
(4.540; 0.000) 
-0.361 
(-6.087; 0 .000 
-0.146 
(3.0060; .003 
0.225 
(3.229;0.002) 
0.090** 
(2.095; .039) 
CGI < mean 
-0.043 
(3.085; 0.004) 
-0.384 
(-4.440; 0.000) 
-0.194 
(1.752; 0.087) 
0.321 
(3.563; 0.001) 
0.138 
(1.116; 0.271) 
CGI > mean 
-0.028 
(2.966; 0.005) 
-0.341 
(-4.673; 0.000) 
-0.079 
(2.553;0.014 
0.089 
(0.904 ;0.371) 
0.345*** 
(3.6I6;0.001) 
CGISq 
-0.032 
(4.360; 0.000 
-0.361 
(-6.079; 0.000) 
-0.146 
(2.984; 0.004) 
0.225 
(3.288;0.001) 
0.090 
(1.039;0.301) 
0.096 
(1.193;0.236) 
Model Summary 
RSq 
Adj R Sq 
Durbin Watson 
F 
0.361 
0.327 
2.210 
10.602 
0.476 
0.413 
2.348 
7.616 
0.434 
0.372 
2.245 
7.052 
0.370 
0.330 
2.088 
9.112 
In the year 2008 the coefficient of CGI> mean are positive and significant and that of 
CGI < mean are positive but not significant.The coefficient of CGI<mean and CGI> 
mean are consolidated in the Table No 4.79. 
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Table 4.79 
Consolidated summary of coefficients of all the 5 years is given below: 
Panel A: Summary of coefficients of CGKMEAN and CGI>MEAN with Tobin's 
Q as the dependent variable: 
CGK 
MEAN 
CGI> 
MEAN 
2004 
0.039 
(1.693;0.108) 
0.271* 
(1.690;0.098) 
2005 
0.222 
(1.558;0.126) 
0.188* 
(1.776;0.088) 
2006 
0.117 
(0.182;0.856) 
0.126*** 
(2.863;0.008) 
2007 
0.126 
(2.863;0.008) 
0.065** 
(2.254;0.029) 
2008 
0.138 
(1.116;0.271) 
0.345*** 
(3.616;0.001) 
From the above table it can be seen that there are distinct differences in the 
coefficients and their significance over the five year period. This is analogous to piece 
wise relationship since non-uniformity in linear relationship is established. 
Panel B: Summary of coefficients of CGI and CGI sq with Tobin's Q as the 
dependent variable. 
CGI 
CGI 
sq 
2004 
0.324 
(-1.329;0.188) 
0.325 
(1.606;0.113) 
2005 
0.175 
(-0.273;0.786) 
0.166 
(0.464;0.644) 
2006 
0.268 
(2.221 ;0.029) 
0.270** 
(2.529;0.013) 
2007 
0.077 
(-1.191;0.237) 
0.074 
(1.368;0.175) 
2008 
0.090 
(-1.039;0.301) 
0.096 
(1.193;0.236) 
From the above table it can be seen that CGI values are consistently negative but not 
significant, whereas the CGI sq values are consistently positive throughout the 5 years 
of the study but not significant except for the year 2006. This shows that the 
relationship between CGI and Tobin's Q is not non linear. Hence the hypothesis is not 
rejected. 
Study by Zheka (2007) has been for three years and his findings are that the 
relationship is non-linear. Drobetz, Gugler, and Hirschvogl (2004) also find a 
nonlinear relationship between ownership concentration and the quality of firm level 
Corporate Governance as measured by the Corporate Governance rating. Lee, Chen 
and Kao (2010) have adopted Neural Network method instead of multiple regression 
method and their findings are that the relationship between the two is non linear. 
During the study of the relationship between Corporate Governance index and firm 
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values Mohanty (2003) has observed the non hnear effect. However in similar index 
based study by Balasubramanian et al., (2010), the findings are that the relationship 
between ICGI and firm market value is driven by large firms included in the BSE200 
index and it is insignificant for smaller finns. 
4.4 Relationship between Board Structure and Corporate Governance 
This secfion deals with the analysis of board structures comprising of Board size, 
CEO duality and Board independence. Johari et al., (2008); Chen et al., (2008); Linck, 
Netter and Yang, (2007) have analyzed these three aspects of Board Structures. 
4.4.1 Board size 
Board size is an important aspect of internal governance mechanism. The purpose of 
the following analysis is twofold; the first one is to find the relafionship between 
board size and firm values; the second is to find the opfimum board size range of the 
firms belonging to BSE 100 index. 
Research studies by Yermack (1996), Eisenber, Sundgren and Wells (1998) and 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2001) found a negative relationship between board size and 
firni values which means firms having smaller board sizes have better firm valuations. 
However studies by Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand (1999), Pearce and Zahra 
(1992) found a positive relationship between board size and firm values which means 
firms having larger board sizes have better valuations. Yet another view is that the 
relationship is 'U' type (Golden & Zajac, 2001, Vafeas, 1999). 
Findings vary about the optimal board size range. The concept of "one size does not 
fit all, after all" (Arcot and Bruno, 2006; Coles et al, 2005) has certain validity in the 
context of finding appropriate board size. The assumption here is that a certain board 
size is required to get the requisite skills and intellect to operate effectively which 
depends on the nature of the fimi and the competitive environment in which it is 
operating. 
Taking into consideration the above aspect, the first step of the analysis starts by 
taking one year data as representative one. 
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Figure 4.6 
The following bar diagram shows the distribution of board sizes of 100 fimis for the 
year 2008-09 and the descriptive statistics for the same is shown below it. 
18 
36 
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4 
2008-09: Distribution of Board size:100 firms 
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 20 21 
Descriptive statistics 
Mean board size is 6.25 : Std. Dev. 4.538: Variance 20.6 
Skewness 0.852 : Kurtosis 2.917: Board size range :4 to 21 
As can be seen from the above diagram, the span of the Board size is wide ranging 
from as small as 4 to as high as 21. 
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Table 4.80 
Descriptive statistics of tlie variables used in the multiple regressions: Year 2008 
Variables 
Tobin's Q 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
Brd siz 
Brd ind 
CEO duality 
Mean 
1.809 
8.900 
9.738 
0.355 
51.046 
11.1 
5.75 
0.43 
Std. Dev 
1.352 
1.491 
1.365 
0.278 
22.051 
3.347 
2.002 
0.498 
Min 
0.588 
4.739 
7.072 
-0.321 
0 
4 
2 
0 
Max 
8.805 
12.722 
13.780 
0.941 
99.33 
21 
12 
1 
The mean values of board size and the proportion of independent directors are 11. 
and 5.75 respectively 
Table 4.81 
Correlation matrix of Tobin's Q and other independent variables used in the 
multiple regression for the year 2008 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
Brd siz 
Brd ind 
CEO duality 
Tobin's 
Q 
-0.03 
-0.36 
-0.15 
0.22 
-0.09 
-0.11 
0.12 
Log 
sales 
1 
0.67 
-0.33 
0.01 
0.31 
0.21 
0.22 
Log 
assets 
1 
0.30 
0.06 
0.21 
0.23 
0.19 
Margin 
1 
0.01 
-0.08 
-0.04 
-0.00 
Pro 
hoi 
1 
-0.09 
-0.14 
0.25 
Brd 
Size 
1 
0.79 
0.06 
Brd 
ind 
1 
0.07 
CEO 
duality 
1 
The above table shows the results of correlation coefficients of Tobin's Q and other 
independent variables used in the multiple regressions. The correlation coefficients 
between board size, board independence and Tobin's Q are negative. The correlation 
between CEO duality dummy and Tobin's Q is positive. 
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Table 4.82 
Collinerarity statistics of different independent variables used in multiple 
regressions: 
Var 
VIF 
1/VIF 
Log 
sales 
4.22 
0.23 
Log 
assets 
4,13 
0.24 
Brd 
size 
2.87 
0.35 
Brd 
ind 
2.76 
0,36 
margin 
2.53 
0.39 
CEO 
duality 
1,13 
0.88 
Pro 
hoi 
1.11 
0.90 
Mean 
VIF 
2.68 
According to Myers (1990) maximum value of VIF should be less than 10. The 
maximum value is that of Log sales (4.22). 
Table 4.83 
Cross sectional regression for the year 2008 with Tobin's Q as the dependent 
variable 
The table reports the regression resuhs of Tobin's Q on Log sales, Log assets, margin and promoter's holding. The 
regressions also include board size, board independence and CEO duahty variables. The regression is estimated 
using White's heteroskedasticity- consistent standard errors. ***, (**) and (*) indicate significance at 1%, (5%) 
and (10%) levels 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
Brd siz 
Brd ind 
CEO duality 
_cons 
Coef. 
0.660*** 
-0.984*** 
1,810** 
0.013** 
0.012 
-0.010 
0.239 
4.026*** 
Std. Err. 
0.238 
0.257 
0.701 
0.006 
0.041 
0.067 
0.258 
0.938 
2.77 
-3.84 
2.58 
2.16 
0.28 
-0.15 
0.93 
4.29 
P>t 
0.007 
0 
0.011 
0.033 
0.777 
0.884 
0.357 
0 
The above table shows that the coefficient of board size is positive but not significant 
which could lead to two interpretations: One, the relationship between board size and 
firm values is positive: Second it can be nonlinear. The results of the regressions for 
the other years were on similar lines. 
In the next step based on the assumption of non-linearity, with panel data (five years; 
2004 to 2008), regressions were run using Board size Sq as an additional variable and 
following are the results of Pooled, fixed and random effect model regressions. 
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Table 4.84 
Summary of panel data regressions for the years 2004-08 with board size sq as 
additional independent variable 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
Brd size 
Brd size Sq 
cons 
Pooled regression 
0.819 
(5.19:0.000) 
-1.528 
(-9.33: 0.000) 
3.527 
(5.10:0.000) 
0.011 
(2.10:0.036) 
-0.555*** 
(3.30:0.001) 
0.022*** 
(3.23:0.001) 
11.303*** 
(9.71:0.000) 
Fixed effects 
regression 
0.522 
(1.40:0.162) 
-1.726 
(-4.24:0.000) 
2.188 
(1.28:0.202) 
0.019 
(0.63:0.526) 
-0.437* 
(-1.66 :0.098) 
0.017* 
(1.67:0.097) 
15 179*** 
(5.14:0.000) 
Random effects 
regression 
0.660 
(3.52:0.000) 
-1.468 
(-7.26:0.000) 
2.953 
(3.53:0.000) 
0.013 
(1.81:0.070) 
-0.497*** 
(-2,60: 0.009) 
0.020** 
(2.59:0.010) 
11.852*** 
(8.22:0.000) 
The coefficients of Board size in all the regressions are negative and significant. The 
coefficients of Board size Sq in all the regressions are positive and significant. Hence 
all the coefficients of the regressions were utilized for partial differentiation. The 
coefficient values of board size and board size square are shown in bold face and they 
have been considered for partial differentiation. 
Partial differentiation computations for finding the optimum board size: 
Partial differentiation (fixed effects regression- coefficient values of Board size. 
Board size square and Tobin's Q) 
y = ax + bx 
Tobin'sQ= -0.437( Brd size) + 0.017(Brd size)-
diy)/d{x)= -0.437 + 0.034(Brd size) = 0 
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-0.437 = -0.034(Brd size) 
Therefore. Brd size = 0.437/0.034 = 10.88 
d~{y)/d{x' = 0.034 The value is minimum. 
Similar computations have been done for other two regressions and the values are 
summarized. 
Table 4.85 
Summary of the results of partial differentiations of Board size 
Board size 
Pooled 
regression 
12.63 
Fixed effects 
regression 
10.88 
Random effects 
regression 
12.425 
The above table shows the results of partial differentiation of the coefficients of the 
Board size and Board size Sq obtained from different sets of regressions. 
All these values point towards larger board sizes which is in consonance with the 
studies in the Indian context by Dwivedi and Jain (2005) and in the Malaysian context 
by Zunaidah Sulong and Fauzias Mat Nor (2010) and others. 
Table 4.86 
Following table shows the trend analysis of mean of board sizes 
2004 
12.07 
2005 
11.81 
2006 
12.07 
2007 
12.19 
2008 
12.30 
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Figure 4.7 
Bar chart for mean values of board sizes 
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Results of cross sectional regressions for the years 2004 to 2008 for firms having 
optimal board size 
In the next step a series of regressions were conducted with board sizes ranging from 
9 to 20 (both inclusive) which was found to be the optimum size. For robustness 
check the natural log of the board size and board independence were incorporated as 
control variables (Zunaidah & Mat Nor, 2010). 
Table 4.87 
Cross sectional regression 2004 with Tobin's Q as the dependent variable 
The table reports the regression results of Tobin's Q on Log sales, Log assets, margin and promoter's holding. The 
regressions also include log board size, log board independence and CEO duality variables. The regression is 
estimated using White's heteroskedasticity- consistent standard eiTors. ***, (**) and (*) indicate significance at 
1%, (5%) and (10%) levels. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log Assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
Log brd siz 
Log brd ind 
CEO duality 
_cons 
No ofobs 
F( 7, 53) 
Prob > F 
RSq 
Adj R Sq 
Coef. 
0.844** 
-1.241*** 
3.500** 
-0.003 
-0.059 
0.524 
0.132 
4.514** 
61 
7.44 
0.000 
0.3085 
0.2171 
Std. Err. 
0.362 
0.340 
1.462 
0.007 
1.281 
0.340 
0.307 
2.191 
T 
2.33 
-3.65 
2.39 
-0.41 
-0.05 
1.54 
0.43 
2.06 
P>t 
0.024 
0.001 
0.02 
0.684 
0.963 
0.129 
0.67 
0.044 
The coefficient of Log board size is negative but not significant. The coefficients of 
Log board independence and CEO duality dummy are positive but not significant. 
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Table 4.88 
Cross sectional regression 2005: Tobin's Q 
The table reports the regression resuhs ofTobin's Q on Log sales. Log assets, margin and promoter's holding. The 
regressions also include log board size, log board independence and CEO duality variables. The regression is 
estimated using White's heteroskedasticity- consistent standard errors. ***, (**) and (*) indicate significance at 
1%, (5%) and (10%) levels. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log Assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
Log brd siz 
Log brd ind 
CEO duality 
cons 
No ofobs 
F( 7, 54) 
Prob > F 
RSq 
Adj R Sq 
Coef. 
0.848** 
-1.406*** 
2.586* 
-0.003 
0.951 
0.643 
0.167 
4.310* 
62 
18.1 
0.000 
0.422 
0.317 
Std. Err. 
0.328 
0.325 
1.350 
0.009 
1.050 
0.401 
0.400 
2.412 
T 
2.58 
-4.32 
1.92 
-0.37 
0.91 
1.6 
0.42 
1.79 
P>t 
0.013 
0 
0.061 
0.711 
0.369 
0.114 
0.678 
0.08 
The coefficients of Log board size and board independence and CEO duality dummy 
are positive but not significant. 
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Table 4.89 
Cross sectional regression 2006: Tobin's Q 
The table reports the regression results ot'Tobirvs Q on Log sales, Log assets, margin and promoter's holding. The 
regressions also include log board size, log board independence and CEO duality variables. The regression is 
estimated using White's heteroskedasticity- consistent standard enors. ***, {**) and {*) indicate significance at 
1%, (5%) and (10%) levels. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log Assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
Log brd siz 
Log brd ind 
CEO duality 
cons 
No of obs 
F( 7, 61) 
Prob > F 
R-squared 
Adj R sq 
Coef. 
0.051 
-0 773*** 
0.406 
0.010 
1.245 
0.621* 
-0.085 
4.822 
69 
11.68 
0.000 
0.3463 
0.2746 
Std. Err. 
0.129 
0.111 
0.404 
0.009 
0.963 
0.313 
0.395 
2.280 
T 
0.39 
-6.96 
1.01 
1.16 
1.29 
1.99 
-0.22 
2.12 
P>t 
0.696 
0 
0.318 
0.249 
0.201 
0.051 
0.83 
0.039 
The coefficient of Log board size is positive but not significant. The coefficient of log 
board independence is positive and significant at 10% level. The coefficient of CEO 
duality dummy is negative but not significant. 
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Table 4.90 
Cross sectional regression 2007: Tobin's Q 
The table reports the regression results ofTobin's Q on Log sales, Log assets, margin and promoter's holding. The 
regressions also include log board size, log board independence and CEO duality variables. The regression is 
estimated using White's heteroskedasticity- consistent standard errors. ***, (**) and (*) indicate significance at 
1%, (5%) and (10%) levels. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log Assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
Log brd siz 
Log brd ind 
CEO duality 
_cons 
No of obs 
F( 7, 64) 
Prob > F 
R-squared 
Adj R sq 
Coef. 
0.327 
-0.921*** 
1.504* 
0.013 
0.192 
0.638 
-0.038 
5.913*** 
72 
5.6 
0.000 
0.3496 
0.2785 
Std. Err. 
0.262 
0.268 
0.844 
0.008 
0.944 
0.417 
0.388 
2.210 
T 
1.25 
-3.44 
1.78 
1.66 
0.2 
1.53 
-0.1 
2.68 
P>t 
0.216 
0.001 
0.079 
0.102 
0.839 
0.131 
0.923 
0.009 
The coefficients of Log board size, board independence are positive but not 
significant. The coefficient of CEO duality dummy is negative but not significant. 
166 
Table 4.91 
Cross sectional regression 2008: Tobin's Q 
The table reports the regression results ofTobin's Q on Log sales, Log assets, margin and promoter's holding. The 
regressions also include log board size, log board independence and CEO duality variables. The regression is 
estimated using White's heteroskedasticity- consistent standard eiTors. ***, (**) and (*) indicate significance at 
1%, (5%) and (10%) levels 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log Assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
Log brd siz 
Log brd ind 
CEO duality 
cons 
No of obs 
F( 7, 70) 
Prob > F 
RSq 
Adj R Sq 
Coef. 
0.584** 
-0.841*** 
2.094** 
0.007 
0.294 
0.267 
-0.049 
2.428* 
78 
4.84 
0.0002 
0.3152 
0.2467 
Std. Err. 
0.277 
0.276 
0.929 
0.005 
0.652 
0.292 
0.239 
1.363 
t 
2.11 
-3.04 
2.25 
1.45 
0.45 
0.91 
-0.21 
1.78 
P>t 
0.038 
0.003 
0.027 
0.153 
0.654 
0.364 
0.837 
0.079 
The coefficients of Log board size and log board independence are positive but not 
significant. The coefficient of CEO duality dummy is negative but not significant. 
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Table 4.92 
Consolidated table showing coefficients for all the years 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
Log brd siz 
Log brd ind 
CEO duality 
cons 
No of obs 
Prob > F 
RSq 
Adj R Sq 
Coef.2004 
0.844** 
(2.33;0.024) 
-1.241*** 
(-3.65;0.001) 
3.500** 
(2.39;0.02) 
-0.003 
(-0.41;0.684) 
-0.059 
(1.54;0.129) 
0.524 
(0.307;0.43) 
0.132 
(0.43;0.670) 
4.514** 
(2.06;0.044) 
61 
F(7,53)=7.44 
0.000 
0.3085 
0.2171 
Coef.2005 
0.848** 
(2.58;0.013) 
-1.406*** 
(-4.32;0.000) 
2.586* 
(1.92;0.061) 
-0.003 
(-0.37;0.711) 
0.951 
(0.91;0.369) 
0.643 
(1.6;0.I14) 
0.167 
(0.42;0.678) 
4.310* 
(1.79;0.08) 
62 
F(7,54)=18.1 
0.000 
0.422 
0.371 
Coef.2006 
0.051* 
(0.039;0.70) 
-0.773*** 
(-6.96;0.000) 
0.406 
(1.01;0.318) 
0.010 
{1.16;0.249) 
1.245 
(1.29;0.201) 
0.621* 
(1.99;0.051) 
-0.085 
(-0.22;0.83) 
4.822** 
(2.12;0.039) 
69 
F(7,61)=11.7 
0.000 
0.3493 
0.2746 
Coef.2007 
0.327 
(1.25;0.216) 
-0.921*** 
(-3.44;0.001) 
1.504* 
1.78;0.079) 
0.013 
(1.66;0.102) 
0.192 
(0.2;0.839) 
0.638 
(1.53;0.131) 
-0.038 
(-0.1;0.923) 
5 Qu*** 
(2.68;0.009) 
72 
F(7, 64)=5.6 
0.0000 
0.3496 
0.2785 
Coef.2008 
0.584** 
(2,11;0.038) 
-0.841*** 
(-3.04;0.003) 
2.094** 
(2.25;0.027) 
0.007 
(1.45;0.153) 
0.294 
(0.45;0.654) 
0.267 
(0.91;0.364) 
-0.049 
(-0.21;0.837) 
2.428* 
(1.78;0.079) 
78 
F(7,70)=4.84 
0.000 
0.3152 
0.2467 
It can be seen from the above table that the coefficients of log board size is positive in 
4 years but not significant and it is negative and not significant in the year 2004.Log 
board independence is positive in all the years and significant in the year 2006.The 
coefficients of CEO duality is positive and not significant in the years 2004 and 
2005.It is not negative and not significant in the other three years 
Table 4.93 
Pooled regression for the years 2004-08 :Tobin's Q 
The table reports the pooled regression results of Tobin's Q on Log sales, Log assets, margin and promoter's 
holding. The regressions also include log board size, log board independence and CEO duality variables. The 
regression is estimated using White's heteroskedasticity- consistent standard eiTors. ***, (**) and (*) indicate 
significance at 1%, (5%) and (10%) levels. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log Assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
Log brd siz 
Log brd ind 
CEO duality 
cons 
No of obs 
F( 7, 328) 
Prob > F 
RSq 
Adj R sq 
Coef. 
0.576*** 
-1.108*** 
2.406*** 
0.004 
0.796* 
0.374** 
0.049 
4.200*** 
336 
30.53 
0.000 
0.3024 
1.3034 
Std. Err. 
0.146 
0.141 
0.510 
0.004 
0.447 
0.162 
0.157 
0.920 
T 
3.94 
-7.86 
4.71 
1.03 
1.78 
2.3 
0.31 
4.57 
P>t 
0 
0 
0 
0.304 
0.076 
0.022 
0.757 
0.000 
The coefficient of log board size is positive and significant at 10% leveLThe 
coefficient of Log board independence is positive and significant at 5% level. The 
coefficient of CEO duality dummy is positive but not significant. 
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Table 4.94 
Fixed-effects regression for the years 2004-08: Tobin's Q 
The tabic reports Fixed-effects regression results of Tobin's Q on Log sales, Log assets, margin and promoters" 
holding. The regressions also include log board size, log board independence and CEO duality variables. ***, (**) 
and (*) indicate significance at 1%, (5%) and (10%) levels. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log Assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
Log brd siz 
Log brd ind 
CEO duality 
cons 
No of obs 
No of gr 
R Sq within 
Between 
Overall 
Coef. 
0.338* 
-0.952*** 
2.750*** 
-0.003 
0.656 
-0.110 
0.482* 
6.015*** 
336 
77 
0.1432 
0.2396 
0.2335 
Std. Err. 
0.174 
0.194 
0.864 
0.014 
0.486 
0.201 
0.269 
1.559 
Obs min 
ave 
max 
F(7,252) 
t 
1.94 
-4.91 
3.18 
-0.22 
1.35 
-0.55 
1.79 
3.86 
1 
4.4 
5 
6.01 
P>t 
0.053 
0 
0.002 
0.826 
0.178 
0.586 
0.074 
0 
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.0575 Prob>chi=0.000 uj=0 
The coefficient of log board size is positive. The coefficient of board independence is 
negative. Coefficient of CEO duality is positive and significant at 10% levels 
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Table 4.95 
Random-effects regression for the years 2004-08: Tobin's Q 
The table reports Random-effects regression results of Tobin's Q on Log sales, Log assets, margin and promoter's 
holding. The regressions also include log board size, log board independence and CEO duality variables. ***, (**) 
and (*) indicate significance at 1%, (5%) and (10%) levels. 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log Assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
Log brd siz 
Log brd ind 
CEO duality 
_cons 
No ofobs 
No of grps 
R Sq within 
Between 
Overall 
Coef. 
0.482*** 
-1 047*** 
2.304*** 
0.001 
0.794* 
-0.014 
0.218 
5 jyy*** 
336 
77 
0.1350 
0.3233 
0.2877 
Std. Err. 
0.112 
0.130 
0.512 
0.005 
0.426 
0.185 
0.199 
1.117 
Obs min 
ave 
max 
Wald chi2(7) 
t 
4.29 
-8.04 
4.5 
0.28 
1.86 
-0.07 
1.09 
4.63 
1 
4.4 
5 
75.24 
P>t 
0 
0 
0 
0.78 
0.062 
0.941 
0.274 
0 
The coefficient of log board size is positive and significant. The coefficient of Log 
board independence is negative. The coefficient of CEO duality dummy is positive 
but not significant. 
Hauasman and Breusch-Pagan tests 
Hausman test chi2 (7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_Br(-l)](b-B) =7.31 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
chi2(l) =240.38 
Prob>chi2=0.3969 
Prob>chi2=0.000. 
Based on these results the Random effects model is appropriate. 
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Table 4.96 
Summary of panel data regressions for the years 2004-08 with Tobin's Q as the 
dependent variable 
Variables 
Log sales 
Log Assets 
Margin 
Pro hoi 
Log brd siz 
Log brd ind 
CEO duality 
cons 
No ofobs 
Prob > F 
RSq 
Pooled regression 
0.576*** 
-1.108*** 
2.406*** 
0.004 
0.796* 
0.374** 
0.049 
4.200*** 
336 
0.000 
0.1432 
Fixed effects 
regression 
0.338* 
-0.952*** 
2.750*** 
-0.003 
0.656 
-0.110 
0.482* 
6.015*** 
336 
0.000 
Random effects 
regression 
0.482*** 
-1.047*** 
2.304*** 
0.001 
0.794* 
-0.014 
0.218 
5 j-yy*** 
336 
0.000 
In the random effects model the coefficient of log board size is positive and 
significant. The coefficient of Log board independence is negative but not significant. 
The coefficient of CEO duality also is positive but not significant. Hausman and 
Breusch-Pagan tests indicate the appropriateness of random effects model. 
From the above set of data, it can be observed that the relationship between the board 
sizes (large size ranging from 9 to 20) and firm values measured by Tobin's Q is 
positive. This implies that, in the Indian context, the fmns with large board sizes have 
better valuations. Similar findings have been observed by Dwivedi and Jain (2005); 
Jackling and Johl (2009); Lange and Sahu (2008) in the Indian context. Findings 
supporting larger boards has been observed in the Malaysian context by Sulong and 
Nor (2010) and in the US context by Dalton et al., (1999). 
Perhaps the justification needing a larger board size in the Indian context is that 
SEBFs clause 49 of the listing agreement has both mandatory and voluntary 
requirements for the fomiation of different committees (Audit, Nomination 
committees etc) and larger board size may minimize the overlapping of functions. 
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Further it will be more difficult for CEOs to dominate larger boards and large boards 
can be effective in their oversight duties (Zahra and Pearce, 1998).Similarly, findings 
of Singh and Harianto (1989) suggest that CEO may not be able to maneuver larger 
boards into decisions banning shareholders" interests. As a support to this conjecture, 
the positive relationship reflects the manifestation of good stewardship thereby 
reducing the agency costs. Further the level of equity, agency costs and informafion 
asymmetry specific to finns may explain variafions in board size. Bigger boards are in 
a position to improve the governance of the firms leading to lower agency costs and 
have a posifive association with firm values (Raheja 2005; Harris & Raviv 2005). In 
the study of board size on Indian banks Mayur and Saravanan (2008) do not find any 
significant relationship between board size and performance of banks 
4.4.2 Board independence 
Referring to the results of cross-secfional regressions shown in the table no 4.92, it 
can be seen that the coefficient of board independence is positive in all the five years 
and significant in one year. The coefficient of Board independence is negafive and 
insignificant in Random effects model. Hausman and Breusch-Pagan tests indicate the 
appropriateness of random effects model. 
This means that the proportion of independent directors may not matter much when 
the board size is large and the proportion of executive directors is high. This is in line 
with the findings of Balasubramanian, Black and Khanna (2010); Mayur and 
Saravanan (2008); Kaur and Gill (2008); Lange and Sahu (2008) in the Indian 
context. 
However Jackling and Johl (2009) find that there is positive and significant 
relationship between Board independence and finn values in their cross sectional 
study for the year 2005-06. 
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4.4.3 CEO duality 
Referring to the results of cross-sectional regressions shown in the table no 4.92, it 
can be seen that the coefficient of CEO duality is positive but not significant in the 
years 2004 and 2005. It is negative but not significant in other three years. It is 
positive but not significant random effects models indicating that CEO duality may 
not matter much. 
Overall the resuhs are not conclusive implying that boards whose chairman is not a 
CEO may not perform better than those boards whose chairman is a CEO. This is 
consistent with the findings of Jackling and Johl (2009) and Elsayed (2007). Findings 
of Coles et al., (2005) and Peng, Zhang and Li (2007) are in contradiction to this 
finding 
Summary of cross sectional and panel data regressions 
Hoi: There is no relationship between Corporate Governance index and financial 
performance as measured by Tobin's Q, MVBV and ROA 
Relationship between CGI and Tobin's Q: The relationship is found to be positive and 
significant in four out of five years of cross sectional regressions. In the random 
effects regression, it is found to be positive and significant. Based on this, it can be 
inferred that the relationship is posifive. 
Relationship between CGI and ROA: The relationship is found to be positive and 
significant in four out of five years of cross sectional regressions. It is found to be 
positive and significant in the fixed effects regressions. It implies that the relationship 
is positive. 
As there is a significant posifive relationship between Tobin's Q/ROA and Corporate 
Governance, the null hypothesis (Hoi) that there is no relationship between Corporate 
Governance and Financial performance/firm values measured by Tobin's Q/ROA is 
rejected. 
However in the case of MVBV the relationship is significanfiy not conclusive. 
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The findings of this study are in line with the following researchers who have 
conducted cross sectional studies. 
In the studies related to developed markets, Gompers et al., (2003) found a positive 
relationship between Corporate Governance index and financial perfonnance proxied 
by Tobin's Q.The index developed by Brown and Caylor (2006) also shows a positive 
relationship between Tobin's Q and ROA. Study by Drobetz, Schillhofer and 
Zimmerman (2004) exploring the relationship between finn level Corporate 
Governance and firm performance of Gennan firms shows that finns with higher 
Corporate Governance scores are associated with substanfially higher finn values. 
Beiner et al, (2006) document a positive relationship between Corporate Governance 
practices of Swiss firms and their valuations. Similarly Bebchuk et al., (2009) find 
that Stronger Corporate Governance scores are associated with higher firm valuations. 
Ammann et al., (2011) find a strong and posifive relafionship between firm-level 
Corporate Governance and finn valuations. 
In the emerging market studies Black et al, (2006) found similar positive relationship 
between the KCGI and Tobin's Q among Korean firms. 
In the study of Venezuelan firms, Garay and Gonzalez (2008) find that better CGI 
results in increased dividend payouts price-to- book ratio (MVBV) and Tobin's Q. 
For Chinese finns Bai, Liu, Lu and Song (2004) find that Chinese investors value 
firms adopting better Corporate Governance practices relatively higher. 
Studies by Hasan, Kadapakkam and Kumar (2002) about emerging markets of Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand shows evidence of a 
positive relationship between Corporate Governance Index and firm investments, 
particularly by foreign instituitonal investors. Javid and Iqbal (2007) constructed 
multifactor Corporate Governance index for the finns listed on Karachi stock 
Exchange and found posifive relationship between Corporate Governance Index and 
finn values. 
However Bhagat and Bolton (2008) find a negative relationship between Governance 
score and ROA. 
Garay and Gonzales (2008) find a positive and significant relafionship with MVBV. 
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In the Indian context Balasubramanian at al, (2010) constructed Coiporate 
Governance Index of Indian firms listed in BSE and find that relationship between 
Indian Corporate Governance Index (ICGI) and financial perfomrance measured by 
Tobin's Q and MVBV to be posifive. Mohanty's (2003) study about Indian Corporate 
Governance evidences similar positive relationship and finds that Institutional 
investors prioroitize investments based on Corporate Governance practices. 
In the case of Panel data studies, the findings are in line with Black et al., (2010-
Korea); Ammann et al., (2011); Black et al, (2010-Brazil); Al-Haddad et al, (2011) 
etc. However the findings of Bhagat and Bolton (2008) are that the relationship is 
negative and significant with respect to ROA. 
To conclude, the posifive relationship between Corporate Governance and financial 
performance can be generalized across countries and over time period and the same is 
true in the Indian context related to companies belonging to BSE 100 index. 
H02: There is no relationship between sales and financial perfonnance as measured by 
Tobin's Q, MVBV and ROA 
Relafionship between Sales and Tobin's Q: In the panel data regressions the 
coefficients are positive and significant in the random effects model. In the cross 
sectional regressions it is positive and significant in two years out of five years. Thus 
it can be inferred that the relationship is positive and significant with respect to 
Tobin's Q. Hence the Hypothesis is rejected. 
MVBV: In the case of MVBV, in cross sectional regressions the coefficients are 
positive in four years but not significant. In panel data regressions the coefficients are 
negative but not significant. Based on this it can be said that there is a weak 
relationship between the two. Hence the hypothesis is not rejected. 
ROA: In the case of ROA the coefficients are posifive and significant in all the years 
of the study. In the case of Panel data regressions it is significant in all the three 
models. Based in this, it can be said that the relationship is positive and significant. 
Hence the hypothesis is rejected. 
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The findings of this study are in line with the findings of Brown and Caylor (2006); 
Saravanan (2009); Pant and Pattanayak (2008); Friedman (1953). Studies by Fich and 
Shivdasani (2004); Kumar (2005) also indicate a posifive relationship between higher 
proportional sales and finn values measured by Tobin's Q. The results are not in 
confinnance with Morey et al., (2010) who find a negative relationship between 
MVBV and sales across all the years of their study. 
H12: The impact of sales differential on financial performance/ valuation is non-
existent* 
Relationship between Sales dummy and Tobin's Q: The coefficients are positive and 
significant in the years 2004, 2007 and 2008. It is posifive and not significant in the 
other two years. Similar positive and significant relationship is observed in the 
random effects models. Hausman test and Breusch-Pagan test results indicate the 
appropriateness of random effects model. Based on this it can be said that the 
relafionship between sales dummy and Tobin's Q is positive and significant. 
Accordingly the hypothesis is rejected. 
MVBV: In the case of MVBV the coefficients of sales dummy are posifive but not 
significant in all the three models of panel data regressions. In the cross sectional 
regressions it is posifive in all the years and significant in one year. Hence the 
hypothesis is not rejected. 
ROA: In the case of the relafionship between ROA and sales dummy it is positive and 
significant at 10% and 5% levels in the years 2004 and 2005 respectively. In the fixed 
effects model it is negafive but not significant. Based on Hausman test, fixed effects 
model is appropriate. It can be inferred from this that there is no association between 
the two and hence the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
H03: There is no relationship between assets and financial perfonnance as measured 
by Tobin's Q, MVBV and ROA 
Relationship between assets and Tobin's Q: The relafionship is negative and 
significant in all the years of cross sectional regressions and in all the models of panel 
data regressions. Hence the hypothesis is rejected. The findings are consonance with 
Ammann et al., (2011); Aggarwal and Williamson (2006). Black, Kim and Jang 
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(2006) attribute such negative relationship to the presence of intangible assets which 
are not recorded in the books. Bhagat and Bolton (2008) find an insignificant 
relationship between these two. According to Black, Love and Rachinsky (2006) 
larger finns have lower valuations relative to their assets. According to Klapper and 
Love (2004) and Durnev and Kim (2005) firms which are intangible (tangible) asset 
intensive, have higher (lower) Tobin's Q. Similarly Ammann et al, (2011) provide an 
evidence of negative and significant relationship between assets and different models 
of Corporate Governance Indices constructed by them. 
The findings of this study are not in line with the findings of Balasubramanian et al., 
(2010) who find the relationship to be positive and insignificant in certain regressions 
and negative and insignificant when addifional control variables are added in some 
regressions. Similarly Saravanan (2009) finds a positive and significant relationship 
between assets and firm values. Studies by Leal and Silva (2005) and Garay and 
Gonzalez (2008) show positive and significant relationship between assets and firm 
values, in their studies. 
MVBV: It is negative and significant in four years and positive and not significant in 
one year. In all the panel data regressions also the coefficients are negative but not 
significant. It can be inferred from this that there is no relationship between MVBV 
and assets. Hence the hypothesis is not rejected. 
ROA: The coefficients are negative and significant in all the years of cross sectional 
regressions. It is negative and significant in all the models of panel data 
regressions.This implies that the relationship between assets and firm perfonnance 
measured by ROA is negafive. The hypothesis is rejected 
Hii: There is no difference in finn valuations/ perfonnance between large tangible 
asset companies and small tangible asset companies* 
Relationship between asset dummy and Tobin's Q: The findings of the study show 
that the relationship between asset dummy and Tobin's Q is positive but not 
significant in the entire cross sectional regressions except in the year 2008. Similarly 
in the case of panel data regressions it is positive but not significant in all the three 
178 
models. Based on this it can be inferred that there is no relationship between the two. 
Hence the hypothesis is not rejected. 
MVBV: It is positive and not significant in two years and negative and not significant 
in other years.lt is positive and not significant in the pooled model. Hausman and 
Breusch-Pagan tests do not indicate the appropriateness of either fixed effects or 
random effects models implying the appropriateness of pooled model. The results in 
the pooled model being mixed, conclusive inference cannot be drawn. Hence the 
hypothesis is not rejected. 
ROA: It is positive and not significant in four cross sectional regressions and in the 
other year it is negative but not significant. It is negative and not significant in the 
fixed effects models. The results of Hausman test indicate the appropriateness of the 
fixed effects model. Based on this it can be considered that there is no relationship 
between asset dummy and financial performance measured by ROA. The hypothesis 
is not rejected. 
Ho4: There is no relationship between margin and financial perfonnance as measured 
by Tobin's Q, MVBV and ROA 
Relationship between Margin and Tobin's Q: The coefficients are insignificant 
indicating that there is no relationship between the two. Hence the Hypothesis is not 
rejected. 
MVBV: The coefficients are insignificant implying that there is no relationship 
between MVBV and Margin. Hence the hypothesis is not rejected. 
ROA: It is positive and significant in three out of five years of cross sectional 
regressions. It is positive and significant in the random and fixed effects model. 
Hausman test indicates the appropriateness of the fixed effects model. Hence it can be 
concluded that there is a positive relafionship between ROA and Margin. Hence the 
hypothesis is rejected. 
The results are in confirmance with the findings of Kumar (2005); Phillipon (2010); 
Mukodim (2010) and Ammann et al., (2011). 
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Hi3; Margin differentials cast no influence on valuation/ perfonnance of the firms.* 
Relation between Margin dummy and Tobin's Q: The coefficients are positive but not 
significant in the entire cross sectional regressions except one year in which it is 
positive and significant at 5% level. Similarly it is found to be positive but not 
significant in the panel data models. Hence it can be inferred that there is no 
relationship between the two. The hypothesis is not rejected. 
MVBV: The coefficients are negative and insignificant in all the panel data 
regressions.In cross sectional regressions the coefficients are insignificant. Hence the 
hypothesis is not rejected. 
ROA: h is positive and significant in all the 5 years and also in all the panel data 
regressions. This shows that there is a positive relationship between ROA and Margin 
dummy. Hence the hypothesis is rejected. 
Hos: There is no relafionship between promoters' holding and financial performance 
as measured by Tobin's Q, MVBV and ROA 
Relafionship between promoter's holding and Tobin's Q: The results of cross 
secfional regressions of Tobin's Q on promoters' holding show that except for the 
year 2004 the coefficients of promoters' holding are posifive and significant. In the 
year 2005, it is positive but not significant. In the panel data regressions the 
coefficient in the random effects model is positive and significant. Hausman test and 
Breusch-Pagan tests confirms the appropriateness of the random effects model. Based 
on this it can be inferred that the relafionship between the two is positive. Hence the 
Hypothesis is rejected. 
MVBV; Based on the cross sectional regressions and panel data regressions it can be 
said that there is no relationship between promoters' holding and MVBV. Hence the 
hypothesis is not rejected. 
ROA: Based on the cross sectional regressions and panel data regressions it can be 
said that there is no relationship between promoters' holding and ROA. Hence the 
hypothesis is not rejected. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) in their respective 
studies find ownership concentration and finn perfomiance to be unrelated. Khanna 
and Palepu (1999) have found that promoters" holding has a positive and significant 
impact on firm values. Sarkar and Sarkar (2005) found a positive and significant 
impact on finns in case of high growth fimis and no impact on low growth finns. 
Pattanayak's (2008) study gives evidence of the fact that with increase in promoter's 
holding, the firm value inititially increases then it declines. 
In the case of promoters" holding, the relationship with Tobin's Q was further 
explored. It was found that when the holding is between 0-40 percent the relationship 
between the two is negative and significant; between 40-60 percent the relationship is 
positive and significant; between 60-100 percent it is negative but not significant. 
Holdemess and Sheehan (1999) find that ownership has a non-linear impact on finn 
performance. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) find a significant non-monotonic 
relationship between board ownership and firm performance. McConnell and Servaes 
(1990) find a strong evidence of a curvilinear relation between insider ownership and 
Tobin's Q. McConnell, Servaes and Lins (2005) revisited the issue of McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) and find that share ownership by insiders increases corporate values 
up to a point afi;er which it declines. Han and Suk (1998) find non-linear relationship 
between management ownership and performance for US firms. Bai et al., (2004) 
examine the governance issues in Chinese listed finns and find the impact of large 
shareholder on firni performance to be non-linear i.e. U-Shaped. 
Ho6: The relationship between Corporate Governance index and financial 
perfonnance measured by Tobin's Q is not linear. 
In the cross sectional studies the assumption is that the relationship between CGI and 
Tobin's Q is linear. However, additional analyses indicate that the relationship 
between the two is not non linear. So the hypothesis is not rejected. This is in line 
with the findings of Zheka (2007). Findings of Lee et al, (2010) are in contradiction. 
Hov: There is a no relationship between the Board size and firm values as measured 
by Tobin's Q 
Based on the analysis of data it is found that the relationship between larger board 
sizes (between 9 and 20) and Tobin's Q is positive and significant. Hence the 
hypothesis is rejected. 
One important reason which can be attributed for this is that there is growing need to 
form different committees of board of directors which are both mandatory and non-
mandatory. In order to avoid overlapping of functions larger board size is preferred. 
In the Indian context these findings are in line with Jackling and Johl (2009); Lange 
and Sahu (2008); Dwivedi and Jain (2005).The findings are not in line with the 
findings of Kaur and Gill (2008) who favor smaller board size. 
These findings are also in line with Zahra and Pearce (1989); Singh and Harianto 
(1989); Beiner et al., (2003); Dalton and Dalton (2005). Study by Brown and Caylor 
(2006) recommends board sizes ranging from 6 to 15. 
In the emerging market studies the findings are in consonance with Sulong and Mat 
Nor (2010); Abidin et al (2009). 
Findings of Yermack (1996); Eisenberg, Sudgren and Wells (1998); Lipton and Lorch 
(1992); Jensen (1993); Hennalin and Weisbach (2003) favor smaller board sizes. 
Jensen (1986) suggests that board size of 7 to 8 members to be appropriate. 
In the emerging markets studies Mak and Yuanto (2005); Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) 
favor smaller board sizes. 
Bhagat and Black (2002); Mayur and Saravanan (2008) did not find any solid 
evidence on the relationship between Board size and firm perfonnance. 
Hos: The number of independent directors in the board composition does not impact 
finn perfonnance measured by Tobin's Q. 
Based on the analyses of cross sectional regressions and panel data analysis no 
significant relationship is found except for the year 2006.This implies that the 
proportion of independent directors does not influence finn valuations. Hence the 
hypothesis is not rejected. 
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In the Indian context the findings of this study is not in line with the findings of 
JackHng and Johl (2009) who find that independent directors and finn valuations are 
positive and significant.These findings are in line with Kaur and Gill (2008), whose 
study puts forth inconclusive effect of Board independence on firm perfonnance. 
Lange and Sahu (2008): Balasubaramanian et al., (2010) also do not find any 
significant relationship between the two. 
Dalton et al. (1999); Fosberg (1989); Bai et al. (2004), find that the insider/outsider 
board proportion has no direct relafionship to firm performance. Bhagat and Black 
(2002); Klein (1998), also observe no relationship between proportion of outside 
directors and return on assets (ROA). 
Davis et al, 1997; Burkar et al., (1997); Baysinger and Hoskinson (1990); Black, Kim 
and Jang (2006), favor greater board independence. Baysinger and Hoskinson (1990) 
recommend inclusion of more independent directors on the board and find that greater 
board independence improves profitability. 
Coles et al., (2005) infer from their studies that independence depends on the nature 
of operations of the firms. 
Klein (1998); Agrawal and Knoeber (1996); Yemiack (1996), evidenced that the 
relationship between the proportion of independent directors and firm performance is 
negafive. 
Ho9: CEO Duality has no impact on firm value 
Based on the analyses of data of cross secfional regressions and panel data 
regressions, it can be inferred that there is no relafionship between CEO duality and 
firm valuations. Hence the hypothesis is not rejected. 
This finding is in line with Ponnu (2008); Dalton et al. (1999); Berg and Smith 
(1978); Jackling and Johl (2009) and others, who find that there is no relationship-
neutral/insignificant between these two. 
Findings of Hirsch et al., (1987); Docouhagos (1994); Kiel and Nicholson (2003); 
Davis et al., (1997); Lam and Lee (2008): support CEO duality on the contenfion that 
it benefits the fiims. 
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This is in contradiction to the findings of Jensen and MeckHng (1976) who contend 
that CEO duaUty is detrimental to firm perfomiance as envisaged in the Agency 
theory. In the case of Chinese firms Bai et al. (2004) find that the CEO-duality 
structure has adverse impact on firm market valuation. Bliss (2011) finds that CEO 
duality constrains board independence. 
Hio: There is no difference in financial performance/ valuation across sectors. 
Relationship between Sectoral Dummy and Tobin's Q: The coefficients are negative 
in all the five years and negative and significant in one year. It is negative and 
significant in random effects regressions. The Hausman test is indicafing the 
appropriateness of the random effects model. One can infer from this that the 
relationship between sectoral dummy and Tobin's Q is negative, meaning that 
valuafions of service sector firms measured by Tobin's Q is relatively higher. The 
hypothesis is rejected. 
MVBV: All the coefficient values are insignificant based on which it can be inferred 
that there are no differences in firm valuafions across sectors. Hence the hypothesis is 
not rejected. 
ROA: Coefficient values are positive and significant in the years 2005 and 2008. It is 
positive and not significant in the other years. It is negative but not significant in the 
fixed effects model. Hausman test confirms appropriateness of fixed effects model. 
This shows that Manufacturing firms have a better operating performance when 
compared to firms in the service sector with respect to this financial measure. The 
findings are in line with Destefanis and Sena (2010), who in their study of Italian 
companies, found improvement in ROA due to improvements in technical efficiency 
and good Governance. Hence the hypothesis is not rejected. 
Hi4: There is no difference in firm valuations/ performance between firais which have 
issued Depository receipts and which have not. 
Relation between GDR dummy and Tobin's Q: The coefficients are insignificant, 
indicating that there is no relationship between the two in all the regressions. Hence 
the hypothesis is not rejected. 
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These findings are in line with the findings of Balasubramanian et al., (2010) in the 
Indian context; Black et al., (2010) in the Korean context. However these findings are 
contrary to the findings of Karolyi et al., (2006); Reese and Weisbach (2002) who 
show that firms which issued GDRs have positive fimi valuations. In the case of 
Venezuelan fimis Garay and Gonzalez (2008) find a positive but not significant 
relationship between GDR dummy and Tobin's Q. 
MVBV: It is negafive and insignificant in four years. Based on Hausman and 
Breusch-Pagan tests both random effects model and fixed effects models are 
inappropriate implying appropriateness of the pooled model. In the case of pooled 
model it is negafive and significant. Hence the null hypothesis is rejected. 
ROA: The coefficients are positive in 3 years and positive and significant at 1% level 
in one year. It is negafive and not significant in 2 years and in the fixed effects model. 
Hausman test is indicating appropriateness of fixed effects model. Overall it can be 
said that there is no relationship between the two. Hence the hypothesis is not 
rejected. 
*In order to draw overall conclusion hypotheses 2 and 12; 3 and 11; 4 and 13 have 
been taken together. 
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CHAPTER 5 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
This chapter provides the main findings and draws conclusions from the study: 
1) The study reveals that there is a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between Corporate Governance Index and financial perfonnance 
of Indian firms over a period of five years in both cross secfional regressions 
and panel data regressions. The results are also robust to different estimation 
methods. The Corporate Governance Index is found to be positively related to 
Tobin's Q. These findings are in line with Gompers et al., (2003): 
Balasubramanian et al, (2010) and others both in developed and emerging 
markets. With respect to the financial measure of MVBV the relationship was 
found to be posifive but not significant. However Balasubramanian et al., 
(2010) report the relationship with this financial measure to be positive and 
significant. In consonance with the findings of Brown and Caylor (2006), the 
Corporate Governance index is found to be positively and significantly related 
with ROA. 
The analysis shows absence of non-linear relation between CGI and finn 
values/performance. The reason for this is not difficult to find as firm 
valuations are affected by variety of other factors and CGI is one of them. The 
bifiarcation of the firms on the basis of the mean values of CGI scores suggests 
that firms belonging to below CGI mean scores have no impact on finn 
valuations. This implies that there is a threshold level of governance score 
beyond which CGI contributes positively to finn valuation. 
In the Dynamic Panel Data estimations the lagged one value of Tobin's Q is 
positive and significant and the coefficients of MVBV/ROA are negative and 
not significant. 
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2) The results show that the relationship between sales and Tobin's Q is positive 
and significant. The relationship between sales dummy and Tobin's Q is found 
to be positive and significant. This implies that firm valuations are relatively 
higher for those finns which have a higher amount of sales. In the case of 
relationship with MVBV, for both the variables of sales and sales dummy, it 
was found to be not significant. The relationship between sales dummy and 
ROA is positive but not significant. It can be interpreted that higher sales may 
not impact firm perfomiance measured by ROA. 
3) The relationship between assets and finn values show negative relationship 
with Tobin's Q, indicating that firm valuations with lesser amount of assets 
are relatively higher. This could be due to unreported intangible assets in the 
balance sheets or 'e-capital' (term coined by Stanford Economist, Hall, 1993). 
Further, while analyzing the differences in firm values of large and small 
tangible asset intensive companies with Tobin's Q, the relafionship was found 
to be not significant which underlines the impact of intangible assets. The 
relationship between asset/asset dummy and MVBV is not significant 
indicating that there is no relationship between the two. However in the case 
of assets the firm perfomiance measured by ROA is negative and significant 
implying that firms having lower assets have higher firm performance 
measured by ROA. 
4) The results show that the relationship between Margin/Margin dummy and 
Tobin's Q is posifive but not significant. In the case of MVBV also the 
relationship is not significant. The relationship with financial measure of ROA 
is positive and significant implying that higher margins of firms results in 
increase in returns on assets. 
5) The study finds that there are no differences in finn valuations measured by 
Tobin's Q between fiims which have issued Depository receipts and those 
which have not. This is in line with the findings of Balasubramanian et al., 
(2010) in the Indian context. In the case of MVBV also significant 
relationship is observed. In the case of ROA, the relationship is found to be 
posifive but not significant implying that there are no differences in firm 
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performance measured by ROA between fimis which have issued the 
Depository receipts and which have not issued. 
6) The overall results show that valuation of service sector firnis in comparison 
to manufacturing is higher in terms of Tobin's Q. However the firm valuations 
measured by MVBV and ROA show no significant relationship implying that 
there are no differences between the manufacturing and service sectors with 
respect to these financial measures. 
7) The relationship between promoters' holding and financial performance 
proxied by Tobin's Q was found to be positive and significant at the overall 
level. However the segmented analyses shows that the relationship is negafive 
when the holdings are between 0-40 percent and then turns positive and 
significant between 40-60 percent level and then positive but not significant at 
higher level. This could be interpreted as being caused by two opposing 
influences, incenfive alignment effect and entrenchment effect (Pattanayak, 
2008). 
8) Board of directors play an important role in Corporate Governance. The study 
shows larger board size has a positive impact on firm valuations which is in 
consonance with the findings of Indian researchers like Jackling and Johl 
(2009). Further analysis showed an opfimum board size ranging between 9 and 
20, both inclusive, in the Indian context. Brown and Caylor's (2006) study 
indicates a range of 6 to 15 as optimum. Overall, the results of this study 
reflect the nature of the environment in which finns operate in India whereby 
greater board size supports the resource dependence theory. 
9) The proportion of independent directors in the board composition does not 
seem to influence finn valuations. According to Balasubramanian et al., 
(2010); Kaur and Gill (2008); Lange and Sahu; Sarkar and Sarkar (2005), 
greater board independence has no significant influence on fimi valuations. 
While the resource dependency theory is valid in case of larger board size, it is 
not so with respect to independent directors being on the board. In contrast. 
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the findings of Jackling and Johl (2009) indicate that greater board 
independence improves firm valuations. 
10) The separation of duties of the CEO and board chainnan has generated many 
discussions across the globe and India is no exception. The analysis of data 
shows that there is no relationship between CEO duality and fmn valuations. 
According to Jackling and Johl (2009), "Given the uncertainty of hidia's 
institutional transitions, the answer to the complex question about the impact 
of CEO duality/Non duality is not obvious". This captures the essence of the 
findings. Chaine and Tohme (2009) find that CEO duality is beneficial when 
there is effective monitoring, thereby alleviating agency costs associated with 
CEO duality. Thus the nofion of separating the roles in a manner consistent 
with agency theory is not supported. 
5.2 Implications of tlie study 
This study demonstrates the economic importance of the valuation effect of Corporate 
Governance. Investors can use these indices along with other informafion about the 
financial performance of firms for making investment decisions. The benefits of a 
larger board sizes has some synergies and relevance to emerging economies, such as 
India. This will avoid overlapping of Ilincfions of directors in the operations of the 
various committees. 
5.3 Limitations 
The results of this research study are subject to some limitations that should be taken 
into consideration when generalizing and inteipreting the results. 
1) CGI is a single measure of Corporate Governance and there is no unanimity in 
the construction of the Corporate Governance index. Hence the CG index 
suffers from some limitations. 
2) Broader index incorporating CSR attributes would have provided better 
measure of Governance. 
3) The sample size and period of the study are small. 
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4) Corporate Governance is influenced by external environmental factors such as 
industry structure, product market competition etc, which this study has not 
considered. 
5) Studies in Corporate Governance are associated with endogeneity concerns. 
One problem is the potential for reverse causation, in which firm performance 
predicts governance practices or board structure, rather than vice versa. A 
second possible form of endogeneity is that optimal governance practices vary 
because of differences in finn specific characteristics. A third possibility is 
that firnis may adopt good governance practices to signal good underlying 
attributes, but governance has no separate effect on value or performance. In 
order to overcome the problem, simultaneous equation method suggested by 
Bhagat and Bolton (2008) would have produced better results which have not 
been considered in this study. 
6) Survey methods can capture some good governance practices which are not 
available in the public domain and these have been not considered in this 
study. 
The research findings must, therefore, be interpreted in the light of the above 
limitations. 
5.4 Directions for further research 
1) Applicafion of simultaneous equadon method to study the relationship 
between CGI and firm values: By developing a system of simultaneous 
equations, where all control mechanisms are allowed to affect each other as 
well as Tobin's Q, while at the same time Tobin's Q is allowed to affect the 
choice of each mechanism is a comprehensive system, which can improve the 
quality of regression results and control for possible endogeneity. 
2) In India there have been no studies on Corporate Governance characteristics, 
idiosyncratic risk and corporate investment decision making. Research in this 
aspect assumes importance in view of the spurt in Mergers and Acquisitions 
activities in India. 
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3) In their study Gompers et a).,(2003) have ranked the firms based on 
governance index values and found that investments in firms in the top decile 
group, which adopt better governance practices, have earned significant long-
tenn abnormal returns per year in comparison to the investment in the firms 
in the lower decile group. A similar study on these lines will be fruitful. 
4) The existence of a large number of family businesses in India warrants a 
further investigation regarding the role of independent directors. 
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List of companies in the BSE 100 index for the five years of study 
2004 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
A B B Ltd 
A C C Ltd. 
Aban Offshore Ltd. 
Adani Enterprises Ltd. 
Aditya Birla Nuvo Ltd. 
Ambuja Cements Ltd. 
Ashok Leyland Ltd. 
Asian Paints Ltd. 
Axis Bank Ltd. 
BankOf Baroda 
Bank Of India 
Bharat Forge Ltd. 
Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. 
Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. 
Bharti Airtel Ltd. 
Century Textiles & Inds. Ltd. 
Cipla Ltd. 
Crompton Greaves Ltd. 
Divi'S Laboratories Ltd. 
Dr. Reddy'S Laboratories Ltd. 
Essar Oil Ltd. 
Financial Technologies (India) Ltd. 
G A I L (India) Ltd. 
Glaxosmithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 
Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 
Grasim Industries Ltd. 
H C L Technologies Ltd. 
H D F C Bank Ltd. 
Hero Honda Motors Ltd. 
Hindalco Industries Ltd. 
Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. 
Hindustan Unilever Ltd. 
Housing Development Finance Corpn. Ltd 
I C 1 C I Bank Ltd. 
I D B I Bank Ltd. 
1 T C Ltd. 
1 V R C L Infrastructures & Projects Ltd. 
India Cements Ltd. 
Indiabulls Financial Services Ltd. 
Indian Hotels Co. Ltd. 
Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. 
Infosys Technologies Ltd. 
J S W Steel Ltd. 
Jaiprakash Associates Ltd. 
23] 
45. Jindal Steel & Power Ltd. 
46. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. 
47. Larsen & Toubro Ltd. 
48. Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. 
49. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. 
50. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. 
51. NTPCLtd . 
52. National Aluminium Co. Ltd. 
53. Nestle India Ltd. 
54. Oil & Natural Gas Corpn. Ltd. 
55. Punjab National Bank 
56. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. 
57. Reliance Capital Ltd. 
58. Reliance Industries Ltd. 
59. Sesa Goa Ltd. 
60. Siemens Ltd. 
61. State Bank Of India 
62. Steel Authority Of India Ltd. 
63. Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd. 
64. Sun Phamiaceutical Inds. Ltd. 
65. Tata Chemicals Ltd. 
66. Tata Communications Ltd. 
67. Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. 
68. Tata Motors Ltd. 
69. Tata Power Co. Ltd. 
70. Tata Steel Ltd. 
71. Tata Tea Ltd. 
72. Union Bank Of India 
73. UnitechLtd. 
74. United Phosphorus Ltd. 
75. United Spirits Ltd. 
76. Wei spun-Gujarat Stahl Rohren Ltd. 
77. Wipro Ltd. 
78. Zee Entertaimnent Enterprises Ltd, 
2005 
1. A B B Ltd 
2. A C C Ltd. 
3. Aban Offshore Ltd. 
4. Adani Enterprises Ltd. 
5. Aditya Biria Nuvo Ltd. 
6. Ambuja Cements Ltd. 
7. Ashok Leyland Ltd. 
8. Asian Paints Ltd. 
9. Axis Bank Ltd. 
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10. BankOfBaroda 
11. Bank Of India 
12. Bharat Forge Ltd. 
13. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. 
14. Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. 
15. Bharti Airtel Ltd. 
16. Century Textiles & Inds. Ltd. 
17. CiplaLtd. 
18. Crompton Greaves Ltd. 
19. Divi'S Laboratories Ltd. 
20. Dr. Reddy'S Laboratories Ltd. 
21. Educomp Solutions Ltd. 
22. Essar Oil Ltd. 
23. Financial Technologies (India) Ltd. 
24. G A I L (India) Ltd. 
25. Glaxosmithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 
26. Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 
27. Grasim Industries Ltd. 
28. H C L Technologies Ltd. 
29. H D F C Bank Ltd. 
30. Hero Honda Motors Ltd. 
31. HindalCO Industries Ltd. 
32. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. 
33. Hindustan Unilever Ltd. 
34. Housing Development Finance Corpn. Ltd. 
35. I C I C I Bank Ltd. 
36. I D B I Bank Ltd. 
37. I T C Ltd. 
38. I V R C L Infrastructures & Projects Ltd. 
39. Idea Cellular Ltd. 
40. Indiabulls Financial Services Ltd. 
41. Indian Hotels Co. Ltd. 
42. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. 
43. Infosys Technologies Ltd. 
44. Infrastructure Development Finance Co. Ltd. 
45. J S W Steel Ltd. 
46. Jaiprakash Associates Ltd. 
47. Jindal Steel & Power Ltd. 
48. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. 
49. Larsen & Toubro Ltd. 
50. M M T C Ltd. 
51. Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. 
52. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. 
53. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. 
54. N T P C Ltd. 
55. National Aluminium Co. Ltd. 
56. Nestle India Ltd. 
57. Oil & Natural Gas Corpn. Ltd. 
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58. Punjab National Bank 
59. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. 
60. Reliance Capital Ltd. 
61. Reliance Industries Ltd. 
62. Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. 
63. SesaGoaLtd. 
64. Siemens Ltd. 
65. State Bank Of India 
66. Steel Authority Of India Ltd. 
67. Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd. 
68. Sun Pharmaceutical Inds. Ltd. 
69. Sun Pharmaceutical Inds. Ltd. 
70. Tata Chemicals Ltd. 
71. Tata Communications Ltd. 
72. Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. 
73. Tata Motors Ltd. 
74. Tata Power Co. Ltd. 
75. Tata Steel Ltd. 
76. Tata Tea Ltd. 
77. Union Bank Of India 
78. Unitech Ltd. 
79. United Phosphorus Ltd. 
80. United Spirits Ltd. 
81. Wei spun-Gujarat Stahl Rohren Ltd. 
82. Wipro Ltd. 
83. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd 
2006 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
A B B Ltd 
A C C Ltd. 
Aban Offshore Ltd. 
Adani Enterprises Ltd. 
Aditya Birla Nuvo Ltd. 
Ambuja Cements Ltd. 
Ashok Leyland Ltd. 
Asian Paints Ltd. 
Axis Bank Ltd. 
Bank Of Baroda 
Bank Of India 
Bharat Forge Ltd. 
Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd, 
Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd 
Bharti Airtel Ltd. 
Cairn India Ltd. 
Century Textiles & Inds. Ltd. 
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18. CiplaLtd. 
19. Crompton Greaves Ltd. 
20. Divi'S Laboratories Ltd. 
21. Dr. Reddy'S Laboratories Ltd. 
22. Educomp Solutions Ltd. 
23. EssarOilLtd. 
24. Financial Technologies (India) Ltd. 
25. G A I L (India) Ltd. 
26. G M R Infrastructure Ltd. 
27. Glaxosmithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 
28. Glenmark Phannaceuticals Ltd. 
29. Grasim Industries Ltd. 
30. H C L Technologies Ltd. 
31. HDFCBankLtd. 
32. Hero Honda Motors Ltd. 
33. Hindalco Industries Ltd. 
34. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. 
35. Hindustan Unilever Ltd. 
36. Housing Development Finance Corpn. Ltd. 
37. I C I CI Bank Ltd. 
38. IDBTBankLtd. 
39. I T C Ltd. 
40. I V R C L Infrastructures & Projects Ltd. 
41. Idea Cellular Ltd. 
42. India Cements Ltd. 
43. Indiabulls Financial Services Ltd. 
44. Indian Hotels Co. Ltd. 
45. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. 
46. Infosys Technologies Ltd. 
47. Infrastructure Development Finance Co. Ltd. 
48. J S W Steel Ltd. 
49. Jaiprakash Associates Ltd. 
50. Jindal Steel & Power Ltd. 
51. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. 
52. Lars en & Toubro Ltd. 
53. MMTCLtd. 
54. Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. 
55. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. 
56. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. 
57. N M D C Ltd. 
58. NTPCLtd . 
59. National Aluminium Co. Ltd. 
60. Nestle India Ltd. 
61. Oil & Natural Gas Corpn. Ltd. 
62. Power Finance Corpn. Ltd. 
63. Punjab National Bank 
64. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. 
65. Reliance Capital Ltd. 
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66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
Reliance Communications Ltd. 
Reliance Industries Ltd. 
Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. 
Reliance Natural Resources Ltd. 
Sesa Goa Ltd. 
Siemens Ltd. 
State Bank Of India 
Steel Authority Of India Ltd. 
Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd. 
Sun Phannaceutical Inds. Ltd. 
Sun Pharmaceutical Inds. Ltd. 
Tata Chemicals Ltd. 
Tata Communications Ltd. 
Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. 
Tata Motors Ltd. 
Tata Power Co. Ltd. 
Tata Steel Ltd. 
Tata Tea Ltd. 
Torrent Power Ltd. 
Union Bank Of India 
Unitech Ltd. 
United Phosphorus Ltd. 
United Spirits Ltd. 
Welspun-Gujarat Stahl Rohren Ltd. 
Wipro Ltd. 
Zee Entertainment Enterprises 
2007 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
A B B Ltd 
A C C Ltd. 
Aban Offshore Ltd. 
Adani Enterprises Ltd. 
Aditya Birla Nuvo Ltd. 
Ambuja Cements Ltd. 
Ashok Leyland Ltd. 
Asian Paints Ltd. 
Axis Bank Ltd. 
Bank Of Baroda 
Bank Of India 
Bharat Forge Ltd. 
Bharat Heavy Electricals 
Bharat Petroleum Coipn. 
Bharti An1el Ltd. 
Century Textiles & Inds. 
Cipla Ltd. 
Ltd 
Ltd 
Ltd 
236 
18. Crompton Greaves Ltd. 
19. DLFLtd. 
20. Divi'S Laboratories Ltd. 
21. Dr. Reddy'S Laboratories Ltd. 
22. Educomp Solutions Ltd. 
23. EssarOilLtd. 
24. Financial Technologies (India) Ltd. 
25. G A I L (India) Ltd. 
26. G M R Infrastmcture Ltd. 
27. Glaxosmithkline Phamiaceuticals Ltd. 
28. Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 
29. Grasim Industries Ltd. 
30. H C L Technologies Ltd. 
31. HDFCBankLtd. 
32. Hero Honda Motors Ltd. 
33. Hindaico Industries Ltd. 
34. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. 
35. Hindustan Unilever Ltd. 
36. Housing Development & Infrastructure Ltd. 
37. Housing Development Finance Corpn. Ltd. 
38. I CI C I Bank Ltd. 
39. I D B I Bank Ltd. 
40. IT C Ltd. 
41. I V R C L Infrastructures & Projects Ltd. 
42. Idea Cellular Ltd. 
43. India Cements Ltd. 
44. IndiabuUs Financial Services Ltd. 
45. IndiabuUs Real Estate Ltd. 
46. Indian Hotels Co. Ltd. 
47. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. 
48. Infosys Technologies Ltd. 
49. Infrastructure Development Finance Co. Ltd. 
50. J S W Steel Ltd. 
51. Jaiprakash Associates Ltd. 
52. Jindal Steel & Power Ltd. 
53. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. 
54. Larsen & Toubro Ltd. 
55. M M T C Ltd. 
56. Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. 
57. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. 
58. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. 
59. Mundra Port & Special Economic Zone Ltd. 
60. N T P C Ltd. 
61. National Aluminium Co. Ltd. 
62. Nestle India Ltd. 
63. Oil & Natural Gas Coipn. Ltd. 
64. Power Finance Coipn. Ltd. 
65. Power Grid Corpn. Of India Ltd. 
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66. Punj Lloyd Ltd. 
67. Punjab National Bank 
68. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. 
69. Reliance Capital Ltd. 
70. Reliance Communications Ltd. 
71. Reliance Industries Ltd. 
72. Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. 
73. Reliance Natural Resources Ltd. 
74. Reliance Power Ltd. 
75. Sesa Goa Ltd. 
76. Siemens Ltd. 
77. State Bank Of India 
78. Steel Authority Of India Ltd. 
79. Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd. 
80. Sun Pharmaceutical Inds. Ltd. 
81. Sun Pharmaceutical Inds. Ltd. 
82. Tata Chemicals Ltd. 
83. Tata Communications Ltd. 
84. Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. 
85. Tata Motors Ltd. 
86. Tata Power Co. Ltd. 
87. Tata Steel Ltd. 
88. Tata Tea Ltd. 
89. Torrent Power Ltd. 
90. Union Bank Of India 
91. UnitechLtd. 
92. United Phosphorus Ltd. 
93. United Spirits Ltd. 
94. Welspun-Gujarat Stahl Rohren Ltd. 
95. Wipro Ltd. 
96. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd. 
2008 
1. A B B Ltd 
2. A C C Ltd. 
3. Aban Offshore Ltd. 
4. Adani Enterprises Ltd. 
5. Aditya Birla Nuvo Ltd. 
6. Ambuja Cements Ltd. 
7. Ashok Leyland Ltd. 
8. Asian Paints Ltd. 
9. Axis Bank Ltd. 
10. Bajaj Auto Ltd. 
11. Bajaj Finserv Ltd. 
12. BankOfBaroda 
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13. Bank Of India 
14. Bharat Forge Ltd. 
15. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. 
16. Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. 
17. Bharti Airtel Ltd. 
18. Cairn India Ltd. 
19. Century Textiles & Inds. Ltd. 
20. Cipla Ltd. 
21. Crompton Greaves Ltd. 
22. D L F Ltd. 
23. Divi'S Laboratories Ltd. 
24. Dr. Reddy'S Laboratories Ltd. 
25. Educomp Solutions Ltd. 
26. Essar Oil Ltd. 
27. Financial Technologies (India) Ltd. 
28. G A I L (India) Ltd. 
29. G M R Infrastructure Ltd. 
30. Glaxosmithkline Phannaceuticals Ltd. 
31. Glenmark Phannaceuticals Ltd. 
32. Grasim Industries Ltd. 
33. H C L Technologies Ltd. 
34. H D F C Bank Ltd. 
35. Hero Honda Motors Ltd. 
36. Hindaico Industries Ltd. 
37. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. 
38. Hindustan Unilever Ltd. 
39. Housing Development & Infrastructure Ltd. 
40. Housing Development Finance Corpn. Ltd. 
41. I C I C I Bank Ltd. 
42. I D B I Bank Ltd. 
43. ITCLtd. 
44. I V R C L Infrastructures & Projects Ltd. 
45. Idea Cellular Ltd. 
46. India Cements Ltd. 
47. Indiabulls Financial Services Ltd. 
48. Indiabulls Real Estate Ltd. 
49. Indian Hotels Co. Ltd. 
50. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. 
51. Infosys Technologies Ltd. 
52. Infrastructure Development Finance Co. Ltd. 
53. J S W Steel Ltd. 
54. Jaiprakash Associates Ltd. 
55. Jindal Steel & Power Ltd. 
56. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. 
57. Larsen & Toubro Ltd. 
58. M M T C Ltd. 
59. Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. 
60. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. 
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61. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. 
62. Mundra Port & Special Economic Zone Ltd. 
63. NMDCLtd . 
64. N T P C Ltd. 
65. National Aluminium Co. Ltd. 
66. Nestle India Ltd. 
67. Oil & Natural Gas Corpn. Ltd. 
68. Power Finance Corpn. Ltd. 
69. Power Grid Corpn. Of India Ltd. 
70. Punj Lloyd Ltd. 
71. Punjab National Bank 
72. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. 
73. Reliance Capital Ltd. 
74. Reliance Communications Ltd. 
75. Reliance Industries Ltd. 
76. Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. 
77. Reliance Natural Resources Ltd. 
78. Reliance Power Ltd. 
79. Sesa Goa Ltd. 
80. Siemens Ltd. 
81. State Bank Of India 
82. Steel Authority Of India Ltd. 
83. Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd. 
84. Sun Pharmaceutical Inds. Ltd. 
85. Sun Pharmaceutical Inds. Ltd. 
86. Tata Chemicals Ltd. 
87. Tata Communications Ltd. 
88. Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. 
89. Tata Motors Ltd. 
90. Tata Power Co. Ltd. 
91. Tata Steel Ltd. 
92. Tata Tea Ltd. 
93. Torrent Power Ltd. 
94. Union Bank Of India 
95. Unitech Ltd. 
96. United Phosphorus Ltd. 
97. United Spirits Ltd. 
98. Welspun-Gujarat Stahl Rohren Ltd. 
99. Wipro Ltd. 
100. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd. 
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